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ABSTRACT 
L0CAL AUTHORITY POLICIES; INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND·THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
CRISIS: AN EVALUATION OF·THE·FORMATION·AND·IMPACTS OF LOCAL-ECONOMIC 
1NrtfATIVES IN ct~VELAND 1963 - 1982 
Master of Arts Submission; Department of Geography, University of Durham 
There is a conspicuous absence in the literature on local authority 
economic policies of any wide searching analysis of local Government as 
an institution of the state and component of the overall State 
structure. This research on economic policy development in Cleveland 
has arisen from the need to undertake a more indepth critical approach 
to understanding the mechanisms of local economic policy formation in 
relation to State intervention in the economy. The major objectives of 
this research are: 
( 1) Analyse and evaluate State economic policy initiatives in the 
Teesside and Cleveland economy with particular emphasis upon the 
development of local government policies; 
(2) From the above analysis, identify central constraints upon the 
formation and implementation of policies and consider the underlying 
reasons for there being a gap between policy objectives and outcomes as 
well as the existence of conflicts and tensions which arise in the 
course of policy development. 
The Study concentrates upon two major components of local government 
economic policy: industrial land allocation (in relation to steel and 
chemicals), industrial estate provision and urban renewal in 
Middlesbrough - the latter two policies forming a central plank in 
achieving objectives for diversifying the local economy. 
After discussing the emergence of consensus policies about perceived 
problems and solutions the Thesis concentrates upon the impacts of these 
policies. These impacts can be identified in the restructuring 
operations of ICI and BSC which have been facilitated by local authority 
infrastructural provision 7 land management policies and Regional 
Development Grant expenditures. The Thesis argues that with the failure 
to attract new service and other types of v growth v industry to 
compensate for job losses in the base manufacturing industry the local 
economy is undergoing a severe structural crisis giving rise to 
unemployment rates the highest in mainland Britain. The current 
situation owes much to the forces of international competition and 
changes in the international division of labour in petro-chemical 
production 7 the mobility of capital and general responses to the crisis 
in profitability (in the case of BSC, crisis in financial structure). 
This crisis has sharpened the conflict of interests over policy 
objectives - between the environmental lobby, interests representing 
'capital intensive' industries, community groups 7 small businesses, 
central Government etc. The Thesis concludes by analysing how these 
developments raise critical questions about whether there is still a 
consensus around policy objectives and about the possibilities of local 
and central State economic planning. 
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PREFACE 
This study arises from personal experience in the field of employment 
policy making in a local authority. Since the mid 1970s a wide-ranging 
debate has emerged about the possibilities of local authority action in 
the field of economic development. It arose primarily from the fact 
that major urban economies were undergoing dramatic structural changes 
giving rise to high unemployment rates, declining job opportunities and 
increasing impoverishment of sections of the population. Policy 
responses have been in the area of tackling the symptons of decline 
rather than the cause. Thus the string of area-based initiatives 
originating from the Urban Programme (in 1968) culminated in 1978 with 
the Inner Urban Areas Act which, as well as providing the framework for 
inner areas policy making for local authorities, also outlined the scope 
and parameters in which local authorities could overtly intervene in 
local economies. 
The whole debate about local economic policy making has suffered from a 
number of problems which can briefly be outlined as follows: 
(i) That at the time local authorities were seen as playing a positive 
role in economic development, cut backs were being made in the 
base resource allocation; 
(ii) Analysis of local economic problems has tended to be bound up with 
spatial definition of such problems - exemplified in the analysis 
put forward in the various Inner Area Studies 
II 
(iii) There has been a general failure for local authorities to 
recognise the international character of production and exchange 
when attempting to attract industry, and its consequences for 
future investment and employment opportunities 
(iv) A conspicuous absence in the literature on local authority 
economic policies is any thorough analysis of local government as 
an agent of the State and a component of the overall State 
structure. Local employment planning has raised useful questions 
and issues about central/local relations - for example conflicts 
over central Government economic policies versus local economic 
priorities. This debate has, however, been limited to viewing 
central and local Government as bodies with an autonomy and 
neutrality which does not accord with day-to-day reality. 
During the past couple of years both local and central Government have 
been concerned with policy evaluation and looking into the impact of 
local economic policies. The framework and methodology of many 
evaluations contains the sorts of pitfalls outlined above. This 
research has arisen from the need to undertake a more in-depth and 
critical approach to understanding the mechanisms of local authority 
economic policy formation. 
The methodological issues raised in the field of policy evaluation are 
indeed complex and ·it was for this reason it was considered that a 
separate Chapter was required to elaborate upon the nature and role of 
the capitalist State as seen from a materialist perspective. 
III 
It is argued that the way one views the State and how its diverse and 
differing institutions operate in relation to the economy is crucial for 
any attempt at evaluating policies both in quantitative and qualitative 
fashion. Although there are a number of approaches and perspectives on 
the State this study adopts a materialist one because it overcomes many 
of the weaknesses which seem to be apparent in orthodox economic theory 
(ie micro economics: welfare economics). The main weaknesses of welfare 
economics seem to be that the State is often analysed in a way that is 
irrelevant or marginal to economic theory and that a separate autonomous 
theory needs to be constructed to explain State activity. Even this 
theory often treats the State as a subject comparable to a firm or 
household, or as a set of neutral policy instruments applicable to 
various economic goals, or as the private property of rational, 
maximising, self interested political actors. As Jessop ( 1977: p 370) 
observes in an important essay on this subject, orthodox theories 
illuminate certain aspects of the State but only in a superficial way 
and lack any theoretical means to explore the deeper connections 
between the state and economic development. Not only do in-depth 
theoretical debates draw out the apparent weakness of orthodox 
approaches, but so, too, do detailed studies of concrete policy 
This study, by examining certain policies at the levels of formulation 
and implementation, hopefully contributes to an understanding of the 
role and actions of State intervention. 
IV 
The motivation behind this study also stems from the current economic 
and political crisis which is raising urgent questions for local 
government policy makers. The choice of Teesside as a case study was 
made because of the role of local Government and other state agencies 
play in economic development, itself a reflection of the almost unique 
character of the local economy. 
of major conurbations in the 
The area does not typify the economies 
UK in terms of depressed rates of 
investment, de-industrialisation and so on. Instead, Teesside has been 
characterised by industries renowned for their national and 
international economic importance and achievement in technological 
innovations. Although there are aspects which make Teesside stand out 
from other areas, some of the underlying processes and dynamics of 
change are common to other major industrial areas in Western Europe. 
The research has involved an analysis of various policy instruments used 
by local authorities. Their apparent failure is highlighted in the 
study - future employment prospects for the Teesside economy are indeed 
bleak. It has been beyond the scope of the thesis to suggest 
alternative policies but the need for radical change is nevertheless a 
major underlying theme. 
CHAPTER 1 
AN INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO STATE INTERVENTION IN TEESSIDE 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Since 1979 a number of policy documents have been published by 
Cleveland County Council expressing concern about the decline in the 
local economy and growth of unemployment in the County. There are two 
explanations given for these changes; the first is the susceptiblity of 
major industrial concerns to cyclical fluctuations in the economy, 
exacerbated by the effects of the recession, while the second factor 
relates to what are described as "long term local issues" such as the 
effects of high levels of investment in new technology in so-called 
'capital intensive' industries. This second aspect is summarised as 
follows: 
nThese unemployment problems which have been felt for a long 
period in Hartlepool, have their roots in the high levels of 
capital investment in Cleveland's base manufacturing 
industries. This essential modernisation and re-structuring 
has led to massive job losses over the years without the 
compensations of sufficient alternative employment 
opportunities in light manufacturing and the service 
sector ... It must be emphasised that the problems of the County 
are not those believed to typify a depressed area such as low 
productivity, lack of competitiveness, poor industrial 
relations or low levels of industrial investment. On all 
accounts Cleveland's industry has set high standards recognised 
world wide. It is a centre of economic growth of significant 
importance to the whole of the national economy.n 
(Cleveland County Council, 1980, p 1) 
Whether Cleveland's industrial international reputation is what the 
County Council claims it to be is perhaps open to debate, but there are 
characteristics of industrial change in the area which contrast with the 
The text refers to both Cleveland and Teesside. Teesside comprises 
the major industrial conurbation within the County of Cleveland. See 
Map in Appendix 1. 
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rest of the Northern Region. The level of investment in chemicals, oil 
and metal manufacture - industries which dominate the local ecomony -
has been above the national average, a significant component comprising 
State expenditures: the largest proportion of Regional Development 
Grants allocated to the Northern Region went to Cleveland throughout the 
1970s. In the period from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, marked increases 
in labour productivity were recorded in chemicals, construction and 
metal industries. At the same time, employment declined sharply in 
these industries towards the late 1970s. (Cleveland County Council 1980, 
1981 ) 
The above described trends raise a fundamental question about the 
role and effectiveness of State intervention. The primary focus of 
attention in this study will be on the nature and role of local economic 
policy formation, with particular reference to the Steel and Chemicals 
industries, and on urban renewal. By way of providing an introduction 
and context this chapter will look at the historical development of 
policies in the area, followed by an analysis of some of the wider 
features of State intervention in the post-war economy which have had 
particular consequences for the development of the Steel and Chemical 
industries. The chapter will conclude by outlining the framework and 
structure of the study. 
1.2 A historical overview of policy initiatives in Teesside 
Since the latter part of the 19th Century Teesside has been a focal 
point of growth in iron and steel, heavy engineering and, from the 
3 
inter-war period, chemicals, in the Northern Region. .Traditional 
explanations of Teesside' s economic problems have focussed on its over 
dependence upon these industries. As these industries have been geared 
to exports and overseas markets, they have been susceptible to changing 
pat terns of world trade and increasing international competition (see 
North, 1975; Chapter 5). Although the development of ICI after its 
formation in 1926 was undoubtedly a boost for employment and investment 
growth in the area, it did not alleviate the overall effects of 
rationalisation in employment in the base industries. In the early 
1930s about a third of the insured labour force was connected with iron 
and steel production, heavy engineering and shipbuilding, and if the 
chemicals industry is included, then 'heavy industry' provided 
employment for nearly half of the working population. 
State initiatives in Teesside cannot be isolated from prescribed 
solutions for the North East region. The Region as a whole suffered the 
effects of rationalisation in 'traditional' industries such as coal 
mining, ship building etc. which not only produced U."lemployment on a 
mass scale but also considerable hostility from the trade union movement 
(Carney and Hudson, 1978; p 5). After 1926 Labour Transference Schemes 
were promoted as a means of moving unemployed people to areas where 
there was work in the more prosperous regions such as the South East, 
and the agricultural land settlement scheme was established. The former 
policy not only failed in its objective but facilitated in creaming off 
the skilled labour from the region and reducing the supply of such 
labour available when expansion in production was to take place (as it 
did prior to the Second World War- Carney and Hudson, 1978, p 6). 
Between 1934-37 central Government established a number of new 
initiatives in response to pressures from various interest groups 
4 
representing both the labour movement and industrialists. The basic 
problem was seen as an over dependency upon a narrow range of industries 
and a marked lack of growth in the consumption goods industries which 
were the main source of growth in employment and investment in 
manufacturing in the South East. The Commissioner for the Special Areas 
in England and Wales consolidated policies under the Special Areas Act 
which enabled financial assistance towards infrastructural schemes such 
as harbours and road communications to be implemented. In 1936, the 
Special Areas Reconstruction Assoc'iation was formed which had powers to 
make loans to new firms and in 1937 the Special Areas Amendment Act gave 
the Treasury powers to make loans to industrial firms and to pay for a 
limited period all or part of the rent, rates or income tax of firms 
setting up in the area (North, ibid, p 74). 
In parallel with the formation of the above regional development 
policies, new institutional arrangements were made as a means of 
providing a mechanism for their implementation. They also provided a 
forum for promoting the interests of the region and mobilising support 
for a more radical comprehensive regional planning strategy. 
In 1935 the North East Regional Development Board (NEDB) was 
established which incorporated a variety of sub-regional development 
boards, local authorities, industrial associations and trade union 
bodies. Carney and Hudson (1974, 1978) argue that through the 
development boards an alliance of interests was formed around consensus 
politics about the nature of under-development in the North East and the 
necessary solutions to such problems. The policies adopted which were 
contained in the Minutes of Evidence to the Royal Commission on the 
Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population (1939) comprised 
three main elements: 
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1) Publicity campaigns and promotion of the area in terms of facilities 
for industrial expansion; 
2) Support of expansion of existing industries; 
3) Attraction of new labour intensive industries to the region. 
Represented on the NEDB was the Tees District Development Board 
which was formed in 1931. This Board throughout the 1930s was not only 
influential in the NEDB's thinking but placed special emphasis upon the 
role of infrastructural modernisation and development of Trading 
Estates. ·In a letter to the 'Times' the then Secretary of the Board 
argued that Trading Estates and Advance Factories could play a key role 
in attracting industry to the area: 
"The trading estates have proved successful in many ways. It 
has shown how industry can be carried on in heal thy, pleasing 
surroundings, enabling town planning to proceed on 'garden 
city' lines, and I consider that this is the way in which light 
industrial deve.lopment will continue. The need for these 
trading estates in the older areas is, in my opinion, 
definitely proven. To establish them would provide employment 
and bring into existence useful assets." 
(Cited in North, 1975: p 76). 
In the post-war period the North East region experienced a period of 
relative prosperity and full employment until the late 1950s when an 
economic recession created similar responses as occurred in the 1930s; 
ie. labour shedding as demand contracted, and in some cases capacity 
cuts in coal and shipbuilding were implemented (Hudson, 1980; pp8-9) 
In 196 3 a White Paper on the North East was published ( Cmnd 2206 
commonly known as the Hail sham Report) formulating a regional planning 
strategy which was geared to massive outlays of public investment in 
6 
urban development, infrastructure, industrial estates, roads etc. The 
purpose of this strategy was to modernise the environment and stimulate 
overall employment diversification in the region. The implication of 
this package of policies for Teesside was that the area was designated 
as part of a larger 'growth zone' extending from Tyneside in the North 
to the Tees in the South with the A1 route forming the western boundary. 
One important aspect of the lihite Paper was the establishment of 
comprehensive urban planning for the Tees side area which would provide 
the guidelines for the implementation of modernisation policies. For 
Tees side this included the renewal of Middlesbrough town centre, the 
reclamation of derelict industrial land, (plus the opening up of the 
Teesmouth area to capital intensive industries), the construction of 
industrial estates and the creation of a new road system to improve 
access to industrial and residential areas. (See Chapter 4 for a 
detailed account of urban and regional planning strategies for 
Tees side.) 
An important feature of the planning strategy as incorporated in the 
Teesside Survey and Plan in 1965 was the sensitivity of policies to the 
needs of the Chemicals a~d Steel concerns. Employment projections took 
account of the fact that these industries would, in the future, base 
their strategies upon labour shedding. The strategic importance of 
Teesside for the national economy was re-affirmed in the regional policy 
document produced by the Northern Economic Planning Council 
(N.E.P.C.,1965). Teesside would be the focal point of investment in new 
technology in the steel and chemical industries with much of the finance 
for this investment being supplied by central Government, and the port 
was to be somewhat upgraded, making Teesside into one of Britain's major 
ports and industrial complexes. Policies for the region did not differ 
fundamentally from those evolved in the 1930s. The main difference was 
7 
the increasing role of the State in terms of responsiblity for promoting 
economic development. These responsibilities were not only confined to 
infrastuctural and social investment but also to industrial 
regeneration. 
1.3 Capitalist productionp economic development and the State 
In historical materialist approaches (see 1. 6 for a fuller 
definition) capital ism as a mode of production is characterised 
(inter-alia) by; 
(a) the production of commodities for exchange on the market, 
(b) a capitalist class which owns the means of production, 
(c) the existence of competition for a share of the market. 
The purpose of production is for private profit and the capitalists 
appropriate the surplus generated in production. They begin with a sum 
of money (M) with which they purchase the means of production and labour 
power to be put to work to produce commodities in the expectation that 
when they are sold they will realise a sum of money (M' ) which exceeds 
the total cost of commodities originally purchased. This surplus (M'-M) 
can be consumed by the capitalist or re-invested to buy more means of 
production and labour power in the quest for increasing profits. The 
accumulation of capital arises because it is in the self interest of 
capitalists to expand profits and because the existence of competition 
means that capitalists who do not invest and increase efficiency of 
production will lose out in their share of the market to those who do. 
Competition therefore influences the actions of individual units of 
capital and thus influences the overall character of accumulation or 
8 
economic development. 
The capital advanced during a production period may be divided into 
constant and variable capital. Variable capital is the sum of exchange 
values of the commodities that enter into the reproduction of labour 
power. It is the exchange value equivalent of the wage bill. Constant 
capital is the sum expended on circulating and fixed capital. The 
former comprises raw materials and the latter buildings, plant and 
machinery. 
It is important to note that, when discussing the movement of 
capital in general and the general rate of profit, the analysis is in 
terms of value, but when focussing on the action of individual capitals 
and rates of profits, the discussion relates to profits as rates 
expresse:d in prices (Mandel 1975: Chapter 3). There are a number of 
ways in which the rate of profit can be influenced: a change in the 
price of goods entering the reproduction of labour powe.r (i.e. 
consumption goods), changes in the price of fixed and circulating 
capital and in the rate at which the surplus value is produced through 
changes in the labour process - methods of production, intensity of 
work, length of working day. 
Uneven development within the capitalist economy arises due to the 
uneven growth of individual units of capital - i.e. differentiation in 
the rate and mass of profits produced as a result of changes in the 
overall relations of production as outlined above. Increases in the 
prices of all the elements which go into the production process (or some 
of them) can depress the rate of profit and reduce the rate of 
accumulation. There are three inter-related ways in which a crisis 
occur. 
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1) Overproduction may arise relative to effective demand, i.e. a point 
in time is reached when the commodities produced are unsaleable. 
The response will be to cut back production, which will affect other 
branches/departments of the economy; 
2) Accumulation will reach a point when the demand for labour will 
outstrip supply. The bargaining strength of labour may increase and 
thus push up the price of labour power. The rate of accumulation 
will slow down as profit levels are eroded and when the rate of 
growth in wages exceeds productivity; 
3) As competition for markets increases, individual capitals will adopt 
more efficient methods of production in order to reduce overall 
production costs. This can involve the introduction of more 
technologically advanced labour~saving means of production and thus 
increasing the proportion of means of production to labour. As it 
is labour power which produces the 'social surplus' (and thus 
profit), a diminishing quantity of labour in production can mean a 
possible overall decrease in the mass of surplus produced. 
There are counteracting influences to these crisis tendencies such 
as a cheapening in the elements which comprise the reproduction of 
labour (increasing productivity in consumption goods industries), a 
reduction in the price of constant capital - both fixed and circulating 
- through the same process in means of production industries, or a 
decrease in the labour time involved in production needed to reproduce 
the wage. Counteracting influences as such are inextricably tied up 
with the capital accumulation process, but nevertheless underlying 
trends towards crisis and instability exist, and at certain historical 
moments will predominate. 
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The dominant relation in society is the capital-wage labour 
relation. The State has an essential role in maintaining this 
relationship and securing the pre-conditions for sustained accumulation. 
The laws of motion of capitalist development generate certain 
requirements for State action although at the same time barriers will be 
created limiting the ability of the state to pursue policies that are in 
harmony with the interests of capital in general (or sections of 
capital). The capitalist State reflects the nature of such a society -
those who control the means of production also have a decisive influence 
over the directions and forms of state intervention. In this con text 
the state regulates capital ism on behalf of the capitalist class. 
Changing conditions of capital accumulation (i.e. profitability for 
those who own the means of production) - reflect also changes in the 
nature of class struggle and politics. Consequently the changing nature 
of State intervention will mirror overall changes occurring in society. 
Post-war accumulation in advanced capitalist countries involved the 
following characteristics: 
(1) Concentration and centralisation becoming a more predominant feature 
of economic change: profitable production increasingly involved 
economies of scale and a higher rate of investment in fixed constant 
capital than in labour. This aspect of accumulation is referred to 
as the concentration of capital because it means that capital is 
concentrated in .fewer hands. Centralisation is related but rather 
than creating new capital, existing capitals merge together to 
benefit from scale economies and increased financial resources for 
further profitable investment (see Prais, 1976 and Jacquemin and de 
Jong, 1977); 
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(2) Surplus profits and 9 technological rents 9 (Mandel, 1975: Chapter 3): 
the pursuit of surplus profits and technological rents is 
inextricably bound up with the concentration and centralisation of 
capital. The quest for surplus profits manifests itself in the 
sphere of competition, where many different capitals are competing 
with each other for the total social surplus, and arises from 
barriers of entry for capital due to monopolisation of production 
and the use of technological innovations (Marx 1969:p 644). 
(3) Post-war internationalisation of production, concentration and 
centralisation has been associated with the growth of multi-national 
companies. Multi-nationals are enterprises which own and control 
assets in more than one nation. As capital accumulation transcends 
national boundaries, then the search for reduced costs and 
increasing profitability will be made world wide. The progressive 
development of the productive forces implies that national 
boundaries and economies are an inadequate basis for continued 
profitable accumulation. The large volume of capital needed and the 
amount of output required to minimise costs of production 
necessitates a world market to be safeguarded, and expanded and a 
world division of labour to seek out specific locations advantageous 
to specific phases of the production process (Campbell, 1981, p 150, 
Mandel, 1975 Chapters 2, 3 and 10; Labour Party, 1977). 
(4) Increasing role of the State in the economy involving the creation 
of the welfare state: general infrastructural provision, 
nationalisation and direct aid to industry. 
1.4 The UK economy and the post war British State 
The post-war boom involved an overall expansion in most industries 
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and sectors of the economy until the late 1950s. However, expansion in 
output and employment tended to overshadow some of the inherent 
structural problems and weaknesses of Britain's manufacturing industry. 
A number of studies (Jessop; 1981, Hobsbawm, 1969; Gough, 1981; Glyn and 
Sutcliffe, 1972; Glyn and Harrison, 1980) argue that the relatively slow 
growth of accumula t·ion in the UK compared with other advanced capitalist 
countries can be attributed to an inter-play of the following: (a) 
highly organised labour movement which held a strong wage bargaining 
position; (b) slow rate of introduction of new production processes and 
technological innovations; (c) slower than average increases in rates 
of productivity; (d) reliance upon traditional overseas markets and 
'invisible' earnings rather t~an concentrating upon increasing 
efficiency in the realm of production. 
weaknesses are shown in Table 1. 
Indicators of these structural 
State intervention in the post-war period according to Gough (1981: 
p 122) and Jessop (1981) only·served to reinforce problems of the growth 
and development. 
was limited to 
In the immediate post-war period economic intervention 
'demand management' (expansion of the welfare state) , 
control and regulation of exchange and interest rates and 
nationalisation of industries involved with infrastructure provision. 
In other words, problems of production were left untouched. As public 
expenditure growth was at a faster rate than accumulation, this tended 
to create inflationary pressures and fiscal problems due to the limited 
scope for further financing of state expenditures (Yaffe, 1973) . 
The recession in 1958 required a fundamental shift in state 
intervention in order to stem the decline in profitability and 
strengthen the competitive position of British industry. In the early 
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1960s there was a move towards industrial rationalisation and economic 
planning via the formation of National Plans and thus a more active 
interventionist structural policy. This entailed restructuring of the 
State itself to create or modify institutions which could implement such 
a policy. In the mid to late 1960s the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation and the National Plan were established with specific tasks 
of encouraging modernisation of production in identified growth 
industries. This included intervention to rescue 'lame ducks 9 which 
were of fundamental importance to national/international accumulation. 
Associated and intergrated with economic planning were efforts to deal 
with issues of industrial location and counteract uneven development by 
incorporating spatial policies with economic development policies; to 
accounting for the large proportion of state regional expenditures being 
allocated to certain key industries (Dunford et al, 1980). 
1.5 The Development of the Steel and Chemical Industries 
Considerable changes were to take place in the UK's steel and 
chemicals industries in the period after 1945. The motive force behind 
these changes was the imperative for increasing the rate of accumulation 
by reducing the price of circulating constant capital (i.e. raw 
materials). In Britain this was one of the few options open for 
increasing the general rate of profit in manufacturing industry due to 
the difficulties in holding down the price of labour. Another factor 
was the restructuring of the world market and the possibilities of 
technological innovation outweighing the advantages of cheap labour in 
the production and extraction of raw materials. In addition political 
and social instability associated with the de-colonisation process after 
the Korean War made it more of an imperative to transfer production from 
colonial to metropolitan countries. Finally, the post-war boom and the 
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increasing demand for both capital and consumer goods guaranteed an 
expanding market for raw material producers (Mandel, 1975). 
These dynamics 
industries. The 
had differing impacts on the Steel and Chemicals 
Steel industry mirrored more or less overall 
developments in UK manufacturing industry. It was characterised by a 
proliferation of small and medium sized firms operating with outdated 
equipment (McEachern, 1979). There was resistance to State intervention 
in production (i.e. nationalisation) by the Steel producers, and in the 
early 1950s they aggressively pursued their own National Development 
Plan for the industry. The central philosophy of the plan was to 
"insulate producers from the full effects of their inefficiency as they 
guaranteed all producers a share of the markets and the industry's 
profits." (McEachern, 1979: p 130) 
Expansion in demand and output led to increased profits, but 
structural problems pervaded the industry and were quick to surface 
during the recession in 1958. There were two main elements to these 
problems; first, the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of production 
led to a tendency towards excess finished steel capacity when there was 
a drop in demand . Secondly, specialisation was continued in certain 
geographical areas and did not guarantee that production would meet a 
corresponding demand for different types and quantities of steel (Heal, 
1974). 
The performance of the Chemicals industry (especially organics and 
inorganics) constrasted sharply with Steel. The industry was not immune 
to international competition which was a major reason for high rates of 
investment in technological innovations. Table 2 compares the 
performance of the Chemicals sector in Western Europe with the rest of 
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manufacturing industry in terms of output, employment and productivity. 
There were strong increases in all these components which partly 
reflects the increasing concentration of fixed capital investments and 
advances made in the exploitation of new technology (Hudson, 1981a). 
There was also the impetus to introduce innovations in the production of 
intermediate commodities such as ammonia (fertilisers), methane (perspex 
and plastics) and methanol (household products) (Allen, 1970). 
Two complementary trends occured in the structure of the industry: 
internationalisation and monopolisation of production. 
In tern a tionalisa tion was an outcome of firms seeking profitable 
locations and markets world wide. ICI, Hoescht and Monsanto for example 
had major operations established in Western Europe and in the USA by the 
early 1960s. Monopolisation arose as a result of individual company's 
ability to take advantage of technological rents and their capacity to 
implement vast fixed capital investment programmes which few other 
companies were capable of achieving. ICI, for example, had attained the 
position by the mid 1960's as Britain's virtual sole producer of 
polyester (Shaw, 1981: p 211). State involvement in the Chemicals 
industry was restricted mainly to subsidies to Research and Development, 
al t'hough patent rights, tariffs and licensing agreements tended to 
reinforce barriers to entry in the industry. 
The second phase in the development of the UK economy during the 
post war period following the 1958 recession was characterised by 
sharper and significantly deeper fluctuations in the industrial cycle 
which dramatically changed the structure of the steel industry whilst 
accelerating existing trends occurring in chemicals. 
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The 1958 recession brought about a fall in profitability in the 
Steel industry - trading profits after depreciation in the fourteen 
companies \vhich were to be nationalised declined from £104 million in 
1960 to £23 million in 1967 (Heal, 197 4: p 107). The response to the 
profits squeeze was a centralisation of production through mergers and 
cut backs in employment (Table 3 shows employment change in Metal 
Manufacture, which broadly represents the Steel industry). The 
introduction of the Basic Oxygen Process in steel making reflected 
attempts to utilize technological innovations on an increasing scale. 
By the early 1960s most firms in the industry were using this process 
(Table 3). Another change induced by pressure from international 
competition was the move towards intergrated steel works concentrated in 
coastal areas. Intergrated production complexes had advantages in 
economies of scale and access to port facilities for imported cheaper 
foreign ore. This latter factor involved substantial savings in 
transport costs. The Port Talbot Works in South Wales, one of Britain's 
first modern intergrated works, exemplified the advantages of this 
aspect of restructuring in the industry in its achievements in higher 
than average rates of productivity and lower unit production costs 
(Heal, 1974). 
All these changes were, however, occurring too slow to restore the 
industry on a profitable and competitive footing. The return of the 
Labour Government in 1964 presented favourable political conditions for 
the formulation of nationalisation plans for the industry. This was 
because there was a commitment by the Wilson Government to induce 
greater competitiveness in the manufacturing sector through the 
promotion of technological investment and National Economic Planning 
(Jessop, 1981: pp 38 - 47). Nationalisation and the formation of the 
British Steel Corporation made it possible to rationalise and 
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restructure the industry on a comprehensive scale. 
In the 1960s, international competition and fluctuations in demand 
for chemical products led to further moves towards concentration of 
production, acceleration in the introduction of technical innovations 
and the consolidation of planned production on an international scale 
(Allen, 1970: p 23). Hudson (1981a) argues that these developments in 
the petro-chemicals industry led to larger scale production complexes 
and investment in increased capacity as a means of reducing overall 
unit costs of production. In this period the role of the State in 
support of restructuring in the Chemicals industry became more 
significant. Infrastructural investment facilitated the location and 
development of petro-chemical complexes. In the early 1970s state aid 
was of a direct nature through the writing-off of fixed capital 
investment by allocating subsidies under the 1972 Industry Act. 
Internationalisation of production meant that profitable conditions were 
provided by different national states and the relative advantage of 
different state policies to petro-chemical branches became more 
important when competitive pressures intensified during the late 1970s 
(Hudson 1981a). 
There are distinct parallels in the development of steel and 
chemicals especially during the 1960s. Both industries were seen as 
important for national growth prospects and were thus a priority in any 
national industrial strategy. Both sought economies of scale in order 
to decrease unit costs of production and, in the period following the 
late 1950s, were subject to considerable technical innovations. 
Production has increasingly become concentrated in larger integrated 
complexes comprising inter-linked production processes. State 
intervention supported these developments by providing the locational 
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requirements of production (land; roads etc) and subsidising fixed 
capital investment. The pattern of industrial change in Cleveland can 
therefore be understood in terms of these key factors underlying 
restructuring in both industries. 
1.6 Issues for policy research 
The purpose of this introductory analysis of policy initiatives in 
Teesside and the development· of the post-war economy and steel and 
chemicals industries has been to: 
(1) Provide a background and context for understanding contemporary 
developments in the Teesside economy. 
( 2) Clarify and identify some of the major processes and problema tics 
relating to policy formation. 
As outlined above, the central feature of the state strategy in 
respect of Teesside has been to provide active support for industrial 
rationalisation in steel and chemicals and in parallel create a more 
diversified economic base. This stategy has led to the emergence of a 
number of conflicts in terms of policy priorities, principally the 
tension between supporting the bias towards 'capital intensive' 
industries and the creation of a balanced employment structure. 
With the awareness within local government that the implementation 
of these policies was going to have a considerable effect upon social 
and economic life in Teesside, it was recommended by local government 
officers and politicians that an evaluation of the social consequences 
of policies should be made. The North East Area Study of Durham 
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University was commissioned to undertake such a study, and the results 
were published in 1975. The conclusions and recommendations were 
particularly controversial. The main thrust of the arguments made in 
the Report were that the formulation of policies in Teesside and the 
North East were based upon a consensus about the nature of the problem 
and required solutions but reflected pressures on central and local 
Government exerted by powerful interest groups to guarantee vast amounts 
rof public expenditure in order to continue their operations. These 
interest groups in this period included the road lobby (influencing the 
road and town centre programmes), the property lobby (affecting central 
area renewal) and the lobby from chemical industries (for guaranteeing 
supplies of industrial land and infrastructure). The overall impact of 
these policies diverged considerably from the goals as set down in the 
Structure Plan about creating balanced employment opportunities and 
redistribution of welfare provision. The Study outlines the inherent 
barriers which make policies geared to social reform difficult to 
implement: 
11 ( i) As we have pointed out, past policies, especially in the 
form of a statutory document, form a considerable barrier to 
change. Many interests within local authorities have a stake 
in perpetuating grossly obsolete policies. 
(ii) The politics of modernisation has served the most 
powerful and articulate interests in Teeside. The politics 
of social reform would serve the least articulate and 
moreover would often come in to conflict with powerful 
interests (over pollution information disclosure for 
instance). 
(iii) If only one local authority pursues the politics of 
social reform then capital will simply shift elsewhere. As 
long as relatively disadvantaged local authorities continue 
to be divided the pursuit of the politics of social reform 
will be extremely restricted."(N.E.A.S. 1975: p 335) 
In 1979, a Monitoring Report was published by the County Council 
which, although using a different approach to policy evaluation, 
expressed similar disquiet about the intentions and impacts existing 
policies. For example: 
11 The structure plans aim to diversify the Countyv s economic 
base by attracting light manufacturing industry and service 
jobs whilst at the same time they encourage the growth of 
capital intensive industry by zoning 2,000 acres of land for 
further growth. Are these two things incompatible, or can 
they both realistically be pursued side by side? If they are 
not realistically compatible (and merely including them both 
in the same document does not make them so) then upon what 
should we concentrate?" (Cleveland County Council 1979: p 27) 
1.7 Objectives and method of study 
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This brief introduction to the Teesside economy and history of 
policies pursued by the State raises a number of issues and questions 
which will provide the focus of this study: 
(i) What are the processes which give rise to the conflicts in 
policies and interests identified above? 
(ii) How are these 9onflicts and tensions resolved by these 
policy initiatives and what limitations are imposed on such 
resolutions? 
(iii) Despite a long tradition in formulating similar policies for 
diversifying the economic base and tackling unemployment 
problems, and the fact that the original expectations of 
these policies have apparently not been realised why is the 
same pattern of initiatives still being pursued? 
( iv) Following from this, why has there been a consistent gap 
between intentions and outcome? 
These four questions, which are fundamentally inter-related, provide 
the themes of this research the purpose of which is to: 
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(1) Analyse and evaluate state economic policy intervention in the 
Teesside economy with particular emphasis upon the development of 
local government policies; 
(2) From such an analysis, identify the central constraints upon the 
formation and implementation of policies. 
The study will concentrate upon two major components of local 
government economic policy: industrial land allocation and the 
development of Middlesbrough as a sub-regional centre. 
1.8 Framework for policy evaluation 
In 1.3 an historical materialist approach was suggested as a method 
of understanding economic and political change and the role of the State 
in the post-war period. Such an approach can be considered to have a 
number of merits because: 
(a) It is founded on the specific qualities of capitalism as a mode of 
production; 
(b) It attributes a central role to class struggle in the process of 
capital accumulation; 
(c) It establishes the relations between political and economic features 
of society without reducing one to the other or treating them as 
totally independent and autonomous; 
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(d) It allows for historical and national differences in the forms and 
functions of the State in capitalist societies; 
(e) It allows for the influence of non capitalist classes and non-class 
forces in determining the nature of the state and the exercise of 
state power. (See Jessop, 1977) 
A mode of production comprises the forces of production (technical 
ability and capacity to produce) and relations of production (the way 
production is organised and the relations between those involved in the 
production process). Whatever forms the appropriation of the surplus 
takes in a mode of production, they are associated with different 
relations of production. which are expressed as class relations, 
relations between groups of people who have a different relationship to 
the means of production. Some will have access to the surplus whilst 
others will not. A class is thus a stratum of society grouped in 
accordance with its relationship to the production process. Under 
capitalism this relationship is defined by those who own the means of 
production and those who do not. 
The importance and relevance of an historical materialist approach 
is two fold: first, that it helps to reveal how class relationships are 
both social and economic and are historically specific to the particular 
mode of production. Secondly, it explains how social change is heavily 
influenced by the economic base of society. It is this framework which 
enables an understanding of different levels of State activity - from 
the most general features of State intervention in a given period to the 
precise effects and impacts of particular policy instruments at one 
moment in time. At the same time the inter-relationship between the two 
levels of analysis can be discerned. The importance of this approach, 
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as Jessop ( 1977) explains, is that the capitalist state takes on a 
central role in the capital accumulation process. 
1.9 Structure and focus of the study 
As the nature of State intervention and the problematic and 
contradictory aspect of state policy formation is the central focus of 
study, then the next chapter (Chapter 2) will be concerned with an 
analysis of the functions of the capitalist state and the major 
limitations placed upon state action. Chapter 3 will develop upon the 
analysis made here on the development of the post war economy and steel 
and chemicals by looking at the trends in restructuring in the Cleveland 
economy, and in the operations of ICI and British Steel. This chapter 
will consider some of the different aspects of state intervention in the 
local economy. Chapter 4 discusses in some detail the role of regional 
and urban planning policies since the early 1960s. This will involve a 
detailed account of the formulation of regional modernisation and 
consensus policies and how they provided the framework for urban policy 
planning as undertaken by local authorities in Teesside (and 
subsequently Cleveland). This is followed by a discussion on the 'local 
state' and some general changes which took place in local institutions 
during the 1960s with particular reference to the development of 
corporate structure planning. (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 concentrates upon 
the implementation of policies relating to industrial 
land/infrastructure and town centre redevelopment. Chapter 7 is devoted 
to a critical evaluation of these policies in light of the general 
theoretical perspective on the state outlined earlier. This chapter 
will consider how the impact of policies has created contradictory and 
conflicting results in the form of a questioning and opposition to 
traditional policies. This questioning is centred around the inability 
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of policies to come to terms with a problem of growing unemployment as 
well as the increasing concern over the environmental hazards created by 
pollutant industries. Chapter 8 brings the analysis up to date by 
providing a brief summary of recent trends in the local economy and 
prospects for the future. This analysis in many ways covers the effects 
of policy implementation as well as posing questions about the 
possibility of state action in resolving local economic problems. 
Chapter 9 concludes with some comments on recent economic policy 
initiatives made by the County Council. Some of the major constraints 
and limitations as well as possibilities of local economic initiatives 
will be analysed. Reference will be made to studies of other port areas 
in Western Europe, and the fact that the growth and development of 
Teesside is not a unique phenomenon in the context of international 
capitalist development during the 1960s and '70s. Certain issues will 
be raised about the dynamics of State action and some of the general 
constraints and barriers emerging for policy resolutions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, an account has been given of the increasing 
role of the UK State in the post-war period. It has been established 
that in this period the State played a vital role in the development of 
the economy, and that the necessary pre-conditions for accumulation 
required increased interventions-illustrated in the analysis of the role 
of the State in the Steel and Chemicals industries. The case of 
nationalisation of the Steel industry shows that in the interests of 
'capital in general' the State will take over responsibility for 
production in an industry experiencing declining profitability. The 
purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical perspective which 
will provide insights into the changing nature and role of the 
capitalist State and the central problematics relating to State policy 
formation. 
2.2 Concept of the State 
Offe (1975 pp 126-7), in his discussion on the form and nature of 
the State, considers there to be four elements to a definition of the 
capitalist State: 
(a) Capital accumulation takes place only in private accumulating 
units with the goal of profitability as the main purpose for 
production (ie. production for exchange value). In this sense 
the state and accumulation are divorced from each other. 
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(b) The State can mandate or authorise the creation of conditions 
which will sustain accumulation. Different elements will pose 
threats to social and economic stability such as international 
competition or working class struggle which will necessitate 
State action. Such action will be at different levels at the 
level of the unit of accumulation (firm), industry and region. 
(c) The "power relationship" of the State will depend upon the 
conditions of accumulation. The State, in terms of its 
expenditure responsibilities and obligations, will rely on 
accumulation for its source of income through taxation from 
wages and profits. The imperatives for maintaining conditions 
of stability for accumulation are incorporated into policy 
formulation, although the pursuance of certain interests, 
taken in isolation, may have little to do with the overall 
accumulation process. 
(d) An important aspect of State policy formulation and 
implementation is the means by which the State can function 
without projecting its image (despite the often precarious and 
unstable relationship between the State and the accumulation 
process) as a capitalist State. In other words, recognising 
the class character of capitalist society and that State 
policies will serve ruling class (or sections of it) 
interests, the problem lies in the ability of the State to 
convey an image of an organising power that pursues common and 
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general interests of society as a whole. The State attempts 
to achieve this through ideology and attain legitimacy "by 
appealing to symbols and sources of support that conceal its 
nature which play an important part in the maintenance of 
State power relationships and overall capitalist social 
relations" (Offe 1976: p 127; see also Habermas 1976). This is 
important for understanding the formation of 'consensus 
politics' in the North East during the 1960s and 1970s. 
2.3 Functions of the State 
Having presented this broad overview of the State, our next task is 
to understand the functions of the State in relation to accumulation 
imperatives described in Chapter 1. By way of introduction, we can draw 
upon one body of theory, the 'capital logic 1 ( CL) school (see Holloway 
and Piccioto, 1977) which derives the general form and function of the 
State from the nature of capital ism as a mode of production (see also 
Jessop, 1977 for a review of this). 
The CL school emphasise that the state will intervene ·in order to 
counteract tendencies in the falling rate of profit, i.e. fulfil the 
requirements demanded by accumulation imperatives by directly 
intervening in the restructuring of capital and reorganising labour 
processes. The second important aspect of the CL 1 s analysis is the 
limitations imposed on the State by the very contradictions inherent in 
the accumulation process itself. In other words, the State is 
subordinated to the laws of motion of capital, and as much as the State 
intervenes to defuse crisis tendencies ( eg. through Keynesian demand 
management, or more directly through nationalisation and subsidies to 
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capital), such interventions will inevitably reproduce contradictions at 
a heightened and more intense level. This is illustrated by the 
analysis of the limitations of State expenditure on accumulation as 
expressed in the form of 'fiscal crisis' (see Yaffe, 1973. and Fine and 
Harris, 1976). 
Hirsch ( 1977: pp 84-88) analyses three functions of the State as 
they "result from the laws of the process of social reproduction 11 • 
Hirsch introduces the concept of historical specificity and the dynamics 
of class struggle in its influence on State policies. Changes in the 
form of State intervention will be conditioned and shaped by changes in 
the progress of capital accumulation. 
The first function of the state is the reproduction of labour power. 
Under this category we can view the economic and political strength of 
the working class influencing social policy and the creation of the 
'Welfare State'. The Welfare State is a concession made because of the 
importance of social security, national insurance and industrial 
training in alleviating the worst effects of restructuring and 
rationalisation whilst at the same time maintaining labour reserves. 
However, whilst it is in the objective interests of capital to implement 
welfare policies (also because certain forms of political and 
ideological domination can be enforced) welfare provision will be 
eroded, when conditions of profitability are threatened. The formation 
of social policy in the North East, for example, was partly determined 
by struggles conducted by the labour movement, but at the same time by 
the need to maintain or restructure labour reserves. 
The guaranteeing of the general conditions of production has become 
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an increasingly important function of the State in post-war Britain. 
Under this broad heading we include all elements of state economic 
policy. The central historical development of the concentration and 
centralisation of capital and the concomitant transformation in the 
labour process has meant that the State has undertaken a role of 
selective support for certain industries/sectors of the economy 
identified as being important for achieving national economic growth 
objectives. Through the provisions of credit facilities, subsidies, 
etc, the State facilitates the process of concentration and 
centralisation. Furthermore, the actual takeover of certain sectors of 
the economy through na tionalisa tion enables capital to be invested in 
areas in which will obtain a quicker turnover, or because these 
industries, although essential to the development of capital overall, in 
general are not sufficiently profitable at a particular time to attract 
private capital. In addition, the increasing importance of 
technological innovation in the process of accumulation has placed 
pressure on the ·State to invest in Research and Development, subsidise 
industries or sectors which are either developing innovations, or 
utilising new technology in their production processes (recognising also 
the inter-relationship between the two). The overall development of the 
productive forces, and associ a ted accumulation imperatives, has 
necessitated the State to take on structural and 'global demand 
management' functions. These appear in the form of incomes policy or 
more direct involvment in production through sectoral (and regional) 
policies. 
"A central aspect of the conjunctural and structural regulatory 
activity of the state is to be seen in the fact that it 
essentially means redistribution of revenue in favour of 
capitals or individual groups of capitals and thus has no 
immediate influence on the development of income structures." 
(Hirsch, 1977: p 88) 
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State industrial policies can be viewed as tendencies counter~acting 
falling profitability. State support to organic and inorganic chemicals 
industries is due to their importance to national economic growth 
objectives. In this manner State expenditure is redistributed in favour 
of certain capitals in the interest of accelerating the general rate of 
accumulation. As we have noted above, the existence of class conflict, 
and interest groups (representing other sections of the economy) as well 
as fiscal constraints imposed upon State expenditure, will together 
place limitations upon the success of such policies. 
The third function of the State is the provision of the general 
material conditions of production. The increasing significance of State 
infrastructural policy must be located in the growing socialisation of 
production, itself an expression of the overall growth in the forces of 
production. Capital itself will produce the material conditions of 
production in the form of fixed capital infrastructural projects ( eg. 
land reclamation and assembly), but such schemes are not profitable from 
the point of view of the valorization of capital and have to be provided 
by the State: "The capitalist unity of labour process and process of 
valorization necessarily creates a category of material conditions of 
production which fall outside the process of surplus value production 
and exchange between capitals and must be provided from outside the 
sphere of capital." (Hirsch, 1977: p 67). Such infrastructural 
investment includes basic services (sewage disposal, water) and the 
provision of industrial estates, land assembly, redevelopment and 
restructuring of the built environment. The take-over of energy 
production by the State also comes into this category. The importance 
of this aspect of public investment has been emphasised by the nature of 
monopoly and multinational investment requiring their 'external costs' 
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to be managed and provided by the State. The necessity of longer term 
company planning has meant that the guaranteeing of essential 
infrastructure (which subsidises production costs) over a longer period 
has become an imperative in late capitalism (Mandel, 1975). This aspect 
of State functions is important for understanding the development of 
local Government interventions in the economy. 
Offe (1975) develops the above analysis of the State further by 
relating the changing form and nature of State intervention to the 
changing character and pattern of accumulation. The historical 
specificity of State intervention is important because it ena.bles an 
explanation of State policy in a concrete historical context. The 
historical dynamics of accumulation throw up contradictions which 
inevitably create a tension between the formulation of ad hoc policies 
securing conditions for particular capitals and establishing general 
conditions harmonious to continued accumulation. Individual units of 
capital are driven by conditions of competition to enact strategies 
which will restructure production and cut production costs. The State 
becomes an area of conflict between different capitals making their own 
demands in the pursuance of their own interests. This raises a question 
mark over the ability of the State to establish a cohesive centralised 
strategy free of conflicts and tensions. The dynamic of class conflict 
continually imposes constraints upon state activity. 
The concept of political and ideological hegemony has been developed 
in respect of the state playing a 'unifying role' for the bourgeoisie in 
terms of organising its political and ideological domination (for 
example, by Gramsci: see Jessop, 1977). Its ability or capability in 
achieving this will depend upon the forms of organisation of the 
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institutions of the state. Hegemony relies upon a certain intellectual 
and moral leadership of the ruling class which is able to gain support 
of the dominated classes because of: 
(1) the nature of the power bloc which has been established; 
(2) its ability to articulate popular demands and aspirations of the 
domina ted class in accordance with its own immediate long-term 
class interests. As Jessop comments: 
"Bourgeois political domination is also said to be reinforced 
by free elections and strong parliamentary institutions. For 
it seems that electoral competition encourages the power bloc 
to take account of the interests of the dominated class when 
formulating its policies for capital accumulation." (Jessop, 
1977: p 368). 
The component of ideology and legitimacy is important in policies 
for the North East . The question of an historical analysis of the 
political and ideological relations of capitalist society and how they 
relate to the State in terms of its structure, functions and legitimacy 
has been raised by the 'Neo-Gramscian' school (Jessop, 1977: p 367). In 
this context the State is not simply the tool of the ruling class, it is 
also an institutional outcome of class struggle and an uneasy compromise 
of class interests in which some of the aspirations of the dominated 
class become partially incorporated. 
The concepts of politics and ideology are relevant to the discussion 
here. The notion of class struggle as occuring only between labour and 
capital represents a simplistic view. Capitalist relations of 
production exist only in specific variant forms and in combination with 
other forms of social and private labour (eg. state employees). The 
state can play an important role in unifying the bourgeoisie and 
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organising its political and ideological hegemony over the dominated 
class as competition between different units of capital continually 
undermines such a cohesive class strategy. Ideological hegemony is 
established in such a way as to present an analysis and solutions which 
attract support because they are couched as the only perceived solutions 
to specific problems. For hegemony to be maintained it would be 
necessary for the dominant class to secure support from the domina ted 
class for policies by attempting to articulate interests and aspirations 
of all sections of society. A power bloc is formed comprising a stable 
alliance of domina ted classes or class fractions. Under late 
capitalism, welfare and social programmes have been formed via the 
incorporation of popular democratic demands placed upon the State, 
although at the same time these strategies have played a vital role in 
establishing favourable conditions for continued capital accumulation. 
2.4 The State and capital - contradictions and responses 
Whether the State can carry out its functions without generating 
further problems for accumulation is of central importance to any debate 
about the State. The intention here is to summarise the salient points 
raised in recent analyses of the capitalist State (eg. Fine and Harris, 
1976, and Jessop, 1977 and in the Journal 'Capital and Class'). 
(a) Fiscal crisis: - a number of writers (eg. Yaffe, 1973, O'Connor, 
1973) have emphasised that one of the central contradictory aspects 
of state intervention is derived from the fact that public 
expenditure is financed from the surplus realised through the 
exchange of commodities on the market (ie taxation of profits and 
wages and taxes on commodities) and by budget deficit financing. If 
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such expenditure promotes an acceleration in the rate of 
accumulation, all is well, but if it does not stimulate production 
it will only contribute to fueling inflation. Fiscal crises arise 
when social and political demands are made on the State to provide 
conditions of profitable production and/or increase welfare 
provision which may promote economic and social stability but at the 
same time present potential barriers to continued accumulation. An 
example is transfer payments made to the unemployed which although 
maintaining a level of demand in the economy as well as securing 
political stability, will not necessarily stimulate further 
profitable production. 
(b) Tendency for the rate of profit to fall:-(Altvater, 1973, Hirsch, 
1976, Fine and Harris, 1976)-this theoretical proposition should not 
necessa-rily be construed as a mechanistic model of capital 
accumulation. From an analysis of the process of accumulation it 
has been stated that there are tendencies which can lead to 
pressures upon profitability (over-accumulation, class struggle 
intensifying) which are inextricably bound up with the social 
relations of capitalist production. In certain periods these 
tendencies come to the fore. In the previous chapter some reference 
was made to counter tendencies. In this con text the State can be 
viewed as an agency which mobilises counter tendencies through 
intervening in the restructuring of production and assisting in the 
realisation of commodities on the market (via credit policies). 
However the State does not simply step in when problems arise for 
capital because to a certain degree these problems arise as a result 
of successive rounds of State interventions in a previous period. 
In this sense the State can never counter tendencies towards crises 
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in the long term because uneven development, disproportioriality and 
class struggle are part of the make up of the capitalist system. 
Capitalist crises act as a steering mechanism on State intervention. 
The ability of the State to resolve crises depends upon its strategies 
and ability to implement them. Capitalist crises do not involve any 
mono-causal influences and are a complex effect of various contradictory 
factors and affect different classes in contradictory ways. There will 
be conflicts generated over their interpretation and resolution, and no 
matter what economic and social strategy is pursued it will come across 
inherent barriers to continued smooth and balanced accumulation . This 
is due to the highly fragmented diversity of interests which places 
pressures upon the State to formulate policy instruments in accordance 
with their goal of maximising profits. Offe ( 1975: p 143) argues that 
as a result of con.flicting interests there will be perpetual 
oscillations between different anti-crisis mechanisms. The State is 
therefore unable to secure the interests of all capitals at the same 
time and thus there arise inherent barriers to implementing any crisis 
management programme. Additionally the State can also implement a 
series of policies which in the long term can act against each other as 
their impacts do not achieve their desired effects. An important 
feature of understanding the functions of the capitalist State and 
contradictions involved in the implementation of its policies is that 
the State is not independent of the accumulation process. What happens 
and occurs within the State reflects political and social struggles 
arising from strategies for restructuring production and maintaining 
profitability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE CLEVELAND ECONOMY 1963~77 
3.1 Accumulation and geographical uneven development 
In Chapter 1 the analysis of capitalist production revealed that the 
accumulation process gave rise, at the macro level, to tendencies for 
the rate of profit to fall, to uneven development between sec tors and 
departments of the economy. These conditions structure the operations 
of individual capitals, which, in the sphere of competition attempt to 
overcome pressures upon profitability by changing conditions of 
production as a means of increasing the rate of profit (by reducing 
costs of production and raising labour productivity). The outcome of 
these strategies has been increasing concentration and centralisation, 
involving accelerated use of technological innovation and trends towards 
scale economies employing larger volumes of fixed capital investments. 
Accumulation and accumulation imperatives give rise to an uneven 
distribution of the conditions necessary for profitable production. 
Historically, geographical specialisation of production has emerged from 
the initial stages of capitalist development when industries located or 
grew in an area due to certain loca tional conditions such as access to 
raw materials, markets and supplies of labour power. The relative 
prosperity of regions and metropolitan areas has been influenced by 
changes in world market conditions, State policies etc. and the response 
of industries to these macro economic changes. The North East, for 
example, contains industries which produce means of production 
commodities (ship building, coal, steel and engineering). This pattern 
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of industrial distribution only became a problem due to changes occuring 
in the UK economy and in the international division of labour. As 
Massey (1979: p 235) argues, the regional problem as such was produced 
by the effects of the decline of the UK economy in relation to the 
international economy on the spatial division of labour within these 
industries. Sectoral decline has consequently produced regional decline 
as measured and reflected in unemployment rates, reduction in incomes, 
social problems etc. 
In the later stages of capitalist development, especially since the 
second World War, it can be argued that regional economies have 
undergone considerable changes with there being less dependency upon 
'traditional industries'. An example of these changes is in the growth 
of services and the formation of 'new' industries predominantly involved 
in the assembly line and automated production. This latter development 
it has been argued is a result of the reorganisation of, and associated 
changes in technology employed in production, and the changing structure 
of individual firms. In the post-war period, intensification of 
international competition has led to increasing pressures to cut costs 
of production and accumulation imperatives have stimulated the 
development of multi-national companies (and the internaticnalisation of 
production). The outcomes of these tendencies have been; 
(a) increasing size of individual firms, 
(b) the separation and hierarchisation of technical control and 
management functions, 
(c) division even within production into separately-functioning stages, 
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(d) standardisation of commodities produced through increased 
automation, 
(e) increased role and importance of Research and Development where 
there is a reliance upon accelerated technological change (see 
Perrons, 1981, Massey, 1979 and Massey and Meegan. 1978). 
It is as a result of such developments that a new form of spatial 
division of labour has taken root. Firstly, the above changing 
conditions of production have meant that in many cases industry has been 
able to free itself from traditional locational ties. Branch plants 
involving assembly line production have been located in areas where 
there are reserves of labour. These tend to be areas traditionally 
characterised by 'regional problems' . Functions involving control and 
Research and Development tend to locate in central metropoles where 
there already exists a specialisation in finance and administrative 
functions (for example London and the South East). 
An additional element of this new form of spatial division of labour 
is the possible development of massive production complexes. Within the 
process of concentration and centralisation, internationalisation of 
production and increased use of technological innovation, the splitting 
up of production processes can involve inter-linked stages which by 
virtue of the nature of technology utilised, the scale and capacity of 
production involved, and through the necessity to minimise transport 
costs (where such costs are potentially a large part of overall costs of 
production) it has been necessary to develop production processes in 
close proximity to each other. Specific locational conditions are thus 
required such as large areas of flat land, proximity to port facilities 
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and availability of skilled labour. This specifically applies to 
certain branches of production such as chemicals and steel. These 
territorial complexes, specialised in the production of petro-chemicals, 
steel and similar commodities have emerged in peripheral re~ions partly 
as a result of state (regional) policy and partly because of the 
existence of labour reserves which were once employed in other 
1 traditional industries 1 • This latter development has in some cases 
tended to reinforce traditional regional specialisation (see Lapple and 
Hoogstraten, 1980) 
3.2 Uneven Development and the Cleveland economy 
The 1960s witnessed a considerable restructuring of British 
manufacturing capital in an attempt to maintain international 
competitiveness. This restructuring received considerable State support 
ranging from selected subsidies to 'advanced sectors' to 
na tionalisa tion. Regional policy for example (through Regional 
Development Grants) subsidised the costs of production of key 'growth 
sectors 1 located in regions such as the North East ( ie petro-chemicals 
and steel). A massive ra tiona lisa tion of production took place 
involving labour shedding in coal, shipbuilding and engineering. 
Considerable investments were made in new technology in chemicals and 
steel followed later by a shakeout of labour, whilst at the same time, 
the development of new industry in the region was encouraged by spatial 
policies such as new town development providing modern infrastructures, 
and Regional Employment Premiums subsidising wage costs in branch plant 
operations. 
Part of the policy of subsidising key industries was to support both 
40 
the technical and locational requirements of the steel and chemicals 
branches through regional and local authority public investment. The 
emergence of Teesside within the Northern Region as an industrial 
complex stemmed from the linking up of national and regional industrial 
policy in relation to national economic imperatives. Regional planning 
and development therefore became an integral feature of the State 1 s 
attempt to restore profitability and accelerate the rate of accumulation 
in Britain. This point can be clarified further with a more detailed 
analysis of steel and chemical production on Teesside in this period. 
Before undertaking this analysis, we shall outline below some major 
character·istics and trends in the Cleveland economy: 
( 1) The industrial structure is dominated by Department I industries 
(i.e means of production including heavy engineering, semi-finished 
raw materials) increasingly displaying tendencies towards high 
ratios of investment in machinery and capacity in relation to labour 
power. 
( 2) In terms of employment and investment (although not in terms of 
number of establishments) the Cleveland economy is dominated by 
multi-nationals where ownership, control and Research and 
Development tends to lie outside the area. Although the rate of new 
labour intensive plant formation does not appear to have been as 
much a significant feature of the Cleveland economy during the 
1960s, as in the North East Region, research undertaken by the CES 
indicates that the majority of major employers were controlled and 
owned outside the area. Related to this is the low rate of growth 
and development of indigenous firms (Storey, 1981, Robinson and 
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Storey 1979, and Table 5). 
( 3) The service sector, although an area of growth both in terms of 
employment and investment was not as significant in terms of 
development in Cleveland as it was in the rest of the Region and 
nationally; 
( 4) Indicators of industrial restructuring in Cleveland 1 s manufacturing 
industry can be clearly seen in the overall scale of employment 
decline between 1966-75 (Table 6). The greatest impact on the local 
economy has been made by the Steel and Chemical concerns. State 
intervention in this process is also clearly identified by the 
proportion of Regional Development /Grants allocated to Cleveland 
compared with the Northern Region and Britain respectively (Table 
7). 
3.3 Developments in steel and chemicals production 
3.3.1 Chemicals 
No doubt one of the most powerful multi-national companies in 
Britain and in Europe has its major operations located on Teesside. 
Imperial Chemicals Industries has been based in the area for nearly 50 
years and by the end of the Second World War the largest single 
chemicals complex in the world was to be found in Billingham. ICI 
concentrated a substantial portion of its investment in production on 
Teesside during the post war period, because Teesside presented ideal 
opportunities for expansion given the availability of large areas of 
flat land, good port facilities and abundant supply of labour. 
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Up until the Second World War Billingham produced a wide range of 
inorganic chemicals based on sulphuric acid, nitrates, petroleum and 
calor gas. Ammonia was a major product in heavy demand from 
agricultural industries (used in the production of fertilisers) and 
accounted for the continual expansion of Billingham in the post=war 
period. In 1949 the Wilton plant was established south of the Tees for 
the production of organic chemicals (synthetic raw materials). Wilton 
comprised a number of inter-related plants which were originally based 
around a cracker used to produce ethylene by pyrolysis. Pyrolysis 
produces a variety of products such as petrol. Ethylene products 
themselves provided inputs to production in Billingham (the two plants 
are linked by pipeline) of hydrogen (from ethylene oxide) which in turn 
is used to produce propylene - a product converted to acetone and 
methylmethacrylate and then returned to Wilton for use in the "Perspex" 
plant. The further development of Wilton in the 1950s was stimulated by 
the high demand for s~thetic raw materials such as "Terylene" and 
synthetic rubber (Hudson 1981). 
The 1950s therefore witnessed a considerable expansion in 
investment, technological change and employment (Table 8). The 1960s 
and 70s, however, were characterised by a changing economic climate when 
international competition in the chemical industry became more intense. 
To remain competitive ICI 's Teesside division undertook a programme of 
restructuring aimed at maintaining its leading position. Competition 
between capitals was not the only reason for restructuring. In this 
period manufacturing industry in Britain was undergoing increased 
pressures upon profitability and it became an imperative for the cost of 
basic raw material inputs to be minimised. 
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Changes occuring during the 1960s reflected a rapid increase in the 
rate of investment in fixed capital as ICI strove to appropriate 
'technological rents'. The purpose of the restructuring programme was 
to increase labour productivity, reduce production costs Rnd through 
advanced technological innovations reap surplus profits. In respect of 
this the following developments took place: 
(i) In Billingham major investments in new technology occured in 
ammonia production. This involved new capacity (three new plants) 
giving a total capacity of 1 million tonnes towards the end of the 
1960s. The introduction of the steam reforming process enabled the 
reduction of raw material inputs into the production process - from 
2 tonnes of coal for every tonne of ammonia produced to 0.9 tonnes 
of coal per ammonia ton. The implications of this development for 
labour productivity were that the labour time required to produce a 
ton of ammonia was reduced from 11.6 to 0.3 man hours (North, 1975: 
p 105). An additional development at Billingham was the world's 
first commercial low pressure process in producing methanol which 
meant a substantial breakthrough for ICI in this area of 
petro-chemicals production. In order to guarantee cheap and high 
quality supplies of raw materials in the production of methanol, 
ICI became involved in a joint venture with Phillips Imperial 
Petroleum in the development of two oil refineries at Seal Sands. 
This venture also enabled the production of feed stocks for other 
ICI plants. 
( ii) At Wilton, technological innovations involved the expansion of 
cracking capacity - in 1966 a computer controlled cracker was added 
with an annual capacity of 200, 000 tonnes while in 1968 a further 
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cracker with an annual capacity of 450,000 tonnes was added. The 
overall capacity increase amounted to 6 times that which existed 
three years earlier and indicated the enormous unit cost reductions 
that could be achieved through increasing capacity and output given 
a high rate of utilization. Ethylene was the main product which 
was transported by pipeline to Billingham as a raw material input 
to inorganic chemicals production. By 1976 the cumulative fixed 
capacity investment in Wilton totalled £400 million and the complex 
was to become the most up to date in the world. Table 9 shows the 
major investment projects implemented at Wilton and Billingham 
during the 1960s-70s period. 
The outcome of this restructuring was the slower growth in price of 
organic chemicals from a 1960 base level of 100 to 118.7 in 1970 
compared with 100 in 1960 to 123.7 for price of raw material inputs to 
all chemical producers (Hudson, 1981). The restructuring programme also 
entailed substantial job losses. Table 6 identifies employment change 
between 1965 and 1976 revealing a loss of over 6, 000 jobs. Table 10 
which shows employment change by individual plants of ICI (1971-77) 
gives a more complete picture relating to rationalisation in ICI. Over 
8,000 jobs were shed in Billingham during the 1970s. 
The role of the State in ICI's restructuring programme along with 
those of other major chemical companies was crucial. Regional 
Development Grants subsidised capital investment (Table 11) but equally 
important the provision of land and infrastructure was necessary to 
accommodate the programme of expansion. The land provision was vi tal 
because the nature of restructuring involved a considerable demand for 
industrial land. Other chemical companies located in Teesside because 
of the possibilty of providing or obtaining feedstock and reducing 
transport costs: 
" .. the close interlinking of plants via inputs and outputs is 
now an almost universal feature of production. Virtually 
without exception, production takes place in production 
complexes of plants that are functionally, if not always 
physically, adjacent, based on oil refineries or similar plants 
for treating crude oil or its primary products such as naptha. 
Production units, even if in the ownership of different 
capitals, often need to be in close proximity to one another, 
for the profitability of many processes depends upon being able 
to sell (rather than waste) by-products, the long distance 
transport of many organics being dangerous and expensive." 
(Hudson, 1981a: p 18) 
It is in this context that the opening up of the Seal Sands area 
(see Chapter 7) became an important element in State policy towards 
promoting the Teesside area as a regional and national centre for 
petro-chemicals production. During the 1960s, with the commencement of 
a reclamation and servicing programme at Seal Sands, a number o~ 
multi-national chemical companies (Rohm and Haas (now closed) and 
Monsanto, for example) located branch plants at Seal Sands. These 
developments were also encouraged by the subsidies to fixed capital 
costs through RDG payments. By 1979 the cumulative total investment in 
plant and equipment on Seal Sands stood at over £500 million and much of 
this cost had been borne by the state (Hudson, 1981a: p16). 
3.3.2 Steel - the effects of the formation of the British Steel 
Corporation in Teesside 
The nationalisation of the steel industry in 1967 and the 
establishment of the British Steel Corporation was an attempt by the 
state to stave off a crisis in the British steel industry. The strategy 
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for the 1970s was for the complete re-organisation of the industry 
including the scrapping of obsolete capacity, technological change in 
production and increased labour productivity. The spatial dimension of 
this strategy involved the establishment of larger integrated production 
complexes in coastal areas where there was access to port facilities and 
reserves of land and labour. It was thus the first big investment 
decision that Teesside should be the location for an integrated steel 
making operation "based upon the best and most modern world practices". 
(Hudson, 1978) 
The principal iron and steel products to be made in Teesside, with 
production concentrated at Lackenby/Redcar in the South Tees area near 
the coast, were ferro-alloys, billets, beams, rails, universal and 
coiled plate, bars and rods and iron casting (BSC, 1969-70). To 
maintain a competitive position on the world market BSC placed great 
emphasis upon the restructuring of production in the area. This took 
the form of three inter-related processes: 
(i) investment in new technology, 
(ii) scrapping of obsolete capacity, 
(iii) labour shedding and increased productivity. 
(i) Investment in technological innovations 
A comprehensive programme of investment in new technology was 
planned in 1969-71 by the Corporation including the replacement of open 
hearth steel making with BOS vessels (at Lackenby), extension of coiled 
plate facilities (Lackenby) 7 replacement of South Bank coke ovens by a 
new installation 7 a continuous steel casting process, and a new ore 
terminal to accomodate ore carriers of over 60,000 tonnes. The rolling 
programme included the continual modernisation of methods in iron and 
steel making; i.e. better roll mill utilisation ( 1970171), pelleting, 
burdening and sintering preparation plants at Redcar (1973/74) and a new 
blast furnace and coke oven plant capable of 10,000 tonnes daily 
production (1974/75). Part of the technological developments was in the 
sphere of fuel economies. The £25 million sinter plant mixes fine ore, 
coke and limestone, and roasts the mix to form a material sui table for 
blast furnace charging. The plant is capable of making nearly 4 million 
tonnes of material a year and provides a cheap feed for the blast 
furnace. Further innovation in this area was the development of a 
computer based reheat furnace control system which enabled greater fuel 
economies. Undoubtedly the major technical development was the 
introduction of· a system of pneumatically charging pre-heated coal in 
the coke ovens by pipeline as a means of increasing plant efficiency and 
the construction il'l the late 1 970s of a 14 metre blast furnace (three 
were planned but due to reduced demand for steel only one was 
completed), intended to increase output and labour productivity as well 
as reducing basic costs of production. Although the bulk of ESC's 
investment programme was completed by the late 1970s, considerable 
Research and Development was being undertaken into further possible 
technical innovations and also making better use of current technology. 
An example of the latter was the investigation into the use of a 
vertical scale breaker at the Lac ken by coil Plate Mill which would 
permit greater flexibility in the width of finished coil. Possibilities 
of achieving further fuel economies were investigated - e.g. ways in 
which cost of coal blends used for coke ovens could be reduced by mixing 
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different coal types (BSC, 1979). The annual amount of investment 
undertaken by the Corporation is shown in table 12. These figures are 
estimates based upon Regional Development Grant payments which, prior to 
1980, comprised 20% of total investment. Cleveland County Council has 
estimated that the cumulative investment in Metal Manufacture in the 
period 1974-81 amounted to £544.6 million which gives some indication of 
the volume of investment which was occuring in this period (Cleveland 
County Council, 1981). 
(ii) Scrapping of obsolete capacity 
The concentration of iron and steel production at Redcar/Lackenby 
integrated works led to two parallel developments - the run down of 
older capacity in the Teesside area (iron and steel works located 
'up-stream') and the closure of major iron and steel works in other 
parts of the region. This reflected the policy of concentrating 
production in coastal areas although the severity of the cuts imposed 
during the late 1970s was somewhat unexpected. In the 1970171 period, 
at the beginning of the restructuring programme, 6 plants were shut 
down - three located upstream and two which were to be replaced by 
larger more modern plant. Nearly 5,000 jobs were involved although some 
redeployment did take place. As Table 13 shows, this was to be the 
first of a series of plant closures to take place throughout the 1970s. 
The largest rationalisations to be implemented were the closure of the 
iron and steel making and rolling mill at Hartlepool involving over 
1,500 jobs (1978) and the complete shut down of the iron and steel works 
at Consett in 1980. Altogether 35 open hearth furnaces were closed and 
19 blast furnaces reduced to one in the Northern Region (Pike, 27/7/81). 
The programme of closures reflected the increased use of technical 
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innovation in iron and steel production and associated acceleration in 
obsolesence and turnover time of capital invested in production. Both 
the Con set t and Hartlepool works, for example, had involved relatively 
recent outlays in fixed capital investment (dating back to the late 
1950s and early 1960s respectively). 
(iii) Employment-change-and labour productivity 
The above capacity cuts considerably reduced the labour force 
involved in production. Using Annual Census of Employment data and 
information obtained from the Cleveland CES Data Bank it is possible to 
identify employment change at the level of the individual plant. The 
characteristic feature was employment change through plant closure which 
comprised approximately 40% of total employment decline (Table 14). 
Between 1965-77 employment declined from 21,879 (1965) to 16,676 (1977), 
a reduction of about 25%. In the same period iron and steel output 
fluctuated around 3.6 million tonnes to 2.7 million tonnes. No data are 
available on output per plant but some indication of productivity can be 
obtained by studying developments at Redcar/Lackenby. Although output 
was reduced because of a decline in orders, the reduction in employment 
was at a much greater rate. Between 1979-81 the BSC attempted to reduce 
employment from 20, 800 to 13, 000 whilst at the same time reduce man 
hours per tonne produced from 13 to 8, the average rate of productivity 
in the South Wales Port Talbot Works. There is no doubt that the 
restructuring programme achieved a marked increase in labour 
productivity although a declining world market and signs of 
over-production have placed pressures on BSC to intensify the 
rationalisation programme even further. The possibilities and 
limitations of doing this and future prospects will be analysed in 
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Chapter 8. 
The next two chapters will examine in some detail the formulation 
and implementation of local economic policies in the period since the 
early 1960s and how their bias in support for chemicals and steel 
branches has, until very recently affected overall developments in the 
Cleveland economy. 
CHAPTER 4 
URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY JNITIATIVES: THE FORMULATION 
OF CONSENSUS POLITICS 1963-76 
4.1 Regional planning measures- the 0 Hailsham Strategyv 
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The policies and programme outlined in the White Paper ( Cmnd 2206) 
were a response to growing political and social pressures created by 
increasing regional unemployment and formed a strategy for dealing with 
the region's outmoded economic infrastructure. As Hudson, (1980: p 11) 
stated, these meas~res reflected a switch in Conservative thinking 
consisting of a combination of short term measures to alle\•iate 
unemployment together with longer term measures of a more fundamental 
nature. These latter amounted to an expanded programme of public sector 
infrastructure investment, which, taking over elements of the prevailing 
planning ideology in the region, was to be concentrated in certain key 
locations possessing 'growth potential' (growth points - such as the new 
towns - and a growth zone, lying between the rivers Tyne and Tees and to 
the east of the A1 (M) motorway. (Hudson, 1980: p 11) 
The 1963 White Paper, as well as recommending the creation of a 
growth zone, also made some detailed proposals relating to how the 
region's infrastructure was to be modernised. These were: 
(1) Building of industrial estates for the 'attraction' of new labour 
intensive industries; 
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(2) Land reclamation schemes for improving environmental quality 
as well as accommodating industrial expansion programmes; 
( 3) Moderntsa tion of the to:-m centres as a means of improving the image 
of the area as well as promoting economic diversification 
(encouragement of commercial capital, office and service 
employment) ; 
(4) The promotion of the Port of Tees as a major national port; 
(5) The creation of new towns which would provide infrastructures for 
incoming light and modern industries; 
(6) Improvement of communications as a means of facilitating 
industrial development - this included a comprehensive road 
building programme. 
The main arguments in the White Paper about the nature and cause of 
the region's problems illustrates the level of perception of the 
situation by the State, which formed the basis from which to justify and 
legitimate its policies. The creation of a consensus around the 
politics of modernisation can be traced back to the 1930s as a response 
by the State to the region's problems (see Chapter 1 and Carney and 
Hudson, 1978). It is this factor which is important in the way 
consensus measures were formula ted and accepted with very little 
questioning by the labour movement. 
are explained by Hudson as follows: 
The context and reasons for this 
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"Crucially, they subsequently came to be accepted as a 
legitimate, even inevitable, solution by the Labour Party and 
working class organisations. Thus it was possible in the early 
1960's for modernisation policies to become the basis of a 
consensus, of a class alliance, as to how best to solve the 
region's problems. Given the Labour Party's political hegemony 
in the North East, this has meant it aGvocating and 
implementing policies which objectively meet the requirements 
either of 'capital in general' or of some individual capitals 
while legitimating these in terms of declared social democratic 
goals (reducing unemployment, improving working class living 
standards etc.)." (Hudson, 1980: p 12) 
Consensus politics were based around a series of assumptions 
regarding the nature of regional problems and how these problems were 
constituted in this period. In a study of public policy in the North 
East, Carney and Hudson ( 1974) analyse planning and other official 
documents such as the North East Study, an unpublished paper which 
directly preceded the White Paper. In this paper, there are a number of 
'explanations' of regional decline. Below, we cite some extracts 
(quoted from Carney and Hudson) from this to illustrate the type of 
analysis used to justify the policy prescription described in the White 
Paper. The analysis related to: 
(a) The nature of the industrial structure in the region: 
"There is an underlying weakness in the employment situation 
in the North East. This is long standing but it has grown 
worse in the last few years... These difficulties stem from 
the region's industrial structure and its effect on the demand 
for male labour. Four industries (coal, shipbuilding, steel 
and chemicals) account for over a third of male employment in 
the North East compared with less than an eighth in Great 
Britain. In steel and chemicals employment is no longer rising 
and in coal and shipbuilding it has fallen sharply." 
(b) The image of the Region: 
"The general impression of the region as a rather dingy and 
unexciting place is widely held to act as a psychological 
barrier to people of this type (i.e. the attraction of 
'professionals' and 'white collar' workers and 'technical 
workers' to the area, DE) and .. "the general appearance of the 
industrial areas and the dilapidated nature of much of their 
social capital are deterrents to the growth of new enterprise 
in the region . " 
(c) The lack of commercial property capital: 
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"Experience shows, however, that property developers in 
general consider the North East a relatively unattractive area 
for investment, and, in the absence of effective negative 
controls, we feel that some powerful discriminatory inducement 
is needed to offset the pulling power of the more prosperous 
parts of the; country. 11 
These explanations tended to confuse symptoms of the problem with 
the actual causes. However, there was a shift again in regional policy 
initiatives with the return of the Labour government - policies became 
even more closely tied up with the National Industrial Strategy. 
4.2 Regional Policy and National Economic Planning 
After the publication of the Hailsham Report, the State was to 
attempt to reverse industrial decline by encouraging restructuring in 
industry. This strategy filtered down to the level of regional 
planning, where, as well as modernisation of infrastructure, regional 
policies were to be orientated to stimulating modernisation of 
production and placing greater emphasis on increasing efficiency. For 
the North East, it was envisaged that the region's problems could be 
resolved through importation of technological development: 
"Higher productivity is, to a great extent, a matter of having 
more efficient plant. This means more investment. It is 
encouraging therefore to see the heavy capital investment 
already undertaken and in hand in the region. Particularly by 
the larger industrial firms and by the nationalised industries; 
and we welcome the preferential treatment being given to the 
region, as a development area, in the matter of investment 
grants towards the renewal of plant and machinery. Industry 
must take full advantage of this opportunity to modernise with 
Government assistance." (NEPC, 1965: p 57, para, 35) 
As Dunford et al (1980) noted, the new Labour government offered an 
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alternative to 'stop gov policies incorporating regional policy into a 
new framework of national economic planning. An important component of 
the changes in State policies towards t:he regions after 1966 was the 
move away from policies encouraging employment generation to policies 
which encouraged rationalisation. This is illustrated in the amount of 
regional expenditures allocated to those industries involved with large 
scale restructuring of production. 
By the 1970s unemployment was to increase nationally - although more 
markedly in regions such as the North East. The reasons for the rise in 
umemployment rates in the region have been discussed above (Chapter 3). 
Paradoxically, it was the 1960s policies which decidedly contributed 
to the post-1966 'shake out'· of labour. In the North East, 
nationalisation of steel production was followed by labour shedding; in 
the coal industry many pits were closed and jobs _ lost as part of the 
NCB's rationalisation strategy; in engineering and chemicals, a 
combination of plant closures and investment in labour saving technology 
involved significant reductions in demand for labour - especially male 
workers. This pattern of restructuring was accelerated during the 1970s 
as the world recession set in. From the mid 1970s onwards the focus of 
attention was switched to the inner city as the process of industrial 
decline (plant closures, redundancies, de-industrialisation) seemed to 
be concentrated in inner urban locations. It was in this period that, 
with the fiscal crisis of the State, the renewed emphasis on monetarist 
policies and the increasing reliance on free market forces and the 
containment of trade unions, greater reliance was placed on limiting 
public expenditure (reduced State aid to industry) and the potential of 
the small firm (for example) as a source of Britain's future economic 
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prosperity. 
Although the economic climate was to change quite dramatically 
towards the turn of the 1970s, the basic kernal of analysis of the 
region 9 s problems (and those of major industrial conurbations situated 
within it) and policy prescription remained essentially the same. 
Rather than alter fund amen tally, policies were to appear in new forms, 
such as the State 9 s inner city strategy. Before analysing the 
institutional and planning framework for policy formation in Teesside, 
(Chapter 5), we will as a context, present an overview of how the rapid 
structural changes shaped urban policies. 
4.3 The Emerging ecomomic crisis and policy responses 
A number of recent works on urban politics/policies (eg Dunleavy 
1981, Mckay and Cox, 1980) have attempted to trace the pattern of 
various responses to the 'urban' or 'regional crisis' as a means of 
formulating a framework for understanding these responses and their 
particular effects. A recent paper by Jessop ( 1980) has succeeded in 
providing an overview of urban policy changes within a necessary context 
of understanding both the patterns of change in the economy (and its 
political and social components) and their relationship with wider 
fundamental shifts in intervention by the British State in post-war 
society. 
In the immediate post-war period the emph~sis of state intervention 
was geared to social and welfare programmes ( ie the National Health 
Service, Public housing; expansion in the Social Services and 
nationalisation of key infrastructure industries). 
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Although these forms of social expenditures had their influences 
upon accumulation, (maintenance of an efficient labour market, labour 
reserves, stimulation of the construction industry and reducing certain 
elements of production costs) they were nevertheless limited, and in the 
longer term imposed a growing burden on central and local State budgets. 
In 1962 the Plowden Report was published on the control of public 
expenditure and it was the growing crisis that highlighted the limits to 
Keynesian economic policies - Jessop explains why as follows: 
"Moreover, although Keynesian techniques presuppose that an 
expansion of effective demand in a closed economy will 
stimulate additional production, money is integrated in the 
international circuit of capital and it can function there 
either as revenue or capital. Given the openness and the 
structural crisis of Britain's economy, increases in effective 
demand were just as likely to finance capital exports and the 
import of consumer goods and/or to enable capital to engage in 
speculative activities or to raise prices .•. without such 
increases in production and industrial reorganisation, 
Keynesian increases in the money supply to maintain full 
employment merely served to intensify the structural crisis and 
fuel inflation." (Jessop, 1980: p 39) 
Jessop argues that the resource and financial costs of welfare 
provision imposed a growing burden on central and local State budgets, 
whilst at the same time were proving inadequate in resolving the social 
problems connected with capital accumulation (unemployment, alienation, 
poverty). Therefore in the mid-sixties there was a redirection in 
social policy from redistribution to attacking the causes of poverty and 
deprivation affecting individual citizens rather than treating their 
symptoms. This is the context for understanding the emergence of 
regional modernisation policies discussed above. The resulting shift in 
State policies is described as follows: 
"There has arisen a complex of local regional and national 
programmes to alleviate such problems as urban poverty, 
educational deprivation, inner city decline, urban disorder, 
imbalance in the spatial organisation of economic and social 
life, regional under-development and so on. Thus in addition 
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to the growth of regional development policies through 
increasing resort to capital grants, tax allowances, employment 
subsidies, infrastructure support, government training 
programmes, land use planning and so forth, there has also been 
a growing movement towards regionalisation of government with 
the formation of Regional Economic Planning Boards, Regional 
Health Authorities, Regional Water Authorities ate. at the 
expense of local authority control. 11 (Jessop, 1980: p 68) 
Local institutional change in the State as reflected in the 
reorganisation of local government formed part of the State 1 s response 
to the urban crisis. The purpose of reorganisation was to create a more 
efficient machinery of management of urban problems as well as 
facilitating tighter control of local expenditure (Cockburn, 1977). 
In the 1960s the politics of modernisation reflected both the 
'social democratisation' of the State through the integration of working 
class demands and organisation into the bourgeoisie's economic and 
political organisations, and the politics of corporatism which 
transcended the separation between the economic and political spheres of 
capitalist social formations through the development of functional 
representation and intervention (e.g. para-state bodies such as 
quangos). In the case of local government reorganisation it has been 
argued (see Benington, 1976) that the institutional integration of 
conflicting interests through the setting up of public participation 
programmes and neighbourhood councils has legitimised the democratic 
aspect of local administration, whilst in reality local democracy was 
being eroded, with more decision making being made with less direct 
accountability to the public. New management structures and the 
corporatist approach has taken power away from the elected member with 
more weight being placed on the professionals, and powerful policy 
groups being dominated by a smaller number of councillors. (Dearlove, 
1980) 
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This corporatist approach is exemplified in the changes in the plan 
making process which we have referred to earlier. The 1968 Town and 
Country Planning Act created a new form of spatial planning which was 
to be integrated with or at least linked to corporate policy 
formulation. Structure planning presented possibilities for formulating 
regional and Local Plans which, as well as taking account of 
social-economic issues, also gave consideration to local authority 
public investment programmes and financial planning (McLoughlin, 1975). 
Work on structure plans in many areas preceded local Government 
reorganisation in 1974, but by the time reorganisation was enacted, the 
shift of emphasis was towards positive discrimination and urban policy 
making. This policy shift, derived from the setting up of the Urban 
Programme in 1968, were based on the assumption that spatially defined 
problems had their causes rooted in the deficiencies of the residents in 
the defined 'problem area' (eg inner city). 
Inner city policies were legitimised with the explanation that 
rather than the inner city reflecting the structural crisis of British 
capitalism, it was seen as a marginal (although important) problem to 
British society which spatially selective policies could resolve. This 
argument pervaded central and local government policy documents, despite 
the recognition that only policy initiatives at the national level could 
in any way effect some meaningful change in the circumstances of inner 
areas. Throughout the 1970s the focus of attention shifted away from 
regional planning to inner areas programmes and selective area based 
policies. Davis and Green ( 1979) in their discussion on inner city 
policy in the North East, make comparisons and draw parallels with 
regional planning strategies of the 1960s: 
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11 Just like the earlier regionalism 9 the inner city strategy 
serves to dir.ect political activity and attention from the 
overall operations of the capitalist system towards the 
particular problems and alleged peculiarities of places and 
people. Also like regionalism a whole fresh range of 
committees and tripartite Consultative bodies serve to enmesh 
and incorporate labour leaders ~ Councillors 9 trade unionists, 
community groups into the acceptance of the state's 
definition of the problem 9 its proposed solutions and 7 by 
extension, its own authority and legitimacy. 11 (Green and Davis, 
1979: p 69) 
Explanations of inner city problems and the concern, arising from 
the increasing level of community action and urban social protest as a 
response to the economic crisis with its associated polarisation in 
spatial and social terms, shaped local government policies with an 
emphasis upon support for private production and accumulation. In the 
1970s, urban authorities formulated economic development programmes 
which contained many of the elements of the regional modernisation 
policies of the 1960s - industrial promotion, environmental improvement, 
diversification with emphasis on new 'seed bed' industries, commercial 
development etc. However, these strategies were from the outset to 
confront insurmountable problems such as a deepening fiscal crisis of 
the state, accelerated de-industrialisation, and the emergence of mass 
urban unemployment. 
4.4 Some comments on the 9 local state 9 
In recent years a number of writers (notably Cockburn, 1977) have 
attempted to place the functions and activities of local government in 
relation to an analysis of the capitalist State. New ground has been 
covered, breaking away from the purely functionalist and pluralist 
conceptions which have tended to pervade a considerable volume of 
literature on the subject. However new theoretical problems have been 
raised, especially relating to the concept of the 'local state'. It is 
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beyond the scope of this study to enter this recent theoretical debate 
on the local state but some points do emerge which are in need of 
clarification here: 
(1) That local government is an institution of the State apparatus - an 
apparatus made up of a diverse number of institutions reflecting the 
heterogeneous character of the State; 
(2) Studying local authorities raises the issue of State intervention 
relating to spatial policy intervention and consequently provides a 
sharp focus on the way geographical uneven development is reflected 
in the state apparatus through the different character of local 
authority interventions; 
(3) The concept of the 'local state' is ambiguous it is more 
( 4) 
appropriate to consider local institutions of the State i.e. locally 
based central Government, regional and corporatist structures, as 
well as local government. These institutions will develop and 
change according to the changing nature of accumulution and class 
struggle - exemplified by the development towards corporatist 
structures in the 1960s and increasing emphasis on industrial 
modernisation policies; 
As an institution which can implement reforms and 
egalitarian/welfare programmes local government is limited by the 
legal and financial constraints imposed by central Government. 
Local authority functions will also change or be restructured 
according to the extent or degree to which local institutions become 
a terrain of struggle and focal point of popular democratic demands. 
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It is this factor which underlines the tension not only between 
central and local Government but between local institutions. 
How these tensions and conflicts are realised will b2 the subject of 
discussion jn the following chapters 
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CHAPTER 5 
SPATIAL POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN TEESSIDE 1963-74 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the previously described trends in 
local policies and .administration at national level were reflected 
dramatically in the changes invoked in urban government and planning on 
Teesside. In this chapter we shall discuss the 'urban policy' framework 
which was set up to implement the White Paper's Regional Planning 
measures. There were three important elements to the development of 
policies in Teesside in this period: the development of new forms of 
land use and policy planning; the reorganisation of local state 
administration; and the actual content of the plans themselves (i.e. 
general policy prescriptions). In many ways these three aspects are 
considerably interlinked but for purposes of clarity and convenience 
they shall be dealt with separately here. 
5.1 Urban Planning and the new Structure Plans 
The idea of setting up sophisticated planning instruments was first 
mooted in the 1963 White Paper itself. The need was seen to be so great 
that central Government was to provide a portion of the funds to finance 
the _project. The White Paper states that environmental improvements 
require high quality town planning: 
"The Minister of Housing and Local Government proposes to 
discuss with them (ie local authorities) and other authorities 
concerned the commissioning, with Exchequer asistance, of a 
comprehensive Teesside Survey and Plan of which one important 
feature would be the promotion at Middlesbrough of central 
development to act as a social and commercial focus for the 
whole conurbation . . . . and the survey would also be the first 
comprehensive project 
Buchanan and Crowther 
Traffic in Towns." 
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to be initiated in the light of the 
Reports on the Long Term Problems of 
Before the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act (and the creation of 
the Teesplan prior to this legislation) statutory Development Plans were 
prepared separately for a number of local authorities covering the 
Teesside area (under the 1947 and 1962 Town and Country Planning Acts). 
Town Maps were prepared dealing with land use and physical planning 
issues. In 1964, a steering cornmi ttee was established, consisting of 
representatives of central and local Government in the Teesside sub-
region, and from road, rail and other transport authorities. In the 
same year consultants were appointed to work on the Teesside Survey and 
Plan. The Teesplan coincided with the inception of the Teesside County 
Borough and the in traduction of the 1968 Planning Act. This piece of 
legislation embodied recommendations made by the Planning Advisory Group 
(HMSO, 1965) about the future of urban planning. These recommendations 
were as follows: 
(a) The compilation of a Structure Plan which would comprise a two tier 
Development Plan system which distinguished between strategy and 
tactics; 
(b) Strategic issues would be dealt with in Structure Plans which were 
to set down socio-economic strategies for an area. Local Plans would 
provide a framework for development control guidance and coordination of 
the development activities of public and private agencies. Local and 
Action Area Planning would be integrated within the overall strategies 
formulated at the sub regional level by the Structure Plan. The most 
significant point of departure from the old style planning was dealing 
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with social-economic issues as well as land use allocation; 
(c) In line with the recommendations made in the Skeffington Report, 
'People and Plans', Structure Plans would give people the opportunity to 
make representations. 
5.2 Local government reorganisation 
The Teessplan covered an area including the former County Borough 
of Middlesbrough, the Municipal Boroughs of Redcar and Stockton and 
Urban Districts of Billingham, Thornaby and Eston, and parts of the 
Rural District of Stockton. When the Teesplan was completed in 1968 
(HMSO, 1969) it was felt that it had the status of a draft structure 
plan. There was one complication involved in the planning exercise: the 
area defined for planning purposes in 1968, when the County Borough of 
Teesside was created, differed from the area covered under the Teesplan. 
As the new Teesside Borough came into being in 1968, national 
consideration was being given to local government reorganisation. The 
Royal Commission on local government gave support to those who argued 
for an expanded Teesside. However a compromise was sought, after 
considerable debate and conflict (especially between the urban and rural 
authorities), and the new County of Cleveland was created in 1974, 
comprising four new district authorities: Hartlepool, Langbaurgh, 
Middlesbrough and Stockton. Three Structure Plans were prepared after 
reorganisation: Hartlepool, West Cleveland, East Cleveland and the 
Teesside Structure Plans. 
Despite the complexities of the changes evoked by local government 
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reorganisation, and the fact that in this period control over local 
administration was to change hands from Labour to Conservative and back 
to Labour in 1974, there was a remarkable level of continuity in overall 
planning and corporate policy objectives maintained throughout: 
reflected in the Teessplan and subsequent Teesside Structure Plan. In 
other words, the ideological commitment to modernisation was adhered to 
by both Parties, and this can be illustrated by a closer examination of 
the general policy objectives outlined in these documents. 
5.3 Content of Plans - reformulation of consensus politics 
In the Teessplan, (HMSO, 1969, Vol. 2) three major objectives for 
the economy were formulated: 
( 1) The maintenance of Teesside as a major port complex of national 
importance and provision for the locational requirements of the 
steel and chemical industries; 
(2) Diversification of the economic base would be encouraged through the 
attraction of labour intensive industries; 
(3) Promotion of Middlesbrough as a Sub Regional Centre. 
Objectives 2 and 3 are closely interlinked as central area 
redevelopment was to provide infrastructure for service and office 
development. 
The means by which these objectives could be realised were: 
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( 1) Co-ordination and management of fixed capital investments through 
the provision of basic services, land reclamation and zoning, 
construction of industrial estates, advanced factories etc; 
( 2) Comprehensive central area redevelopment, land assembly, property 
development partnerships; 
(3) Large scale road planning linking up industrial and commercial areas 
with the national road network and residential areas; 
( 4) Public and private housing areas located to minimise journeys to 
work; 
(5) Provision of education (including a university) and welfare 
services. 
There was no doubt that the Teesplan placed considerable emphasis 
upon the local economy. It anticipated major restructuring and 
rationalisation programmes in the steel and chemicals sectors, but the 
commitment of resources to 'capital intensive' industries arose in 
recognition of the national importance of these industries. It was 
envisaged therefore that alternative employment opportunities which 
would be stimulated by infrastructural investment would compensate for 
job losses in the major industries. 
The Teesside Structure Plan, which superseded the Teesplan, was 
formulated under changing economic circumstances when unemployment in 
the area was on the increase. Interestingly, the analysis to come out 
of the Report of Survey (1972) was verbatim identical to that outlined 
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in the rfuite Paper: 
1
' (i) The Sub Regional employment structure is dominated by 
heavy industry 9 so that a narrow range of employment 
opportunities are responsible for approximately 40% of all male 
jobs. This figure compares unfavourably with the national 
average of only 12% 
(ii) The Sub Region also has a low proportion in those 
industries such as electronics which have displayed the higher 
rates of employment growth in recent years 
(iii) The level of service employment, too, is low in the Sub 
Region, and this applies in particular to the professions 9 
finance and government 
(iv) The low female activity rates reflects the number of jobs 
which are available as a result of the small size of the 
service sector, and the imbalance in the employment structure •. 
( v) The proportion of 1 White Collared 1 workers is relatively 
lown 
(Para. 6.4) 
Post local government reorganisation in Cleveland involved 
considerable changes in policy making. The newly created Middlesbrough 
Borough Council produced a corporate Policy Plan on similar lines to 
those produced by the London Boroughs. This Policy Plan attempted to 
incorporate Structure Plan objectives by concentrating on land 
reclamation and policies which would assist the small firm, in addition 
to central area comprehensive planning. In the 1976/77 period, 
Middlesbrough was one of many authorities which lobbied central 
government for inner areas status and was accorded Programme Authority 
Status in 1978. Subsequent Inner Areas Programme policies have in many 
ways complemented Structure Plan policies by relating economic 
development programmes to assisting small firms and renewing the 
industrial environment (eg declaration of Industrial Improvement Areas). 
At the County level, industrial promotion, involving extensive publicity 
campaigns, was expanded and included representations to central 
Government arguing for changes so that central Government policies would 
be sympathetic to the particular economic problems experienced in 
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Cleveland. Such conflicts of interest between central and local 
government, plus the increasing questioning of traditional policies from 
within local government and in the community over recent years indicates 
some questioning of the consensus strategy which has domina ted local 
politics for over 15 years. The next two chapters will analyse in more 
detail industrial land and Sub Regional Centre policies, and how they 
have reflected some of the conflicts, contradictions and tensions 
involved with local government policy making in this period. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERNISATION POLICIES 
1. Introduction 
Earlier we have emphasised the two major components of modernisation 
policies in Teesside: 
(a) land and infrastructure provision in relation to meeting the 
locational requirements of the steel and chemical industries; 
(b) the promotion of Middlesbrough as a Sub-Regional Centre for 
attracting service and office employment opportunities. Accordingly, 
this chapter analyses the implementation of these policies and is 
sub-divided into two major sections:- Section A describes the various 
elements comprising industrial land policies, Section B discusses the 
background to and detailed implementation of town centre renewal in 
Middlesbrough. 
A INDUSTRIAL LAND POLICIES 
6.2 The reclamation and development of Seal Sands 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the restructuring strategies of the 
steel and chemicals companies involved a locational shift to the 
Teesmouth area. Changing production processes required larger tracts of 
land. An influential element in this process was the changing nature of 
bulk trade and the gradual movement down stream of port facilities. It 
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can be argued that the development of the port, stimulated by its 
increased status following the Hailsham proposals, went hand in hand 
with the development of chemical and steel production because of the 
importance of close proximity of berths to centres of production 
(Hudson, 1981). This movement of industry was assisted by local 
authorities in terms of their intervention in the reclamation and zoning 
of land at Seals Sands. 
In the Teesside Structure Plan, Policy B1 stated that: 
"Provision will be made for the expansion of capital intensive 
industries, particularly the steel, chemical and oil based 
industries, heavy engineering and shipbuilding and repairing." 
(Cleveland County Council, 1977: p 72) 
The analysis which led to the formulation of this policy was 
contained in the Report of Survey (1972) which argued that: 
"Chemical manufacture is increasingly becoming concentrated in 
large, integrated plants, with a growing dependence on coastal 
locations to facilitate the integration of chemicals and oil 
refining. The only large area available for such developments 
on Teesside is at Seal Sands where the reclamation of 1, 000 
acres of land should provide attractive sites for firms wishing 
to build plant for processing imported raw materials." (p 43) 
Seal Sands was first subject to reclamation plans in the 1930s and 
by 1953, 246 acres had been reclaimed and were available for industrial 
development (Taylor, 1982). From 1953 to 1966 most reclamation took 
place on the South Bank but by 1966, pressures were placed on the State 
by the need for major chemicals industries to seek larger areas of land, 
and the programme of reclamation was switched to Seal Sands. At this 
time the responsibility for reclamation was undertaken by the Tees and 
Hartlepool Port Authority although local authorities began to take on an 
increasingly vital role in terms of reclamation, programming and land 
management. 
72 
At the same time, in line with State policies regarding port 
development, work had already commenced on dredging the river channel, 
making Teesport accessible by vessels of 63,000 tons deadweight (at the 
new Tees Dock at Lackenby on the south bank). The new Shell Oil 
refinery and also ICI v s Naptha Crackers at Wilton were built in 1966, 
both making use of the deep water channel. This new port facility 
stimulated demand for sites in the Teesmouth area, and by 1966 4, 000 
acres had been reclaimed on both sides of the Tees and roads had been 
built from Haverton Hill to Stockton, Port Clarence to Seaton Carew and 
from Grangetown to Teesport. (Taylor, 1982) 
In the first phase of the Seal Sands reclamation, Phillips 
Imperial was the first to open a new plan:, an oil refinery. This was 
located adjacent to the ICI distillation plant on the company's North 
Tees site. Following the PIP refinery development, there was an influx 
of petro-chemical and oil-related industry into the Seal Sands area. In 
February 1968, Monsanto, a US chemical company, announced its plans to 
develop a 200 acre site at Seal Sands. This development represented its 
largest investment outside the U.S. At the same time, The Tees Storage 
Company announced that it was taking over 500 acres with an option for a 
futher 50 acres for the storage of 200,000 tons of oil and liquid 
chemicals. 
Teesside County Borough provided the necessary roads and services. 
The council announced plans to co-operate in the development of the area 
by providing 3, 000 yards of dual carriageway to open up the area 
(Northern Echo, 29/2/68). The Tees Valley and Cleveland Water Board 
also undertook to provide large quantities of fresh water necessary for 
chemicals production, and this amounted to some 1. 5 million gallons a 
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day for Monsanto alone. 
Impetus was also given to the development of the Seal Sands by the 
publication, in 1969, of the National Economic Planning Council's 
Regional Ports Survey (HMSO, 1969). This Report advocated the Tees as 
the only port in the North for which big developments should be 
recommended. It was also proposed that the port of Tees should become a 
prototype for a new Government plan to develop selected port areas into 
major industrial complexes, under the 'MIDAS 1 scheme. The Tees was 
selected as the best site in the UK for such a development because of 
its existing port facilities, its European connections and its 5,000 
acres of flat, riverside land. The MIDAS areas were seen as complexes 
of bulk processing and associated industries, alongside major new port 
facilities (National Port Council 1972). Although the MIDAS scheme was 
eventually abandoned, Teesside's industrial port complex in fact 
continued to develop along these lines. 
A major stimulus to the continued development of the Seal Sands was 
the discovery of oil in the North Sea. Whereas the refineries at North 
Tees (PIP) and at Teesport (SHELL) operate using oil imported by tankers 
there was the opportunity to pipe oil ashore from the North Sea. The 
geographical position of Teesside in relation to the oil fields, and its 
existing oil and chemical plants, led to it becoming one of the UK' s 
major oil terminal and refining complexes by the late 1970s. 
The policy of encouraging North Sea oil development, which was 
promoted during the early 1970s, was considered in terms of its likely 
future impact on employment opportunities. The THPA favoured the 
development because of its obvious impact on the future development of 
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the Port. The THPA put forward plans to reclaim land at Seal Sands for 
oil related development. In 1971 a Working Group was set up, comprising 
representatives of the main parties involved or interested in the future 
development of Seal Sands, including industrialists, conservationists 
and the Teesside County Borough. The local authority was quite 
optimistic about the fact that spin-offs as a result of oil developments 
would be beneficial to the local economy. An interesting element of the 
Report which was prepared ( Teesside County Borough, 1972) was the hint 
of some doubt about promoting oil related developments: 
"On the other hand, the image of Teesside as a growth area 
with an improving environment and widening job opportunities 
could be adversely affected by the persistence of a labour 
market, dominated by chemicals and steel, and an environment 
under continuous threat from pollution resulting from the 
development of large capital intensive plants." (p 10) 
These proposals were however accepted and incorporated in the 
Teesside Structure Plan. The proposals were in two stages (see Taylor, 
1982). The first stage comprised reclamation of land which is now 
occupied by the Norsea Ekofisk oil fields concern. A 220 mile pipeline 
connects the Tees to the North sea fields being developed by the 
Phillips Norway Group. Naturally this stimulus to the growth of the 
Port was quite evident; jetties had been constructed to handle ships of 
up to 150,000 tonnes d.w.t. Four jetties were also constructed for the 
export of natural gas liquids, and were located, together with two of 
the crude oil jetties in a large inset dock built by the THPA on the 
North Bank of the Tees. By the end of 1978, the costs of fixed capital 
investment in the Phillips petroleum terminal and separation plant and 
the associated tank farm at Greatham totalled over £300 million. 
The Seal Sands development represented a partnership between various 
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agencies of the British State and the European Community. Although the 
THPA initiated much of the reclamation work, a large proportion of the 
finance for roads, drainage and power supplies carne from the European 
Regional Development Fund. The local authority was responsible (partly) 
for financing reclamation and services but took on board a vi tal land 
management and development control function. The Regional Water 
Authority, through its investment in the Cow Green and Kielder 
Reservoirs, ensured more than adequate water supplies. An additional 
and significant factor in the location of multinational companies was 
the payment of Regional Development Grants towards costs of plant and 
machinery. (Hudson, 1981) 
6.3 Policies for employment generation and diversification: 
Industrial estate provision and land reclamation. 
The policy of providing industrial estates to accommodate 'modern 1 
labour intensive industries was put forward in the White Paper on the 
North East and one outcome of this policy was the construction of the 
336 acre Teesside Industrial Estate constructed by the (then) English 
Industrial Estates Corporation on the south side of Thornaby. According 
to North (1975) new industrial estates constructed in the mid 1960s by 
local authorities played a large part in attracting new industries to 
Teesside. Interestingly, North (1975; pp 116-118) describes the type of 
industry and firm which located on the estate and it is notable that 
many became part of large national and. possibly international 
corporations during the late 1960s early 1970s. We will return to this 
point below. 
Because of the movement of industry up-stream to Teessmouth during 
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the 1960s, many sites were left derelict. Local a.uthori ty reclamation 
and industrial estate provision were therefore interlinked with each 
other. The first major scheme commenced in 1965, at the time of the 
Teesplan when the consultants were commissioned by Middlesbrough Town 
Council to prepare a plan for the reclamation of the derelict 
Ironmasters district, a site of some 384 acres. By 1970 some 1, 500 
acres of derelict land had been allocated £1 million by the newly formed 
Teesside County Borough for reclamation mainly for light industry and 
warehousing. (Evening Gazette, 2/7/70). In 1974, Cleveland County 
Council took over responsibility for industrial land reclamation and 
identified another 500 acres of suitable land, making a total land 
reclamation programme of 2,000 acres. 
Approximately 80% of the derelict sites were disused steel making 
sites, and as Table 15 shows, Langbaurgh had the most reclaimed sites in 
the period up to 1978; this partly reflects the amount of disused BSC 
land along the south bank of the Tees. The figures in this table, 
covering the period 1974-1978, indicate that the land reclamation 
programme was progressing slowly. The chief problem has been in land 
acquisition and the Statutory undertakers' reluctance to sell their land 
voluntarily to the local authorities for reclamation. In the mid 1970s 
the impetus to continued development of industrial estates and land 
assembly for advanced factory building was given by the increasing level 
of unemployment in Teesside associated with the restructuring of the 
economy. A report from the County Council identified the problem as 
follows: 
" ... the costs to the community implied by the investment in 
North Sea oil and the restructuring of the steel industry, in 
particular the proposed closures in Hartlepool will have a 
severe impact on its economy. . . and in the medium term the 
developments are not providing the kind of diversification of 
the occupational . structure that the growing Cleveland labour 
force needs." (Cleveland County Council, 1977) 
77 
Meanwhile the Structure Plan ( 1977) reiterated its commitment to 
employment creation through its policy B3 which stated: 
nprovision will be made for the growth of existing labour 
intensive industries and for industries in this category that 
will be attracted to the area." 
This policy was implemented on two fronts: greater local authority 
involvement in industrial estate provision and building advance 
factories, and the special emphasis on support to the small firm. 
The four borough councils in Cleveland have recently built small 
factory units at Newburn Bridge in Hartle pool; Cowpen Lane Industrial 
Estate, Billingham; St. Annes, Portrack; North Oxbridge in Stocktor., 
Letitia St. in Middlesbrough and Bolckow Road Industrial Estate, 
Grangetown, Langbaurgh. Local authorities have also encouraged private 
developers to build similar units on council-owned land; they have also 
taken up long leases on privately built units and sub-let these to small 
firms. The authorities have concentrated on small units as English 
Industrial Estates which has been active in the area, provides larger 
units (Taylor, 1982). 
In common with the local authority provision of industrial land and 
infrastructure on Seal Sands, their involvement in the provision and 
servicing of industrial estates has received aid from the EEC's Regional 
Development Fund. This aid, which is shown in Table 16, has largely 
been towards the costs of the provision of basic services for the 
industrial estates, including water, gas, telephones and roads. Further 
aid is given to BSC (Industry) Ltd., from the European Coal and Steel 
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Community funds, and this has been used in the development of ESC's 
industrial estates at Brenda Road, Hartlepool and in Langbaurgh. 
Inner city policy and the small firm 
In the discussion on the evolution of State policies on Teesside in 
the previous chapter, we described how inner city policies were a 
response to the structural crisis of capitalism and reflected wider 
institutional changes in the state apparatus which were taking place in 
the early 1970s with the onset of local government reorganisation. 
Because of the impact of the recession on the Teesside economy and the 
need to deal with the effects of restructuring, Middlesbrough was 
accorded Programme Authority status under the Inner Urban Areas Act 
(1978). As the emphasis of inner city policy gradually became geared to 
economic development, so the level of commitment to the small firm 
policy increased. It has been argued (Harford, 1979 and Green and 
Davies, 1979) that the commitment to small firm policies by the Labour 
and Conservative parties alike in the mid 1970s was based on the 
ideological presentation of the "independent entrepeneur battling for 
survival against the big battalions of the giant monopolies and the 
multi-national corporations." Small firm policy became an important 
legitimation for positive discrimination policies which help to foster 
'indigenous' new employment as the larger industries came to be 
considered as major sources of employment loss. This sort of analysis 
permeated offi~ial policy documents. The First Middlesbrough Inner 
Areas Programme thus stated: 
" ... it is obvious that 
jobs will have to come 
possible expansion of 
public and private). 
the majority of the required increase in 
from the establishment of new firms, and 
employment in the service sector (both 
New firms can either be those which are 
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setting up for the first time or those which already exist 
elsewhere, and are attracted to move to Middlesbrough ..• Firms 
which come in from outside, particularly if they retain 
connections with parent companies elsewhere in the country, are 
more likely to contract or move out again in times of economic 
stringency. Thus a key issue the Councils face is bow to 
encourage the establishment and subsequent growth of new firms 
within the Borough.;; (Middlesbrough Borough Council, 1978: p 
30) 
Within the defined inner areas boundary, there is a concentration of 
undeveloped derelict sites (eg Cargo Fleet, Newport North) and a number 
of Industrial Improvement Areas were proposed. Assistance to small 
firms was to be financed by rate levy, and was also in corpora ted with 
the County Council Economic Development Programme. This assistance now 
comprises: 
(a) the introduction of concessionary rentals for small firms; 
(b) the introduction of rates by installments for small firms; 
(c) the production of a producer/supplier catalogue for small firms on a 
County wide basis. 
In addition to the above incentives, Middlesbrough Borough Council 
recently appointed (in 1980) an Industrial Liaison Officer for promoting 
small firm policies, including the investigation of the special needs of 
businesses employing less than 25 employees in the inner areas. 
B SUB-REGIONAL STRATEGY AND THE POLITICS OF DIVERSIFICATION 
6.4 Policy prescriptions 
The regional planning framework for local authority policy 
formulation in Teesside, set down in the White Paper (Cmnd 2206) 
emphasised the attraction of property capital to the area, on town 
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centre renewal and the promotion of Hiddlesbrough as a Sub~Regional 
Centre acting as a social and commercial focus for the whole 
conurbation. In an unpublished paper prior to the White Paper 
publication (North East Study 9 1963) policies relating to town centre 
renewal are described in more detail. 
"In the North East commercial property is just as in need of 
modernisation as industrial plant. It is part of our plan that 
the town centres of the growth zone should be redeveloped and 
there is a need for more modern office accommodation in the 
context of attracting more white collar work to the 
region .... Urban improvement has a direct bearing on efficiency. 
If the road layout and urban facilities do not give firms easy 
and quick access to the things they need in a town 9 they will 
be less encouraged to come and expand there. If the shopping 
areas are inconvenient and unattractive people will go 
elsewhere for their personal business - and ultimately for 
their homes and livelihood. The town 1 s social and commercial 
activity 9 rateable value and municipal standards, will then 
spiral down and so will prospect of growth. It is also a 
matter of improving the region's image •.. " (Cited in Carney and 
Hudson, 1974) 
This analysis was adopted in subsequent planning and policy documents. 
The recently submitted Structure Plan (1977) states that "Central 
Middlesbrough will be developed as the Sub-Regional Shopping Centre." 
(p 80). There are four major dimensions to this policy: 
( 1 ) The provision of an efficient land use system as a focal point for 
the area's road and traffic system; 
(2) Redevelopment would cater for needs of existing shops (including 
pedestrianisation); 
(3) The concept of developing Middlesbrough as a regional centre 
included the development of commercial, entertainment, social 
and administrative functions. 
Structure plan policy B 16 links up the objectives of the sub-regional 
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centre renewal with the overall economic policy of proposing 
Middlesbrough as a sub-regional office centre. 
In discussing how this strategy was adopted, evolved and changed 
since the 1960s and the White Paper proposals, it is useful to examine 
some arguments of the North East Area Study ( 1975) in its critique of 
the Teesside Structure Plan, about the nature of the policies and their 
fundamental weaknesses. Basically three points were put forward. These 
points will be more fully explored in the next chapter (7). 
(1) The planning documents (including Teesplan) did not fully calculate 
the implications of the role of property companies, and assumed property 
interests and those of the local community coincided. The policy of 
positive attraction of property capital to the North East was seen as a 
means of renewing town centres in line with Local Plan and development 
brief guidelines. Alongside the statutory planning process, local 
authorities were expected to provide infrastructure and create the right 
environment for development. However, property interests did not 
necessarily coincide with local planning policy. 
(2) Another factor explaining the limitations of the Sub-Regional Centre 
policies is the assumptions made in the Teesplan (and incorporated in 
the Structure Plan) about retail expenditure patterns and demand for 
shopping floor space. The recession itself, combined with retail price 
inflation (especially between 1972-75) restricted consumption good 
spending. 
(3) An important element behind the formation of central area policies 
during the 1960s was the road lobby. The interests of this lobby were 
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clearly identified in the Buchanan proposals for renewing and 
restructuring town centres in such a way as to accommodate road traffic, 
assuming dramatic increases in car ownership. (see also Hamer, 1974) 
In addition to the above three factors shaping to1...rn centre 
redevelopment in Middlesbrough, there was also a significant ideological 
dimension to the Sub-Regional Policy proposals. In the initial 
discussion on the adoption of a comprehensive urban renewal strategy, 
committee reports tended to legitimise policies by emphasising the 
improvement of the image of the area and the re-creation of some civic 
pride and improvement (it is interesting to note here the parallels 
between the statements made by the 'City Fathers' in the 19th Century 
and those made by con temporary Councillors and local authority 
officials). As the Teesplan noted: 
"A policy of fostering development of such a centre is 
necessary as part of the creation of a new image for Teesside. 
For example, discussion with leading industrialists in 
Teesside .. indicates that the absence of such a centre, with its 
associated commercial and cultural facilities is a weakness 
when comparing Teesside with other conurbations." (HMSO, 1969: 
Vol. 1) 
In much the same vein the Structure Plan argued, some years later: 
"The physical manifestation of urban decay, besides presenting 
certain intrinsic problems, create an unfavourable community 
image. It follows that no opportunity should be lost to link 
with necessary redevelopment the means of making Teesside more 
attractive to developers and residents." (Cleveland County 
Council, 1977: p 26) 
6.5 Dynamics of town centre renewal and the role of property capital 
The attractiveness of land and property as a major focal point of 
investment stems (partly) from wider structural changes in the economy 
and the peculiar and dominant role financial institutions play in the 
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economy (Thompson, 1977, Minns, 1981). In the period immediately after 
the end of the second world war, financial institutions began to invest 
in land. One reason for this was the relatively high rates of inflation 
which made investment in land and property reasonably secure, coupled 
with the ability of its income and capital value to keep pace with 
inflation. Another reason was the reconstruction of the bomb damaged 
cities, combined with a growth in the state and tertiary sectors, 
created a need for a semi-independent institution specialising in the 
provision of use values contained in parcels of land and property. Thus 
in the 1950s, a number of major property companies were formed to take 
on urban renewal and development schemes (Massey and Catalano, 1978). 
Because of the long term turnover in capital invested in urban 
development, long period arrangements were necessary in financing 
/ 
projects. 
Property companies obtained their funds through share issues, 
retained profits (rents) and/or by borrowing from financial 
institutions. In the post 1954 period, building controls and betterment 
levy originally introduced in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, 
were lifted. The demand for office space was such, being geographically 
concentrated in the South East, that only larger property companies, in 
partnership with local authorities, were in a position to undertake 
large scale projects. Financial arrangements were changed from bank 
loans to sale and lease back or long term loans on the money markets. 
By the early 1960s there was a levelling off in demand for office 
space as the post-war boom rescinded. It was in this period that there 
was a move away from development in London to other areas in Britain. 
Massey and Catalano (1978: p 134) describe the background to this: 
"By the early 1960s the conditions t~hich bad provided the 
dynamic for the post-war development boom were beginning to 
change. In the office sector supply started to catch up with 
demand; increases in rents and land values in London slowed 
down. Companies began to seek other areas; between 1960 and 
1965 they turned to provincial towns and to Europe and 
Australia. 11 
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This was one factor for understanding the move of property capital to the 
North East. The role of the State was important here in restructuring 
the property and construction sector. Office Development Permits were 
introduced in order to restrict development in London (because of the 
rent inflation resulting from the boom and to discourage 
'overdevelopment'). Combined with the regional public expenditure 
programmes in infrastructure, ODP 's assured the continued profitability 
of the property development sector. Because of the huge financial 
returns that accrued to this sector during the development boom, the 1965 
Finance Act was implemented in order to provide more stringent taxation 
policies for the property sector, which was seen as making "too much 
profit". A reaction to this in the period between 1966-70 was for the 
property sector to almost come to a standstill and considerably curtail 
development, whilst at the same time attempting to maintain market and 
financial holdings by company mergers or larger companies acquiring 
smaller ones. Despite this process of financial restructuring, by the 
late 1960s property companies began to experience a shortfall in rental 
income. High interest rates and credit policies geared to restricting 
borrowing were instrumental in bringing about the collapse in the 
property market in 1973. A number of points emerge from the above 
discussion of the property sector: 
85 
(1) Property development is highly sensitive to changes in the economy~ 
especially in terms of inflation, interest rates and credit policies; 
(2) Related to this, the role of the state has influenced the structure 
of the property development industry as well as facilitating capital 
investment in town centre developments. 
6.6 Sub~Regional Cent~e st~ategy ~ u~ban renewal in Middlesbrough 1 
The Teesplan estimated the demand for land in the central area 
for civic, commercial and retail uses from an analysis of population, 
income and service employment trends. Population projections were based 
on continued immigration as a result of regeneration of the economy. In 
this way, the planned expansion of the town centre was based upon the 
presumed attainment of economic policy objectives such as diversifying 
the economic base of Teesside and continued support for capital 
intensive industry. Additionally it was also assumed that population 
immigration would generate its own demand for services. Overall, the 
success of the policy of promoting Middlesbrough as a Sub-Regional 
Centre would be dependent on the general assumption that regional 
differences would be reduced through the implementation of the White 
Paper (Cmnd 2206) development strategy. 
Shopping 
The basis of the shopping policy in which most retail functions 
would be located in the central area of Middlesbrough (serving the 
catchment area of Teesside) was the established fact that Teesside was 
served with two shopping centres (Stockton and Middlesbrough) where the 
1This section is based on info~~ation obtained from committee minutes and 
press cuttings which are referenced in detail in the bibliography. 
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quality and range of services were relatively poor. Fostering the 
growth of one of these centres (i.e. Middlesbrough) was seen as the most 
rational means of deploying public investment. Shopping floorspace 
requirements were calculated from existing productivity rates in the 
retail sector and through forecasts of future changes in retail methods 
such as the growth of the multiple chain store and supermarkets. 
Offices 
The rationale for a centralized location of office development was 
based on the following criteria: 
( 1) As a consequence of population growth there would be a demand for 
about 3,500 jobs in the central area services, banks, finance and 
professional services; 
( 2) A "tentative" assumption was made regarding the increase of about 
2, 200 jobs in local government arising from the building up of 
Middlesbrough as an administrative centre; 
( 3) A further allowance of 2, 200 jobs was made for the possible 
increase in civil servant employment if a major government office was to 
be attracted to the area. 
Town centre development in Middlesbrough was programmed in the early 
1960s for the clearance of slum property and modernising the central 
area. By the time the Comprehensive Development Area No ( CDA) was 
submitted to the Minister of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) events 
1This sect5.on is based on information obtained fro~ committee minutes and 
press cuttings which are referenced in detail in the bibliography. 
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had overtaken this planning exercise and the MHLG was to refuse it on 
the grounds that a more comprehensive plan was needed for the town 
centre. It is interesting to note that the initial response to the 
White Paper which selected Middlesbrough as a sub regional centre was 
one that questioned the public expenditure implications of a large urban 
renewal scheme. Detailed proposals for a new regional centre were made 
in the period 1964-1969. It is difficult to assess the degree to which 
local authority partnership schemes with developers had a significant 
bearing on the attraction of property capital to the area. However 
there is evidence to show that other interest groups claimed a future 
stake in the town centre scheme. The Northern Architectural Association 
wrote to the Middlesbrough County Borough Town Planning Committee 
warning that there might be a scramble for rights to undertake 
development by various commercial developers and warned that individual 
local authorities might find themselves under pressure to accede to 
these proposals without a prior coordinated plan. They were also quite 
concerned about the need to exploit their own skills and resources in 
order to assist "in what is probably the major job of reconstruction and 
renewal." Also in 1964 the local authority set about discussing with 
developers the proposals relating to the Town Map which was to provide a 
framework for developing the town centre. In 1965 a redevelopment 
scheme was worked out and the Draft Town Centre Map was published. 
Agreement was reached between the chosen developer and council that 
the local authority would acquire an area of Middlesbrough (the 
Linthorpe Road/Grange Road/ Albert Road area). Further shopping space 
would be reserved elsewhere in the town centre. A whole urban design 
project was undertaken "having regard to government reports in relation 
to traffic in towns". The Buchanan Report's recommendations were to 
1This section is based on information obtained from committee minutes and 
press cuttings which are referenced in detail in the bibliography. 
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have considerable influence in the future course of development of the 
town centre. The emphasis of the Buchanan proposals was the economic 
efficiency of urban centres in terms of land use and traffic 
circulation. Accordingly, although the Consultants were unsure of the 
profitability of the scheme in hand, they were nevertheless satisfied 
that it was a viable project based on "sound economic principles looking 
at the town in a regional context." 
Although the financing of development and details regarding the 
'partnership agreements' were not revealed in the council minutes, there 
is some information relating to expenditure and phasing of the 
Comprehensive Development Area No. 2 (Linthorpe Road/Albert Road). The 
expenditures involved were quite considerable: 
Acquisition of property 
Demolition and clearance 
Services 
.J 
1967/68 
£1 '700' 000 
£5,000 
1968/69 
£1 '700' 000 
£10,000 
£35,000 
The course of the development of the town centre was to change with 
the introduction of the Teesplan. The Teesplan envisaged changes to the 
draft Town Centre Map in light of a greater emphasis being placed on 
Middlesbrough as the Sub-Regional Centre. Investment was to be 
attracted .for the next Comprehensive Development Area involving the 
provision of an extra 200, 000 extra square footage of shopping floor 
space. An important element in the Sub-Regional Centre Strategy was to 
employ considerable resources for the linking of the centre with the 
1This section is based on information obtained from committee minutes and 
press cuttings which are referenced in detail in the bibliography. 
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rest of Teesside. This involved the construction of the Northern Route 
of the A 19 and a re-alignment of the A66-A-1 085. In this way 9 town 
centre policies were linked with the road building programme and the 
ideology of individual car ownership (see North East Area Study, 1975). 
Before the approval of the Tees plan 9 a Report produced by the 
Transport Working Party for officers suggested a 3 0 year phased 
programme for implementation. At this time there was a lobby from the 
Lin thorpe Trades Association representing small businesses and shops, 
which supported a linear development which would physically incorporate 
their businesses in the Town Centre scheme (along Linthorpe Road). The 
Report overruled objections by stating: 
"Any changes from the concept of a compact centre would have 
serious consequences on the development now taking place in the 
centre, and investment currently being considered by developers 
and would delay the preparation of a preferred urban structure 
plan for Teesside." 
Apart from the conflict created as a result of policies favouring the 
larger retail concerns, there was an additional tension created as a 30 
year life was given to many small shops, businesses and residential 
properties. 
Work began on redevelopment in 1968 and was completed in 19749 with 
the final phase (Hill Street Development) completed in 1982. The major 
first phase, known as the Cleveland Centre, was opened in 1972 providing 
335,000 square feet of shopping and 60,000 square feet of office floor 
space. In the next chapter we shall consider some of the problems 
involved in the implementation of the urban renewal scheme. 
1Thi5 section is based on information obtained from committee minutes and 
press cuttings which are referenced in detail in the bibliography. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONTRADICTIONS AND CONFLICTS OF URBAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE 
DECLINE IN CONSENSUS POLITICS. 
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In Chapter reference was made to the fact that modernisation 
policies generated tensions and conflicts in their implementation. A 
detailed study of the issues arising from policy implementation enables 
a deeper understanding of how the gaps between policy objectives and 
outcomes occur and why impacts create new and unintended problems which 
require further interventions by the State. This Chapter looks at the 
way in which contradictions in policy interventions have emerged 
through: 
(i) land allocation policies for 'capital intensive industries', 
and controlling environmental hazards; 
(ii) industrial estate and small firm policies, creating 
alternative employment opportunities; 
(iii) implementation of urban renewal policies and diversifying 
the local economy. 
7.1 Land zoning capital intensive developments and environmental hazards 
The second stage of the Tees and Hartlepool Port- Authority's 
reclamation plans brought about considerable opposition from 
conservation and environmental groups over the development of more land 
for port related industry. The first round of opposition came when the 
THPA announced plans to reclaim land which was in an area of Special 
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Scientific Interest due to its unusual bird population. The THPA did 
not have the statutory powers necessary to reclaim all this land, and 
thus sponsored a Bill in Parliament to enable it to develop the land for 
'port related industry' (Economic Consultants, 1979). 
This Bill did not reach Parliament because the required powers were 
given by the Teesside Structure Plan in 197 4 in policies B. 1 and C. 19. 
However, at the· examination in public of the Structure Plan strong 
opposition was expressed to the reclamation of this area (Cleveland 
County Council, 1977). 
The panel of inquiry upheld the conservationists' protest in the 
case of 85% of the land, recommending in this case that the land should 
not be allocated for future port development. This decision caused a 
local furore, with all the main unions and employers' organisations 
lobbying in favour of the original Structure Plan proposals on a 'job 
not birds' platform (Taylor, 1982). This lobby was certainly 
influential in overturning the panel's decision by the Secretary of 
State, who firmly reiterated the significance of Teesside in terms of 
national economic priorities: 
" ... the Secretary of State considers that the continued 
development of the port and port-related industry on Teesside 
is vital both at a national and at a regional level. He 
accepts the need for port development in this area may arise 
quickly and unexpectedly and that, in this situation, it is 
very important that there shall be freedom for development to 
proceed. He has concluded that, despite the importance of the 
nature conservation considerations, it is of great importance 
for employment in the region and in the overall national 
economic interest that plans should make provision for the 
potential need for deep-water facilities by making this land 
available for 'port-related industry'. (By 'port-related 
industry', the Secretary of State has in mind industrial 
development which requires close proximity to deep water 
berths). (Teesside Structure Plan, 1977 Modification by the 
Secretary of State) 
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What was emerging in the late 1970s was a polarisation of opinion about 
the benefits or otherwise of 'capital intensive' development. This 
opinion was not neatly divided between trade unions and local employers 
and clearly cut across class lines. This can be attributed to the 
influence of modernisation policies and their ability to appeal 
(although with certain limitations) to most sections of the community. 
However there are a number of points to consider about the development 
of, and opposition to, consensus politics in Tees side which stem from 
the nature of class politics and social traditions. 
Class politics and local representation 
Teesside possesses a history of a low level of working class 
militancy and independent organisation. Gladstone ( 1976: p 40) in his 
discussion on the politics of plan making· on Teesside compares the 
history of local political activity in the area, with Sheffield: 
11 
•• politics for most people is something done by 'them'. The 
result is that standards, too, are self defining. As an 
example, there are on Teesside none of the local protest 
groups that have sprung up in Sheffield. Often these groups 
are inspired by people with trade union or university 
experience. But on Teesside trade unionism is muted 
(particularly in the chemical industry) and there is no 
university. The result is an extremely low standard of local 
government." 
ICI especially has a long history of incorporating the trade unions 
into its long term financial and restructuring strategies. In fact the 
management-union consultation structures established by the Company is 
the kind of system that James Prior, the former Employment Secretary, 
appeared to favour, and saw as a model for other major companies (See 
Financial Times, 6/3/81). This has spilled over into local political 
and cultural life and a major contributory factor is the degree of 
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representation ICI has on the local councils (Taylor, 1982). This 
representation can be viewed as essential in ICI's influence upon 
planning and other aspects of local policy. This alone underlines the 
important role local authority as well as central Government policies 
have played in ICI's company strategy. 
Naturally, not unrelated to this is the nature of the local Labour 
Party. Carney and Hudson ( 1978) relate how a strong tradition of a 
certain brand of social democracy had prevailed within the Labour Party 
in the North East since the 1930s and this factor is clearly illustrated 
by the incorporation of local Labour Party policies within the long term 
political strategies of the local bourgeoisie. The formulation of 
modernisation policies and the creation of a consensus around these 
policies illustrates this. This is no less true in Teesside. In fact, 
despite the changes in control over the local state machinery between 
Conservatives and Labour (since the late 1960s/early 1970s) there has 
been a strong continuity in local policies. This is partly reflected by 
the adherence to modernisation policies of both the local Conservative 
and Labour Parties, and the right wing nature of the Labour Party 
itself, reflected in the recent move to the Social Democratic Party by 
two local Labour MPs. 
All the above factors, especially the strong representation of local 
industrial interests on the local councils together with the weakness, 
both organisationally and politically, of the local labour movement have 
shaped the nature of local authority intervention in Teesside and 
Cleveland over the last 20 years or more. 
The more autocratic character of local goverment intervention can 
be illustrated by the nature of public participation programmes adopted 
by the local authorities. During the late 1960s, with the formulation 
of local planning policies in the Teesplan, conflicts arose between the 
coordinator of the consultants and local politicians. Franklin 
Medhurst, who was the Coord ina tor, aimed to give the public as much 
information as possible about the nature of the plan-making process and 
the issues involved. This was in a period before public participation 
was formally integrated into Structure Planning. 
Naturally this was a sensitive issue and councillors were no doubt 
afraid of their credibility and power base being threatened. The other 
source of conflict was over the issue of pollution. Medhurst considered 
this as a major problem, but again created a great deal of tension 
between the Tees planners and local politicians because he focussed 
attention on the major sources of pollution, ICI and BSC. The local 
politicians denied the fact that pollution was a problem, to such an 
extent that when the word had crept into the council minutes, it was 
ommitted and replaced by the word 'condition'. (Gladstone, 1976: p 44) 
Medhurst was finally sacked in 1967, and the Teesplan was produced 
four years later in 1971. The question of environmental problems and 
pollution was however brought into Structure Planning (Report of Survey, 
1972) and this was no doubt due to growing individual and collective 
protest over the effects chemical toxic pollution was having on 
surrounding residential areas. What was evident was that in the early 
to mid 1970s there was a growing realisation that the strategies put 
forward by the local authority regarding the regeneration of the local 
economy were failing. Local unemployment was increasing and jobs were 
not being attracted to the area. There is also evidence to suggest that 
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major decisions about policies and the process of their implementation 
pre-empted public participation exercises, creating legitimation 
problems for local Government. A study of local participation in 
Teesside criticised the way local authorities brought in the public at a 
late stage and the limited time made available for consultation. It has 
therefore been argued that because the decision making process barely 
reflected public opinion, and the available discretion over policies was 
severely curtailed by pre-existing decisions, participation techniques 
seemed an 'empty shell' (Community Advancement Project, 1976). This was 
no doubt a source of considerable resentment and frustration which 
possibly added to the questioning of major modernisation policies. The 
fact that policy objectives were not being realised, together with the 
effects of the recession on the local population, gave impetus to those 
groups to oppose policies which contained effects that would threaten 
the quality of the environment. This is a context for understanding the 
emergence of an environmental lobby in Teesside, and the conflicts over 
the land allocation and reclamation policies in Seal Sands. 
Environmental hazards and deepening contradictions for economic policies 
Tensions not only existed between pressure groups and the local 
authority, but also within the local institutions of the state and 
between local and central Government regarding future land needs for 
capital intensive development. This is illustrated by the formulation 
of policies on the future of the land at North Gare/Seaton Channel, 
adjacent to the Seal Sands area. In the modifications to the Hartlepool 
Structure Plan (Cleveland County Council, 1979b) the Secretary of State 
proposed to make available approximately 440 acres of land at North 
Gare/Seaton Channel for port related industry on the grounds that 
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further deep-water port facilities were necessary to meet national 
port-related industrial requirements. This land has also been 
designated an Area of Special Scientific Interest because of the wading 
birds in the marshy area. Both Hartlepool Borough Council and Cleveland 
County Council objected to these proposals on environmental grounds 9 and 
because the THPA had not produced a sufficient case to substantiate 
doubling the amount of land already zoned at Seal Sands in the Teesside 
Structure Plan (430 acres) for port-related industry. The final 
decision of the Secretary of State following Cleveland 9 s objections and 
those of various other objectors are still awaited. In this case, the 
interests of the employers' organisation and the main unions again 
converged against objections to this development on environmental 
grounds. Teesside Chamber of Commerce argued that "Hartlepool must 
strike the balance between pollution and jobs", and called for "the very 
stringent environmental controls" to be relaxed in a period when 
Hartlepool was faced with 5, 000 steel and construction workers being 
made redundant (Evening Gazette, 1/4176). The Middlesbrough District 
Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union added that 
Hartlepool must not 91 put birds in front of human beings". 
Gazette, 6/7/76) 
(Evening 
As the Hartle pool inquiry shows, the local authorities in Teesside 
became increasingly concerned about both pollution and safety hazards on 
Seal Sands, and also about the prospects of having large areas of 
industrial land for yet more capital intensive industry. This indicated 
not a sudden reversal of existing policies but a more or less slow 
movement in that direction. So in the late 1970s there emerged a 
challenge within local authority circles to the existing consensus, 
based partly on the conflicts and lobbies over the Seal Sands' policies 
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but also because of the clear failure of policies to produce their 
desired outcome. 
This shift in policy emphasis also relates to the fact that 
Cleveland has one of the highest concentrations of potentially dangerous 
industry in Western Europe. There are 21 hazardous installations and 
the Health and Safety Executive has identified zones of 1 km and 2 km 
within which it requires to be consulted in relation to significant 
numbers of people working and living in the zone. 26, 000 people live 
within 1 kilometre and 72,000 people work within 2kms: "During the last 
few years there has been an increasing awareness by the public and L.A.s 
of the problems associated with modern technological development and the 
conflicts between the need for economic growth and conservation." 
(Cleveland County Council, 1979d: p 109). The Cleveland Health and 
Safety Executive had indicated that they wished to be informed about 
applications for planning permission which affect property within two 
kilometres of any listed major hazardous plant. The concern is with any 
significant increase in the number of people at risk living or working 
within these areas. In Cleveland the number of major hazardous 
installations and their location is such that the two kilometre zones 
cover most of the built up areas of Stockton, Billingham and central 
Middlesbrough. Both the Health and Safety Executive and Cleveland 
County Council recognise the prejudicial effect that these installations 
can have upon the future development of these areas, and also the delays 
caused by the consultation procedure on planning applications (Cleveland 
County Council, 1979). 
The much delayed nuclear power station at Hartle pool (due to come 
into operation in 1982) adds further to the risks of the area. A safety 
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zone has been designated around it which includes parts of the Seal 
Sands and the industrial areas of Hartlepoolo This zone will present 
problems for expansion of other potentially hazardous industries in the 
area. Hot-Jever, in an area of high unemployment, jobs alone have been 
seen by some as more important than considerations of hazard or 
pollution o Hartle pool B. Co , which administers an area experiencing 
heavy job losses largely due to contraction in the local steel works, 
has been keen to attract industries of any kind, regardless of hazard 0 
In 1979 Hartlepool, together with the Northern Economic Planning 
Council, lobbied to have one of the new batch of fast breeder reactors 
to be located in Hartlepool to bring in new jobs (Evening Gazette, 
6/6179). 
Hartlepool Council has also been notable for relaxing safety 
standards recommended by the Health and Safety Executive (H.S.E.) and 
supported by Cleveland County Council. In one case, for example, 
Hartlepool first allowed a chemical company, Magnachem Ltd., to build a 
plant in close proximity to a residential area and then supported its 
application to store over twice the amount of ethylene and propylene 
stipulated by Cleveland County Council and the H.S.E. as a condition of 
approving its planning application. Hartlepool Council argued that, by 
accepting the safety recommendations of the H.S.E., the area was 
"putting itself at a disadvantage by imposing conditions of this nature" 
(See Planning Application CH/600175, C.C.C. Planning Committee 1517176 
and 30/12/76). After a number of meetings and considerable pressure 
placed upon the County Council, a final agreement was reached and 
Magnachem's application was passed in its original form (Cleveland C.C. 
Planning and Industrial Promotion Committee (Special), 18/10/79). 
99 
This relaxation of safety standards as part of the scramble for jobs 
may not have been important were it not for the fact that the Magnachem 
site is virtually adjacent to the former village of Graythorpe, which 
was completely surrounded on all sides by petro~chemical and oil plants. 
The 1971 Working Group which examined the possible impact of the new 
oil-related developments on residential areas in Teesside concluded 
that: 
"·.the clearance of High Clarence, Port Clarence and 
Graythorpe would add significantly to the amount of land 
available for the full range of production and storage 
facilities . 11 (Teesside County Borough, 1972) 
Hartlepool Council refused to clear Graythorpe, despite protests from 
the residents living there, on the grounds of the cost of clearance and 
of rehousing the residents. The residents' protracted campaign to be 
rehoused was finally successful and in October 1979, Michael Heseltine, 
the former Secretary of State for the Environment, ordered the Council 
to demolish all the houses in Graythorpe at its own expense. The 
decision of the Council in July 1979 to allow Magnachem to develop its 
potentially hazardous plant "only feet away from the Graythorpe houses" 
was thought to be instrumental in bringing about the DOE's decision some 
three months later. It is also interesting to note that Magnachem had 
relocated from Pickering where it had been 'thrown out' because of the 
Company's frequent disregard for pollution safeguards (Northern Echo, 
10/7/79). 
There are indications that the 'jobs at all costs' philosophy which 
has been very much bound up with the politics of modernisation has been 
challenged in recent years. Local residents living around the 
chemical/oil complex at Seal Sands have become more aware of the 
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potential hazards of certain installations and are opposing new plants 
that are hazardous. In Hartlepool, for example, the central government 
wanted to site a new titanium plant, a move which the council supported. 
After a local public meeting and a well organised demonstration, local 
residents managed to convince the planning authority that the proposed 
plant should not be encouraged to locate in Hartlepool. After the 
public meeting one resident wrote to the local newspaper expressing 
fears about the implications of siting the plant in the area: 
"They said that it couldn't happen in Flixborough, but it did. 
There the residents had been told that that particular plant 
was safe and houses were flattened miles away. Can one 
imagine what could happen if a vast explosion occurred at the 
ICI or a nearby site causing a chain reaction. Flixborough 
would be like a five pence banger going off in comparison to a 
hydrogen bomb." (Hartlepool Mail, 20/7/79). 
Another resident argued that: 
"The North East has been exploited by just about everyone and 
everything in the name of progress to the detriment and 
complete disgregard for the area or its people. The jobs 
involved are but a drop in the ocean and not worth mentioning, 
compared to the danger to the health of our area." 
(Hartlepool Mail 20/7/70) 
The case of Carless Chemicals 
The most recent issue concerning the location of a plant belonging 
to the firm Carless Chemicals in Middlesbrough town centre has raised a 
number of important questions about the future strategy of local 
Government environmental planning policy towards hazardous or 
potentially hazardous industries in Teesside. 
In 1976 the Cou.'lty Council's plans to design the Northern Route 
Stage III road through the central area of Middlesbrough met with some 
concern from the Health and Safety Excutive (HSE) due to its proximity 
to the ethylene oxide storage tanks on the Carless Chemicals site; 
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Ethylene oxide is a colourless gas classified as moderately to severely 
toxic and concentrated exposure to it is lethal. It is a dangerous fire 
hazard but will only explode when exposed to flame. One of its uses is 
in the manufacture of ethhylene glycol which is a base, product of 
anti~freeze. The manufacture of ethylene oxide involved the 
introduction of ·a process which did not require planning permission as 
it was permit ted development within Class 8 of the Town and Country 
General Development Order, 1973. The construction of the plant was 
carried out within the recommended safety measures imposed by the HSE. 
The conflict between the local authorities (Cleveland County Council and 
Middlesbrough Borough Council) and central Government arose when the HSE 
made their comments on the siting of the proposed Property Services 
Agency in the town centre: 
"Although the likelihood of an incident occurring is small, it 
would be unwise to further develop for housing in the radius 
within 500 metres of the ethoxylation plant at Carlesss 
Chemicals Ltd. In addition it would be unwise at a distance 
between 500 metres and one kilometre to consider any 
developments higher than 2 storeys or with large exposed 
window areas and a high density population. These views have 
been formulated on a calculation based on the TNT equivalent 
and while no strong claims are made for their accuracy they 
form a basis when other more detailed or accurate means of 
determination are not available. They are a guide, in many 
cases, the only guide, to hazard limits." (cited in joint 
local authority Report on Carless Chemicals) 
The controversial aspect of the HSE's recommendations were as 
follows: 
"(a) If the ethoxylation plant remains, there should be no close 
development around the works as outlined in para. 2. 
(b) If the plant is removed, then the grounds on which we are 
advising against development would be eliminated." 
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The local authorities report went on to outline the main points of 
negotiation between the Company and the local authorities, and with the 
HSE. The option of further restrictions (or any at all) being placed on 
the Chemicals Company as regards the prevention of any further creation 
of hazardous processes was rejected by the Company on the grounds that; 
" ... the restrictions would place Car less Chemicals in a worse position 
than their competitors." The Committee Report raised what seemed to be 
the central issues about controlling industrial development of this 
nature: 
"The problem in part, arises from trying to use general powers 
available under planning legislation to control an "open 
ended" problem if we take into account advances in technology 
which may produce new materials." 
The central point of confict between central and local Government 
lay in the use of powe!"s; as the leaders of the two councils stated in 
their letter to the Times (717 /81), although the Company has complied 
with the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 regulations in its 
introduction of new processes, the plant nevertheless represents a 
potential environmental hazard to what would be, if redevelopment took 
place, a relatively highly populated area of the city. Whilst the HSE 
reckons that existing planning powers could adequately cope with the 
problem, the local authorities argue that it is a matter for the HSE to 
use its executive powers in removing and relocating the plant elsewhere. 
The dilemma faced by the local authorities, as clearly stated in the 
Committee Report, has been about what course of action to take. The 
following options were considered: 
(1) Appropriate and relocate the plant elsewhere in Teesside and 
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continue with the redevelopment programme-requiring considerable 
public expenditure; 
( 2) v Take the chance 9 that the plant was safe and continue with the 
urban renewal programme; 
( 3) To take heed of the HSE 's advice and thus face the prospect of 
central area blighting, which would be politically unacceptable. 
The option chosen was to take an 'interim strategy' including a 
publicity campaign, lobbying of central Goverment, continue 
granting improvement grants for a Housing Action Area and continued 
discussion at a Ministerial level. 
Three important questions are raised in this particular instance: 
( 1) What are the implications of the Carless case for control 
over pollutant industries in Teesside? 
(2) Why have the HSE made such recommendations at this point in time? 
( 3) What are the implications for leg isla ti ve and policy control over 
industrial development in the area? 
The existing legislative framework for controlling pollution is the 
Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 and the 1971 Town and Country 
Planning Act which covers control over development. In 1972, the 
Secretary of State issued a Circular to local planning authorities 
giving guidance on planning applications involving major hazards. A 
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major hazard is defined as " ... a situation where, if any incident 
occurred, there might be substantial loss of life or serious injury 
outside the confines of the work place. 11 Following the Flixborough 
disaster in 1974 the guidelines stressed more stringent controls over 
the siting of hazardous or potentially hazardous processes. However, at 
the level of legislative control, the Royal Commission on Health and 
Safety had already concluded that the planning machinery was not devised 
as a means of protecting the public against industrial hazards. 
Subsequent reports on this question have been published by the Advisory 
Commit tee set up by the HSE. In 1979, the Committee produced a Report 
which outlined the standards for the storage of dangerous substances 
whereby quantities in excess of recommended thresholds needed to be 
notified to the HSE. In terms of planning control, the Report 
considered that a material change of use should include the introduction 
of a hazardous process. However this element has not been incorporated 
into existing legislation and it is primarily left to the remit of 
development control policy for controlling the siting of hazardous or 
potentially hazardous plants. The question of safety is left to the 
bargaining strength of shop floor organisation at the work place in 
implementing Health and Safety Legislation (see Kinnersley, 1977 for an 
excellent discussion on this). 
The weaknesses of legislative control over the siting of hazardous 
plant are obviously reflected in the nature of industrial development 
which has occurred in Teesside over the past 20 years or so. As 
mentioned above, even the most stringent development control policies, 
backed up by a strengthened leg isla ti ve framework, have 1 i ttle 
effectiveness if the majority of interests do not wish to see them 
implemented. Certain development control guidelines regarding 
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industrial development have been relaxed because of the fear of putting 
off prospective developments. The 11 jobs not birds" lobby tended to 
consider that industry should be encouraged at any price. This attitude 
may be 
effects 
changing with both a greater community 
of industrial pollution on the local 
awareness about the 
environment, and an 
increasing questioning within local authorities about the actual 
employment benefits of capital intensive industries, and the fact that 
these developments can adversely affect the image of the area. 
The case of Carless Chemicals, then, could partly reflect a shift 
in policy towards pollutant industries. It does represent an example of 
a situation when the State will act against the interest of a particular 
capital if that stands in the way of securing major policy objectives: 
in this case the implementation of a programme of social infrastructural 
investment. Carless does not represent a vital feature of the local 
economy in the way that ICI does. The political influence of ICI on 
policies cannot be under-estimated. The fact that ICI can relocate its 
plant if conditions become unfavourable for profitability is obviously a 
key factor that restrains the enforcement of rigid land use planning 
controls. Hudson (1981) in his study of the development of ICI in 
Teesside cites the example of ICI 's location of its PVC and chlorine 
capacity in Wilhelmshaven rather than in Dunkirk being related to the 
fact that "German politicians at both city and regional level were the 
most helpful ICI had met." Therefore it is unlikely, unless there is a 
mass widespread social protest that the HSE will make similar 
interventions against the multi-nationals as it did in the case of 
Carless. 
In one sense, Carless represents a political crisis for the State 
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with regard to control over pollutant industries. The explosions at 
chemical plants in Staleybridge and Salford, near Manchester, in 1981 
and 1982 respectively and subsequent national publicity has placed 
pressures upon the HSE to be seen to be carrying out its functions by 
making the local authorities aware of the potential dangers that a 
chemical plant represents. This question of legitimation has spilled 
over to the responsibilities of local authorities who are campaigning 
vociferously to force central Goverment to act and remove the plant. 
This implies that the Carless case may have wider repercussions 
regarding both local authority policy and the influence of the 
enviromental lobby on the siting of industries in Teesside, and possibly 
the future development of the area as 'a dumping ground' for hazardous 
industries. 
Politics of land zoning 
The growing objections to allowing further large scale 
petro-chemicals development were not solely based on concern about 
hazards and pollution, but also on the demands to attract more 
labour-intensive industry into the area. In the early 1970s the 
euphoria which surrounded the potential of oil related development for 
Tees side led to wildly over-optimistic projections of new jobs (see 
Cleveland County Council, 1979). As the oil related development got 
underway, it was recognised that investment by oil companies in the area 
would produce relatively few jobs, and that employment in 'spin off' 
industries, such as the oil platform construction site of Laing's which 
had closed by 1979, would also be very limited. It was thus proposed 
that more land should be zoned for 'light' industry in order to redress 
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Teesside 1 s heavy industrial image and help to attract more small labour 
intensive companies. 
However, the existing oil and chemical companies, together with the 
THPA and the main unions, have historically formed a very strong lobby 
in Teesside for the continued and unfettered development of 'heavy 
industry'. Attempts by the County Council to reduce the amount of new 
land being zoned on Seal Sands for such developments have been strongly 
resisted by this lobby. For example, it was proposed that north of the 
Tees, where the Tees Tunnel was to be located, a certain amount of land 
would be allocated for light industrial uses. This proposal was 
strongly favoured by the County Council planners but rather than 
proceeding with the implementation of the policy, the County Council 
merely 'noted' the plan rather than forcefully supporting it. Gill 
Taylor supplies evidence that this particular policy was made 
ineffective by the pressure placed on the Council by ICI (Taylor, 1982). 
An interesting example of ICI's influence upon the local authorities is 
when the County Council agreed to ICI developing a general industrial 
estate on 20 acres of land near Port Clarence subject to the condition 
that the industry would be 'non polluting and non hazardous 1 • It was 
also agreed that the estate would be developed by labour intensive 
industry. In fact neither happened. The Calor Gas Group Ltd applied 
for permission to extend their premises and installation and take up 10 
acres of the site. Because of the lack of political committment to the 
above policies conditions on the development were relaxed and the 
expansion went ahead. 
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7.2 A critical evaluation of industrial estate and small firm policies 
There are two questions to be considered when evaluating industrial 
estate and small firms policies; 
(1) Have industries located on the estates provided the jobs to 
compensate for jobs lost in the chemicals and steel industries? 
(2) Do the small firms, in reality, provide the major source of 
employment growth in the Cleveland economy? 
A Survey of Industrial estates undertaken by Cleveland County 
Council in 1977 reveals that net employment growth in 16 industrial 
estates between 1972-1977 was 7,460 (Table 17). As part of this 
research, a study was undertaken, using the Cleveland Manufacturing 
Establishment Data Bank as the major data source. This data bank 
comprises information on employment changes of manufacturing firms, by 
location, covering a period 1965-1971-1977. Details were available also 
on ownership, and male/female employment. The methods of 
Robinson/Storey research on the Cleveland economy are described more 
fully elsewhere (Robinson and Storey, 1979 and 1979a). This particular 
industrial estate survey covered 12 industrial estates in Cleveland 
involving a total 105 firms. (see Table 18) Although the survey was by 
no means fully comprehensive, the results confirm trends identified in 
previous analyses about the location of branch plant and 'mobile' 
industry on industrial estates. Between 1965-71 there was an overall 
increase in employment of over 1600, and this mainly comprised new 
openings. Between 1971-1975 however, there was a decline in total 
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employment 7 with employment levels returning to those which existed in 
1965. It has been argued that in Teesside. 7 female activity rates are 
significantly below the national average (see North 7 1975: pp 121-122) 
The Survey revealed that a substantial proportion of total employment on 
the estates was female - in 1971 this was nearly twice that of male 
employment o This seems to confirm the suggestion that a major reason 
for choosing Teesside to locate factories or branch plants was because 
of the availability of female labour reserves and that as a result 
industrial estates provided significant sources of female employment in 
Teesside. It is also interesting to note that of all the firms 
surveyed 7 over 40% were owned and controlled outside Cleveland o 
Furthermore, a large proportion of total employment loss involved plant 
closures, although it could not be identified whether these involved 
complete closures or relocations elsewhere. If we combined the results 
of the two surveys, the major source of employment generation on the 
industrial estates has been warehousing, distribution and services. 
However it is clear that overall employment growth in the industrial 
estates has not compensated for employment losses in, for example, ICI 
and BSC. An assessment of the policy of small firm formation as 
encouraged by local authorities (and more recently by ICI and BSC), must 
be made in relation to employment changes by individual units of 
production. 
In their study of the Cleveland economy, Robinson and Storey (1979) 
classify company openings by type and origin (Table 19). Taking new 
indigenous firms first, it is clear that over the period in question, 
(1965-77) these firms contributed relatively little to employment. 
Although the number of indigenous firms was large ( 188), these created 
only 3,725 jobs in total. The authors of the study compare the new firm 
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formation rates in Cleveland and the East Midlands? taking into account 
data differences. They show that even if Cleveland's rate of new firm 
formation were raised to that of the East Midlands 7 this would create 
only about 700 extra jobs over an eleven year period. 
In the light of the small firm's policy pursued by the local 
authorities 7 Storey and Robinson's study is very interesting. The data 
shows that new independent company formation is not likely to make a 
significant difference, at least in the short-medium term. It is also 
argued that exogenous openings are related to regional policy 
initiatives. The data suggest that exogenous openings accounted for 93 
out of 303 new establishments (31%) but provided 74% of employment. 
However 7 the creation of 11,392 jobs in exogenous establishments by 1976 
must be set within the context of over 34,000 gross job losses since 
1965 and a progressive decline in branch plant .movement in recent years. 
There is another aspect to the attraction of exogenous plants in 
Cleveland. Robinson and Storey argue that: 
" .. it may be the entry of large branch plants from outside the 
area that has depressed the level of entrepeneurship and new 
firm formation in the County. There may be a second dilemma 
between making a short/medium term impact upon employment by 
attracting branch plants 7 but in doing so weakening the 
entrepeneural base upon which self sustaining growth in the 
long term has to be built." (Robinson and Storey, 1979) 
However, this pattern of employment change is only partly to do with 
the various regional and local authority policy measures designed to 
'attract' jobs. It is argued here that the combination of regional and 
urban policies and accumulation imperatives, which have involved the 
location of branch plants in Teesside as part of the restructuring 
strategies of larger national, and in the case of the chemicals sector, 
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multi~national companies in the face of increasing international 
competition and the economic crisis, account for the changes in the 
Teesside economy in the 1970s. In Chapter 1, in discussing the 
background to State intervention in Teessidep we noted how State spatial 
policies became increasingly integrated with the Na ticnal Industrial 
Strategy that sought not only to restructure capitalist production but 
also the State. Regional and urban policy had lost many of its 
traditional egalitarian aims in that regional aid ceased to be 
conditional on the generation of employment, was channelled to capital-
intensive industries, and was often given to firms that would in any 
case have located in assisted areas. In Cleveland, for example, the 
area has received as much regional assistance as the whole of Wales and 
half as much as the whole of Scotland but manufacturing jobs have been 
lost through closures and contractions both in the 'traditional 
industrial sectors' and those located on the industrial estates. This 
situation has become more acute since the end of the area's investment 
boom in 1976: more jobs have been lost through closures in the four 
years 1976-79 than in the eleven years between 1965-76. In addition, 
the forms of regional assistance available have not directly encouraged 
the diversification of the economy through further industrial 
developments. The combination of these factors with the conflicts 
between the development needs of the larger capital intensive firms and 
smaller, 'light' industries has effectively increased Cleveland's 
vulnerability to closures or contractions in its two main sectors (see 
Taylor, 1982) . 
Viewed in this light, the limitations of small firms policy are 
evident. Although the County Council are currently pursuing active 
financial support for small firms through Section 137 o.f the 1972 Local 
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Government Act, at the same time there is a growing scepticism about the 
short or medium term benefits of this policy. The 1979 Monitoring 
Report produced by the County Council stated: 
"There are those who believe that the birth of new small 
businesses in Cleveland is vital to the future of our economy. 
Certainly small manufacturing firms (i.e. less than 50) have 
shown better records recently for job growth than larger firms 
which tend to have declined from 1965 to 1976. However the 
actual contribution to the total number of new jobs in 
Cleveland, made by small manufacturing firms is minimal. 
Certainly we cannot look to such firms to make substantial 
inroads into our unemployment totals, at least in the short or 
medium-term." 
(Cleveland County Council, 1979d: p 28) 
The significance of the above statement is that it forms a section 
of opinion within the local authority which clearly questions existing 
policy initiatives. The formation of alternative policies clearly 
reflects this questioning process (see Chapter 9). 
It is clear that in the most recent period (i.e. 1979-82) the 
challenge to the politics of modernisation has not only emerged within 
the local community over environmental issues, but also within the State 
itself expressed in the conflict between local and central Government. 
The Examination in Public of the Structure Plan revealed conflicts 
between the local authorities, especially Cleveland Colli~ty Council, and 
the THPA over the zoning and allocation of land 'for port-related 
industry. In this case, central government decided in favour of the 
Port Authority and thus capital intensive industry. The maintainance of 
Teesside as a Port zone, ~-vhich would provide an ideal location for 
advanced sectors dealing with raw material production (chemicals) , has 
been a consistent priority for central Government. 
The recognition that these national priorities have conflicted with 
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local economic policy objectives towards the creation of a 1 balanced 1 
economy, has led to a dilemma for local authorities. Long term planning 
objectives pursued by local authorities have been mutually contradictory 
they have assisted through infrastructure provision in the 
restructuring of the steel and chemical industries whilst at the same 
time, through industrial estate provision, provided little contribution 
to reducing unemployment in the Cleveland economy. In many ways, 
policies have been continually constrained by the actions of individual 
firms. The optimistic forecasts of the Tees plan and the vague notions 
of diversification have ideologically legitimised these policies. Thus 
the contradiction between intentions and outcomes inherent in State 
intervention is clearly illustrated in the formulation of industrial 
land policies over the past 15 years. Inner city policies have only 
served to bring these contradictions more to the surface as local 
government has attempted to tackle the worst excesses of restructuring, 
reflected in the socio-economic decline of inner Middlesbrough. 
Furthermore, national State economic policies, which have been geared 
towards fiscal measures to reduce public expenditure, have placed severe 
constraints on local authorities in dealing with the economic and social 
problems associated with high unemployment. These are some of the 
issues which we will return to in our concluding chapter. (Chapter 9) 
7.3 Politics-of-urban-renewal-and the Sub Regional-Centre-Strategy 
It is difficult to assess the precise effect that the clearance of 
the town centre and comprehensive redevelopment had upon the local 
population. It is even more difficult to trace the response by the 
local population to such upheaval. However, minutes of the Town 
Planning Committee and Town Centre Development Committee indicate that 
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there were a number of petitions made by local shopkeepers and residents 
expressing concern about the uncertainty and blighting effects that the 
redevelopment scheme was having on the area (see Gladstone, 1976). A 
number of sociologists and planners have written about the social 
consequences of urban renel..ral programmes which were introduced in the 
major conurbations throughout the 1960s (e.g. · Jackson, 1981) . Many 
conclude that schemes were too 'ambitious' or that local Government 
officials were 'insensitive' to the needs of the local population. In 
retrospect, these criticisms are valid and hold some ground. But they 
fail to take account of the fact that conditions of accumulation in this 
period required spatial restructuring of urban centres in order to 
provide some of the material conditions of capitalist production 
(services and modern infrastructure). Because of the nature of fixed 
capital investment, with the relatively long turnover time generally 
involved, the State (through local and regional institutions) was 
required to take an increasingly interventionist role in renewing the 
built environment (see Harvey, 1978). This role was not just in the 
field of public investment but also in the form of management and the 
creation of more sophisticated urban planning machinery. In terms of 
class politics and vested interests there ~.:as the powerful influence of 
the road and transport lobby (Plowden, 1973 and Hamer, 1974). This 
lobby comprised civil engineering concerns, the motor and oil industry 
and the road haulage industry. Barbara Castle was to remark at the time 
when the lobby was considerably influential: 
"When I took over as Minister of Transport the most vociferous 
lobby in this country was that represented by road interests. 
The propaganda and pressure groups led by the British Road 
Federation said that we must concentrate all our resources on 
building the first 1,000 miles of motorway. The environment 
lobby had barely been born. When I tried to suggest that 
there were other considerations that we should bear in mind I 
had an uphill task because about the whole of public opinion 
and the then opposition were against me. n 
East Area Study, 1975: p 228) 
(cited in North 
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It was clearly stated in the Teesplan and council policy documents 
that the future design of Middlesbrough 9 s central area would follow 
quite closely the guidelines set down in Colin Buchanan 9 s rYTraffic in 
Towns 99 ( 1965). The Sub Regional Centre policies were as influenced by 
the above lobby as in other areas of the country. The massive road 
programme planned for Teesside in the early 1960s, following the 
recommendations of the White Paper, is an illustration of this. 
The influence of community pressure groups was one of modifying 
rather than substantially changing policy decisions. As we have 
remarked earlier, the level and existence of independent working class 
organisations (eg Trade Union rank and file, community associations, 
etc.) has been at a low level. At the same time, attitudes within local 
government were such that little relevance was seen in the process of 
consultation. This is reflected in the Report (cited above) which had 
overuled objections to the Town Centre Plan by arguing that delays in 
decision-making would not attract "investment currently considered by 
developers." This was also at a time when the recommendations were 
being made by the Planning Advisory Group that public consultation was 
an important and integral part of the planning process. The attitude 
within local government, as expressed by the Development and Planning 
Officer appointed on the completion of the Teesplan, was that 
development had to override other aspects of planning such as social 
considerations. Gladstone describes the "getting things done" mentality 
which existed at this time: 
11 9 Getting things done' depends on an argument that goes as 
follows. The first priority is bringing jobs to the area; 
being able to attract employers depends on their attracting 
bright young executives. And this in turn depends on being 
seen to do 'prestige' projects which get you into the twenty-
first century. And this is largely a matter of building large 
scale city centre development and a system of urban 
motorways." (Gladstone, 1976: p 50) 
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However, the sub-regional plan did not proceed without opposition. 
Lynch (1976) in his study of a residents' association in North Ormesby, 
an area affected by major road proposals, describes how it was formed 
over environmental issues and conflicts over involvement in the policy 
process. The Association was initially set up by ward councillors at 
the time the Neighbourhood Organisation Strategy was being encouraged by 
local and central government. As blighting affected the area (situated 
due east of the town centre near the riverside) residents became 
disillusioned with their representatives as it was evident that major 
urban renewal policies were adversely affecting the general environment 
of the area. This was reflected in the statement of one resident who 
claimed "that the councillors had only formed the group to manipulate 
it". 
An interesting aspect of Lynch's study is how sources of militancy 
in the Association stemmed as much from the lack of consultation and 
involvement in the decision making process as with the tangible effects 
. of policy decisions. The Association began to bypass the decision 
making process by formulating their own 'alternative plan'. 
"As ratepayers we want to show the council exactly what we are 
after. To be quite honest, I feel that we do much of the work 
for the councillors. I am not completely happy with the 
interest some councillors have shown towards our problem." 
(Evening Gazette 19/4/75) 
At a public meeting, open conflict was revealed between the 
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residents and the local authority. A planner at the meeting considered 
that there was no difference between their plan and the one produced by 
the residents. There was an uproar at the meeting when the residents 
argued that their plan was very much in conflict with the one produced 
by the planning department. (Lynch, 1976: p 56). Although it would be 
wrong to generalise or draw concrete conclusions about the degree of 
conflict that existed over the Sub-Regional Centre Plan from Lynch's 
study, Gladstone ( 1976) suggests that the local authority pursued a 
policy of incorporation whilst at the same time attempting to legitimise 
its authoritarian approach with the ideology of needing to 'get things 
done'. 
Problems in·the implementation·of urban·renewal·policies 
Retail development in Middlesbrough was considerably delayed because 
of the recession, and due to the uncertainty regarding the possible 
development of out-of-town 'super stores'. This was a source of 
competition to town centre stores and it was only when confirmation was 
given by the local authority that such developments would not take place 
(being actively discouraged in Structu!"e Plan shopping policies) that 
major stores decided to move into the Hill Street area. 
Gazette, 7/8/72) 
(Evening 
The active promotion of spatially centralised shopping facilities in 
the town centre was nevertheless undermined by the ASDA superstore 
proposed development at Eston in 1978. Structure Plan policies, 
although discouraging the development of the store, were 'modified' 
because of considerable pressure brought to bear on the local authority 
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by local residents and politicians o There was a five week public 
inquiry in which the major issue to arise was the existing lack of 
shopping facilities in the Eston area 9 and the high level of local 
unemployment o The inspector overuled objections from Cleveland County 
Council by arguing that Middlesbrough was already an adequate provider 
of convenience durables (Evening Gazette, 16/10/78)0 
Another instance when the future of the Sub~Regional Centre Strategy 
was undermined was with the case of the attraction of the Department of 
Environment's Property Services Agency to the area. In fact a 
substantial component of the ideology of large scale redevelop-
ment and provision of an "attractive town centre" was that prestigious 
developments would be encouraged to locate in Middlesbrough. It was 
only after some considerable lobbying on behalf of the local authority 
that the Government, in 1976, decided to locate the PSA offices in 
Middlesbrough. This was, at the time, part of a conscious policy of 
office decentralisation. A site was cleared and services were provided 
costing the local authority approximately £1 million. 1 Approximately 
3,000 jobs were expected to be provided by the development. However, in 
1979; when the Conservative Government r-eturned to power, the decision 
was reversed as a major shift in policy away from decentralisation of 
office location was implemented, reflected in the abolition of the 
Location of Offices Bureau. 
Whilst a combination of the effects of recession and changes in 
central Government policy were important factors responsible for the 
1 (Source: Officer in Planning Department) 
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problems encountered in Middlesbrough achieving its major sub-regional 
centre status as envisaged in local authority policy documents, they 
were not the only factors. Local government reorganisation attempted to 
resolve the potential conflict in land use planning likely to be created 
by major changes in the location of economic activity, by creating 
unitary authorities responsible for a clearly identifiable metropolitan 
(or conurbation) area. Reorganisation at the same time only served to 
heighten tensions within the State, i.e., between vested interests 
representing district authorities comprising major town centres (in 
Cleveland: Redcar, Billingham, Hartlepool and Stockton). This conflict 
was over the relative status of these urban centres in the shopping and 
office development hierarchy set down in the Structure Plan. An example 
of this conflict was when the British Steel Corporation closed its steel 
plant in Hartlepool in 1978. Representing the steel workers in their 
lobby of Parliament in their campaign to prevent the closure, the Labour 
MP for West Hartlepool, when arguing for more office jobs for the town, 
criticised the Structure Plan policies in their assumption that a 
spatial concentration of commercial activity in one centre will benefit 
outlying areas (Leadbetter, 1978). It is possible to assume that such 
pressure had some effect in the DOE's modification of the Structure 
Plan's office policy: 
"Their current policy has the fundamental aim of obtaining the 
employment which comes with office development. As regards 
the location of offices, they still wish to give the 
sub-regional centre first priority, but they do not wish to 
enforce this priority to the extent that potential employment 
would be lost to the County." (Cleveland County Council, 1979 
Modification to Structure Plan) 
A recent monitoring report on the sub-regional centre policies 
raises some interesting questions regarding the effects of policies and 
future developments in the town centre (Cleveland County Council, 
1979c) . The Report considered that Middlesbrough had "outshone" other 
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centres in the sub~region in terms of office development. In the 1970s 
new offices housing the County Council Headquarters, the local head 
office of the Employment Service Agency and the Department of Trade and 
Industry were developed in the town centre. In addition to these major 
developments, Middlesbrough became the focal point for the location of 
local building society offices serving the Cleveland area. It can be 
argued that this pattern of office location was to be expected 
considering the amount of public investment that went into the provision 
of infrastructure and servicing sites in the town centre. The Report 
did add that the cancellation of the location of the PSA to 
Middlesbrough was a "severe set back to the development of Middlesbrough 
as the sub-regional centre. It means that yet another large area of 
vacant land now faces an uncertain future, adding to the already 
considerable acreage of vacant land in and around Middlesbrough." ( p 11) 
As regards policies which have attempted to attract major retail stores 
to the town centre, they have met with some success although the 
effective catchment area of the centre does not significantly go beyond 
the Stockton and West Hartlepool areas. In fact the town centre does 
not offer significantly more in terms of range a'f"ld variety than exists 
in Stockton a..l"!d Hartlepool. Specialist retail functions have not been 
established in ~1iddlesbrough although this was the intention of the 
Tees plan. The envisaged role of Middlesbrough acting as a centre for 
culture and entertainment has not materialised: 
"If Middlesbrough is compared with other centres of similiar 
size it does emerge -rather badly in terms of entertainment 
facilities. For example it has no sports centre, no theatre 
and no major art gallery. 11 (Cleveland County Council, 1979c: 
p 11) 
In a review of employment forecasts for Cleveland, the County takes 
an extremely cautious view of the likely future creation of service and 
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office jobs in the County. Undoubtedly these forecasts are influenced 
by the apparent failure of the Sub-Regional Centre Strategy to achieve 
its original objectives in terms of attracting 9 alternative 9 forms of 
employment on a significant scale. This point will be examined in 
greater detail below. 
The Sub-Regional Centre policy (or package of policies) as a means 
of attracting alternative forms of employment was given impetus during 
the late 1960s - early 1970s when labour shedding was occurring in the 
Steel and Chemical industries. The large scale infrastructure activity 
undertaken by the local authority in the PSA site is an example of the 
lengths to which the local authority is willing to go to attract office 
employment to the sub-region. On the other hand, industrial change in 
the various dominant industries has no doubt had a negative influence on 
the development of the Centre. Increasing local unemployment has had an 
impact upon living standards, compounded by the fact that the sub-region 
has a lower than national average female activity rate. One can infer 
from this that a large proportion of families depend upon one income or 
upon unemployment and related benefits. Therefore local consumer demand 
has been reduced to a level below that planned for in the Teesplan. 
fact the reality of events (including the failure of Teesside to obtain 
a university) only serves increasingly to question the assumptions made 
in the Teesplan. These assumptions relating to employment projections 
will be critically examined in the concluding part of this Chapter. 
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Sub~Regional Strategy and conflicting~responses 
In his study of town centre renewal and the role of local 
authorities, Gough (1976) selects five themes around which we can 
concentrate our discussion on the Sub-Regional Centre policies and their 
relationship with sub-regional planning in Teesside. These themes are 
as follows: 
(a) The accommodation of the local authority to the needs of the 
developers and user firms; 
(b) The interaction of (a) with the need to limit State expenditure; 
(c) The reflection of these and other contradictions in local authority 
planning; 
(d) The extent to which these contradictions break through in spite of 
that planning, and; 
(e) The employment implications of these policies. 
(a) Accommodation-of·the-needs-of-developers-and~user-firms 
In the White Paper on the North East and the Teesplan there was a 
conscious intention to attract and subsidise development capital as a 
means of renewing town centres in the sub-region. In the late 1960s the 
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Teesside County Borough negotiated with developers to create prestigious 
office and shopping developments. Their profits were guaranteed through 
land assembly, compulsory purchase of properties and servicing of sites. 
In the case of Middlesbrough, there is little information regarding the 
level of public expenditure involved except for the figures cited above. 
Gough ( 1976, Chapter 7), in his survey of a number of town centre 
schemes undertaken during the early 1970s, argues that local authorities 
have continually subsidised development capital by accepting low initial 
returns on land value and the revenue losses that these frequently 
entail. In Middlesbrough, partnership arrangements were made between 
the local authority and the chosen developer. This type of arrangement 
(when the local authority remains the major land owner) benefits the 
developer because it avoids the uncertain time factor and associated 
costs and risks involved with site aquisi tion. The developer can wait 
until the market picks up before moving in to build on the site. This 
occurred to some extent with the development of the Cleveland Centre but 
especially so with the Hill Street area. This is why the planning and 
phasing of site development are crucial in terms of avoiding extensive 
losses. 
Apart from direct expenditures, the local authority, through its 
strategic planning policies, will guarantee the profits accrued from 
development. In Teesside, a major feature of the road programme was the 
linking up of the Middlesbrough town centre with the hinterland in order 
to maximise accessibility to retail users. A major proposal of the 
structure plan was the realignment of the A 19 to the east of the town 
centre (known as the Northern Route) and the South Bank East/West route. 
In line with this road programme of linking the various urban centres in 
Teesside was the strategy of spatial concentration of development. This 
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spatial concentration of investment in urban redevelopment has enabled 
both the restructuring of development capital (and civil engineering 
firms) and retail capital by promoting centralisation and by forcing out 
the less competitive elements (e.g. shops along Linthorpe Road). 
(b) Fiscal-limits to·public·expenditore 
Naturally the pressure of developers' requirements comes up against 
the limitations imposed on local authority expenditure by central 
government . During the 1970s, expenditure constraints have become 
severe, creating delays in the programming of the Hill Street shopping 
area. The form of intervention the local authority takes can be 
understood as an interaction between two pressures: the imposition of 
curbs on spending and pressure from developers. At the sub-regional 
level the curtailment of part of the road programme (eg. the Marton 
North South Link Road Structure Plan Modification, 1977) and delays in 
the phasing of development have led to blighting and environmental 
problems and created additional uncertainty about the future of the 
centre. 
(c) eontradictions·in local·aothority·planning 
In the 1960s, pressures on local authority planning produced 
responses in the form of the adoption of different methods (eg corporate 
planning) and long term programming of policies and investment. The 
creation of a centralised state apparatus has been .reflected in the 
reorganisation of local government. Whilst the County Council has been 
supposedly concerned with strategic planning questions at the 
sub-regional spatial scale, local authorities have been concerned with 
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local planning and details of implementation. In the case of the 
development of the sub-regional centre at Middlesbrough, this has 
created conflicts over local authorities' Structure Plan objectives 
creating a 'hierarchy of shopping and commercial centresv. Even at the 
outset of the Teesplan, the Stockton Labour Party, in partnership with a 
property firm, envisage comprehensive redevelopment of the Stockton High 
Street giving Stockton a highly competitive status in relation to 
Middlesbrough. This conflict was not based purely at the level of 
general policy. Vested interests saw the redevelopment of the Stockton 
town centre as a highly profitable venture. Gladstone describes the 
processes and rationale behind Stockton's town centre redevelopment as 
follows: 
"The town had commissioned John Poulson's firm to do a study 
of shopping needs. As is often the case when private firms 
are given a commission like this they took the hint and showed 
that there should be more shopping space. Some big retail 
chains and a developer built the new shopping area. Obviously 
this sui ted the developer. It also sui ted the chain stores. 
Knocking down small shops· and building big new ones improves 
their compe ti ti ve position and increases their assets. 11 
(Gladstone, 1976: p 52) 
Interestingly a number of these contradictions permeated the County 
Council's appraisal of the Sub-Regional Centre Strategy. A list of the 
disadvantages of the current policies are presented as such: 
11 ( 1) It could restrict and inhibit growth of other centres in the 
County and therefore is contrary to some District Council 
aspirations; 
(2) It could go against the current shopping trends towards out of 
town shopping; 
(3) It could push up land values in the main centres; and, 
(4) It could require expensive infrastructure, for example 
extensive car parking. 11 (Cleveland County Council, 1979c: 
p 19) 
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(d) NeN·set·of·problems and-contradictions 
The re-evaluation of policies, although part of the Structure Plan 1 s 
monitoring exercise, reflect attempts by the state to come to terms with 
the conflicts described above. However, State planning strategies in 
the case of sub-regional centre policies are unable to contain new sets 
of contradictions which hinge around the following: 
( 1) Politicisation of individuals and groups as redevelopment 
programmes create social upheaval. This is an issue which not only 
applies to residents directly affected by redevelopment and road 
plans 9 but also the movement of population to the outlying areas. 
The latter aspect has involved increasing problems with 
accessibility by public transport to the town centre. In the late 
1960s, a severe crisis became evident in the local public transport 
system, partly due to the priority of spending upon roads (see 
various Evening Gazette articles of this period). 
(2) The crisis in the property market 9 which has been an endemic 
feature of the 1970s, has affected the pace of renewal and 
confidence in policy implementation. 
(3) During the late 1970s, a legitimation problem occurred because the 
basis of the strategy as a means of creating an image of prosperity 
broke down, as the recession has led to increased local 
unemployment and reduction in consumer spending and its volume in 
the town centre (although this applies also to other centres in the 
region). 
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(4) The fact that the local authority has little control over the 
location of investment in the private sector (firms taking over 
office space), whether it relates to property or 'user' capital, 
places a continuing question mark over policy assumptions which 
claim that facilitating expenditures will achieve a level of 
employment, relating to the original Tees plan projections. This 
particular aspect of the policy has been made relatively 
ineffective by the actions of other units of capital and 
nationalised industries which have continually been involved in 
labour shedding throughout the 1970s. 
(5) Finally, as the recession deepened, and 'pockets' of local 
unemployment appeared within the sub-region, local authorities have 
tended to place an emphasis upon policies which contain potential 
conflicts at the local level. We have indicated that local vested 
interests have tended to ignore strategic planning issues as long 
as these interests attain an adequate return on investment (in the 
case of local authorities, maximizing rate income and prestige 
development), but as the recession has deepened there are clear 
cases where strategic planning questions have been challenged in 
order that local employment opportunities in the other urban areas 
as increased. The examples we have referred to above are the lobby 
for more office employment in Hartlepool, and the successful appeal 
by the ASDA hypermarket for its development at Eston. 
(e) Employment-implications-of-the-Sub~Regional-Strategy 
We have so far considered the implications of urban renewal policies 
in relation to land use, environment, and relative benefits and costs to 
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interest groups directly affected by (and also affecting) policies. The 
outcomes of policies in terms of hierarchy .££ functions have diverged 
from original policy intentions - i.e. Middlesborough has not developed 
to the degree as originally intended in the White Paper and Tees plan. 
The other dimension to this, and a crucial one, is that the strategy as 
a means of diversifying the employment base of the local economy has 
been limited in its effectiveness. 
Tables 20a and 20b shows the original Teesplan forecasts by sector 
using their own Standard Industrial Classifications. The forecasts made 
by the Cleveland County Council (Table 21) include data for the SICs 
(ie. 1968 Standard Industrial Classification) covering an area not 
contiguous to the originally defined Teesplan boundary. This makes 
comparative forecast and trend analysis difficult. However, despite 
these caveats, overall comparisons can be made if rates of change are 
also included in the analysis. 
The Teesplan forecasts were formulated from the expected influence 
of regional policies on the level of population on Teesside (HMSO, 1969, 
Vol.2: p 68). Changes in productivity and methods of retail 
distribution were also incorporated in the projections. The Teesplan 
forecast was for an increase of 70, 000 jobs in the service sector 
between 1966-91 (+72.4%). A conservative estimate was for an increase 
of 52,000 jobs (+53.7%). 
A comparison of trends with Middlesbrough Employment Exchange Area 
(Table 22), containing the sub regional Centre and Cleveland show some 
interesting results. Actual changes between 1966-76 in Cleveland 
(covering a larger area) show an increase from 88,000 to 118,000 in 1976 
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with a projected increase of approximately another 14,000 jobs to 
132,000 in 1991. This means that an actual rate of increase of 34% 
occured between 1966-76 and an overall projected change of 50%. In 
1966, service employment (SICs XXII ~ XXVII) amounted to 29,682. There 
was as an actual increase in employment of 9,590 (32.3%) to 39,272 in 
1976. Employment forecasts are not available for Middlesbrough but 
these statistical changes in employment are significant in that they are 
well below the Teesplan forecasts, even at the conservative level of 
prediction. Furthermore, the projected and actual rates of change for 
Cleveland are similar to the Teesplan forecasts, although it must be 
remembered that Cleveland covers a larger area than the original 
Teesside planning area. In this context, forecast changes can be 
compared; it could be assumed that the Cleveland area would have a 
higher forecast change that the Teesside area taking into account that 
it covers a larger area (including Hartlepool). This is not the case. 
If we return to employment changes in Middlesbrough, it could be 
assumed from the Sub-Regional Strategy encompassing the growth centre 
for service employment in the Teesside sub-region, that the rate of 
employ.ment change would be higher than that for Cleveland or Teesside. 
In fact the post 1976 trend has been for a slight absolute decrease in 
employment. In 1978, the Structure Plan Monitoring Report outlined the 
significance of these changes for the local economy: 
"The growth in the service sector should also be seen in 
relation to the growth in manufacturing industry and to the 
economy as a whole. The service sector has traditionally not 
played a major role in the Cleveland economy and has been 
under represented in certain service industries such as 
financial and professional (business) services. This still 
remains an area of the service sector which, despite recent 
growth, significantly lags behind national employment indices. 
In all service industries, with the exception of construction, 
the Cleveland economy would appear to be under-represented 
when compared with Great Britain as a whole. 11 
County Council 1978a: p35) 
(Cleveland 
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Employment opportunities provided by service industries have tended 
to go to women and studies conducted by the County Council have 
indicated that a large proportion of jobs are of a low paid part-time 
nature. (Cleveland County Council, 1978) 
Possible future decline in service employment is related to both 
cuts in public expenditure and the introduction of new technology. This 
underlines how much the Teesplan forecasts were 9 overoptimistic 1 • The 
political importance of these forecasts was that they led to the 
consensus - until the late 1970s - that alternative employment was 
available for those being made redundant in the base manufacturing 
industries. In the next Chapter we shall examine in greater detail the 
impact of policies and changes in the economy on the labour market and 
consider the question of growing unemployment in Cleveland. 
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CHAPTER·8 
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND-UNEMPLOYMENT ~-eURRENT·PROSPECTS·FOR·THE 
TEESSIDE·EeeNOMY 
.. 
8. 1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented a broad outline of the trends in the Cleveland 
economy up until the late 1970s. The purpose of .this chapter is to 
· analyse the dramatic increase in unemployment in Cleveland over the past 
four years ( 1978-82). An assessment will also be made of the 
performance of ICI and British Steel 9 the two major sources of job loss 
to the local economy. 
8.2 Backronnd:·restrnctnring; ·employment·and-nnemployment 
The long term decline in profitability of British manufacturing 
industry has been well documented (Gough, 1982; Harrison and Glyn, 1980) 
and some of the factors relating to the 1 disadvantaged 1 position of 
British industry compared with its European counterparts have been 
covered in Chapter 1, (Table 1). The slowing rate of accumulation has 
not been compensated by any significant counter influences and as a 
consequence the international economy is experiencing a long period of 
'stagflation 1 , a combination of slump in output, demand and employment 
combined with hyper-inflation (Mandel, 1978). 
One of the effects of falling profitability has been a gradual cut 
back in investment and the particular impact of the profits squeeze in 
Britain has led to a more marked phase of 'disinvestment 1 than has been 
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experienced since the 1930s (Community Development Project, 1977, 
Blackaby 1979) . This process of deindustrialisation is not only an 
effect of the recession but also a response in terms of restoring 
profitability and competitiveness. The dynamics behind restructuring of 
production have been described by Campbell (1981: pp 122=123; see also 
Carmichael, 1978 relating to local labour markets}. There are two basic 
changes which will enable an increase, or stave off, a further reduction 
in, profitability: 
(a) Influence the amount of labour power employed by reducing the number 
of workers employed through (i) the closure of individual plants in 
a multi-plant organisation. This would usually involve those with 
the lowest rate of profit, least efficient, etc.; (ii) reduce the 
number of workers at the individual plant level either through 
redundancies or non-replacement of posts where vacancies occur. 
(b) By changing techniques of production, i.e. the type and quantity of 
means of production in relation to labour power employed. This 
could involve increasing labour productivity through increased 
mechanisation and reducing unit costs of production. 
Both these processes involve a reduced demand for labour or the 
numbers of workers required for any given level of output. The ability 
of firms to undertake such strategies depends upon the level of class 
struggle - the degree of struggle for control over the labour process. 
It can be argued that in recent years this struggle has intensified and 
part of the most recent strategy of the State has been to shift the 
balance of power in favour of owners of capital and management by 
placing further restrictions upon trade union organisation (e.g. 1982 
Employment Act). 
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8.3 Restructuring in Cleveland • An overvie~ 
In Chapter 3, employment changes were seen to be the result of 
investment in new capacity and new technological processes which enabled 
increased productivity and output with a reduced labour force. 
Therefore method (b) above was the predominant source of restructuring 
up until 1979. Table 23 shows volume of investment in major 
manufacturing firms in Cleveland 1974-81 and the ratio of employment 
los·s to Regional Development Grant investment in ICI and BSC 1976~79. 
This underlines conclusively the significance of state involvement in 
restructuring of industry in Teeside. The picture changes after 1979 
and this will be discussed in some detail below. 1 
8.4 Crisis in Petro-Chemicals and the Future of ICI in Teesside 
The most recent review of local economic prospects to be made by the 
County Council presents a bleak picture of future trends in the local 
economy: 
"It is estimated by the County Planning Department that total 
employment in Cleveland declined by 40,000 between 1977 and 
1981. The latest employment forecasts suggest a further decline 
in employment of some 14,000 between 1981 and 1983, before a 
modest improvement sets in." (Cleveland County Council, 1982: p 
6) 
The report states that the unemployment rate has increased from 7% 
in 1975 to 18.9% in 1982 and is within 1% of the unemployment rate 
The analysis of recent changes affecting ICI and BSC is based on a 
comprehensive surve of financial press cuttings. Key references are 
cited in the text but all sources are referenced in the bibliography. 
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within Northern Ireland. Furthermore, for wthe unemployment rate to be 
reduced to the 1975 level it would be necessary to create about 38,000 
additional jobs. About 24,000 would be needed for a 10% unemployment 
rate 01 (ibid p6). Recent events (June 1982) relating to ICI's 
retrenchment plans for its petro chemicals production at Hilton will 
make the current forecasts on the 9 over optimistic v side, and if the 
Wilton complex ceases production altogether it would not be exaggerating 
to describe the effects as a near catastrophe for the local economy. 
the latter part of this chapter will outline local economic trends. 
This section deals with some of the underlying processes giving rise to 
the question mark now hanging' over ICI in Teesside. 
Recent research undertaken by Hudson ( 1981: p 19) reveals that the 
decline in Teesside as a prime location for ICI stems from ICI's lack of 
access to North Sea Gas which forms a cheaper source of petro-chemical 
feedstock than crude oil derivatives. ICI 's major competitors in 
petro-chemicals products are oil companies which have for some time have 
been able to gain access to North Sea gas which is piped ashore in North 
East Scotland. The possibility of other chemical companies taking 
advantage of cheaper gas feedstock brought a response by ICI in 1981 to 
the effect of considering plant closures on Teesside (Hudson, ibid: p 
19). This possibility has now become more real and the reasons, albeit 
complex,· will be outlined below. 
Gambling for a Tax deal with 9;000 jobs 
ICI's position in terms of petro-chemicals production is not unique; 
financial commentators have repeatedly shown the extent of overcapacity 
which is currently affecting the European chemicals industry and the 
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pressure on the industry to rationalise itself will increase~ not 
diminish (Cameron, 1982). This pressure has been brought about through 
decline in profitability and tremendously intense pressure of 
international competition. In 1980 ICI experienced a 54% reduction in 
net profits as follows; 
1st Quarter £162 million profit 
2nd Quarter £ 80 million profit 
3rd Quarter £ 10 million loss 
4th Quarter £ 6 million loss (Source: Financial Times 23/4/81) 
There was a dividend reduction for the first time since 1938 which 
sent a severe shock wave rippling through the stockmarket. 
Profitability was restored in 1981 but it was apparent that one of the 
world's leading chemical companies and Britain's biggest manufacturing 
concern was in its weakest position for many years. This weak position 
has been identified by the new Chairman of ICI, John Harvey Jones, as 
relating to the current Government support for Shell and Esse's ethylene 
plants at Mossmorran in Scotland (Cameron: 1982). 
Towards the late 1970s ICI 's major investments in Wilton comprised 
its napthalene and propylene plants and the construction of a sixth 
cracker of 500,000 ton capacity jointly owned by ICI and British 
Petroleum. This venture was completed behind schedule and with the 
total cost doubling. Despite these investments, ICI was falling behind 
in its ability to extract 'technological rents' due to American 
companies use of cheaper feedstock for plastics production. The 
building block for polyetheylene is ethylene. Ethylene can be cracked 
from either oil or gas feedstocks and most European countries crack 
naptha to make ethylene. One of the natural gas liquids, ethane, is a 
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much cheapar feedstock. American companies already use this and have 
flooded the European artificial fibres and plastics markets with cheaper 
products. Large quantities of ethane lie under the North Sea and 
supplies are expected to come ashore in the near future. The major oil 
companies 9 Shell and Esso 9 who were instrumental in '1the abandoment of 
the State 1 s gas pipeline11 which would have linked up with the Teesside 
complex will benefit from direct access to ethane. In early 1982 the £1 
billion FLAGS pipeline from the Brent oil field will ultimately pump 
ethane through to Esso 9 s petro-chemicals plant under construction at 
Mossmorran in Scotland. The Mossmorran plant is expected to start 
producing cut-price ethane-based ethylene. (Elrichman 17/6/82). 
Selective support· for the oil companies is primarily focussed in the 
tax concession contained in the Finance Bill involving a tax-referred 
price for gas produced and transferred from an oil company to its 
chemical subsidary for periods of up to five years at a low fixed 
transfer price. These tax concessions extend to BP which is planning to 
transfer mixed gases from its Magnum and Forties Fields to BP chemicals 
for use at its Grangemouth complex. If these. concessions are 
implemented it would mean that oil companies would have access to cheap 
raw materials whilst ICI will have to buy its oil-based chemical raw 
materials (Naptha for example) at market prices (Cameron 24/6/82). This 
competitive advantage must also be set in context of an evident shift in 
world petro-chemical production to the Middle East. Middle East 
countries such as Saudi Arabia are now building petro-chemical complexes 
because of the abundant cheap supply of indigenous gasses. As Elrichman 
states, the most serious threat to ICI is not the plant at Mossmorran 
but when the Saudis complete their first ethylene crackers in 1983/84. 
ICI 9 in its desperate bid to gain government tax concessions, has 
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threatened to shut its Teessirie petro-chemicals complex with a possible 
loss of 9~000 jobs. Sue Cameron summarises the pressures on both ICI 
and the Government. 
l'1ICI cannot be given the same tax concessions~ because it is 
not an oil company with North Sea production and it does not 
use ethane gas as a raw material for making petro chemicals. 
It uses naptha which is made from oil and which has to be 
bought at variable arm 0s-length market prices. Unless there is 
a change in plan ICI 1 s ethylene production costs will almost 
certainly be twice as much as those of its competitors.~ 
(Cameron 29/6/82) 
In the meantime ICI's response to the crisis in petro-chemicals has 
been to close one polyethylene plant at Wilton, involving a loss of 700 
jobs, and do a portfolio swap with BP~ICI will take over 80% of the 
million ton ethylene cracker. At present the question -remains whether 
ICI will carry out its threat of plant closure in Teesside in the same 
manner as the oil companies threatened to close their plants in 
Mossmorran and Grangemouth. The agreed deal with BP suggests that 
ICI will maintain some commitment to Teesside but, given the stakes 
involved and the world wide restructuring of petro-chemicals production, 
the attractiveness of Teesside is not the same as it was. 
8.5 British-Steel:--Bleak-prospects for-Teesside 
Since the starting-up of the modern blast furnace at the 
Redcar/Lackenby complex~ the fortunes of the steel industry have 
fluctuated dramatically, compounded by the strike in 1980. 
In 1979, despite a £400m interim grant by the state, the Corporation 
recorded a loss of £545 million which was paralleled in 1980 by another 
loss of over £500 million. (Financial Times 26/9/80). A classic crisis 
of overproduction hit the industry in the late 1970s which previous 
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rounds of rationalisations and technological innovations have been 
unable to avert. The industry has been a centre of political conflict 
since the State 1 s reduction in financial aid and strategy of minimising 
unit production costs. More recent strategies have hinged on 
productivity and manning agreements~ and as Mainwaring (1981) points 
out, the Steel Unions semi-acceptance of the managerial Corporate Plan 
in terms of 1 job bargaining 1 has had crucial implications on how the 
industry will continue in the future. 
The Corporate Plan (CP) presented by the Chairman Ian McGregor which 
received the go-ahead from the Conservative Government, recommended 
substantial capacity cuts and increases in productivity; "if demand 
continues at current levels a capacity of no more than 8m tonnes would 
be justified." (Financial Times 10/10/80) 
Naturally the cuts in capacity involved considerable reductions in 
manning levels. In 1981 a further 25,000 jobs were to disappear along 
with the 52,000 jobs shed in 1980. In terms of productivity the BSC 
converted their measurement of output from the traditional man tonnes 
per year to man hours per tonne and the aim was to get this as low as 
possible, i.e. a reduction from 13 man hours to 8.5 man hours per tonne 
was envisaged. (Financial Times: 10/10/80) 
The significance of these rationalisation proposals for investment 
were profound; out of a total £730 million "external funding'' allocated 
by central government, £180-million was portioned off for redundancy and 
closure costs for the 1981/82 financial year. 
The precondition for the success of the strategy was for a greater 
disciplining of the workforce; as the Financial Times commented: 
r:But more than redundancy and pay freeze is being demanded from 
the BSC workers - they have been told they must improve working 
practices, eliminate unnecessary tasks and cut absenteeism and 
unnecessary overtime." (Financial Times 25/2/81) 
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The most recent outcome of the Corporate Plan is the incr-easing 
indebtedness of the Col."poration which is attributed to the national 
steel strike and further "dramatic'' decline in steel consumption o The 
BSC 1 s chairman 1 s commi ttment to the Corporate Plan has been resolute -
if it was not on target "further significant closures will have to be 
contemplated 1' 0 
British Steel in Teesside 
In late 1981, the Teesside plant had not yet made the productivity 
improvements demanded in the CP-9 man hours per tonne compared with 8 
man hours achieved in South Wales. This position had been aggravated by 
the technical problems experienced by the Redcar Coke ovens which were 
pushing up costs. Fears were aroused that unless technical difficulties 
could be resolved the coke ovens would be closed down. The effects of 
the Plan on Teesside are clear; in early 1980 the workforce had 
totalled 20, 000 o In October 1981 this was reduced to 13,500. The 
political and social conflict arising from the CP were evident in 
Teesside. The Managing Director had claimed that attitudes of the 
workforce were partly responsible for not achieving adequate 
productivity deals: 
"The problem has been less one of getting the numbers down but 
changing the attitudes of those who remain." 
There was a greater demand for: 
"Whole hearted co-operation particularly in areas like 
flexibility and inter-changeability on maintenance tasks." 
.• 
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The workforce had felt, given the closure of the Consett and 
Hartlepool steel works, that workers in the North East had had their 
fair share of redundancies (Financial Times 27/7/81). 
It can be argued that BSC began to suffer the effects of their own 
rationalisation plans. Three furnaces were originally planned for the 
Redcar complex and the construction of only one had resulted in 
considerable inflexibility in terms of continued production. Meanwhile 
more job cuts have been planned (1,900) and management attitudes 
regarding "excessive overtime'' and pay had led to scepticism amongst 
trade unions regarding the future of the plant. 
11 Some Union officials have interpreted yesterday's warning over 
the Teesside survival plan as meaning that the Redcar plant 
would close if no agreement were reached." (Financial Times 
9/10/81) 
Although precise employment figures are not available on steel, the 
estimated employment change in metal manufacture in Cleveland has 
involved a reduction from 27,022 in 1977 to 19,400 in 1980. The 
forecasts envisaged a further reduction to around 17,000 in 1981 with a 
levelling off towards the 1990s. These forecasts could well be 
undermined if the Redcar closure does take place. 
Postscript on·Bse in Teesside 
Since 1981 the BSC Teesside Division has cut 5,600 jobs (Cleveland 
County Council, 1982: p 6). In July 1982 BSC announced plans to axe a 
further 900 jobs "because of a serious fall in steel sales in the first 
quarter of this financial year". BSC have warned that if the Unions did 
not accept the proposed job cuts then some steel mills would have to 
close permanently. The first job losses will arise as a result of the 
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closure of the pellet plant with the remaining being lost across the 
Division (Wright and Hetherington 1 22/7/82). These recent developments 
seem to indicate that the complete closure of the coke ovens at the 
Redcar/Lackenby plant is a distinct possibility. If this did occur~ 
then an extra 7 1 000 jobs Hould possibly disappear in the South Tees 
works. 
8.6 Labour Market trends and increasing·unemployment 
Table 25 shows that employment loss, although significant in the 
steel and chemicals industries, occurred also in other sectors of 
manufacturing with little com pen sating increases taking place in 
services. The 1980 Monitoring Report considered that these were 
"disturbing statistics" in that there had been a drop of almost 10% in 
the total number of employees on the 1977 levels - the equivalent of 
23,200 jobs. If the total job loss is allocated to the main sectors, it 
can be seen that 11 construction1' has been the worst hit - experiencing an 
employment loss of 32% or 8 1 100 on 1977 levels. The growth in 
employment in services was only 0.9%, a net increase of only 1,000 new 
jobs. 
The rate of job loss or contraction has been quite dramatic. In the 
period 1977-79 the annual average rate of contraction was an estimated 
2.5% - in the 1979/80 period this doubled to an estimated 4.8%. The 
most alarming indicator of the crisis in the Cleveland economy is that 
the service sector contracted by approximately 2. 6% as opposed to the 
average estimated growth rate of 1.8% for the 1977-79 period. 
The impact of these changes on the Teesside/Cleveland labour market 
is difficult to evaluate without going into some depth and undertaking 
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further primary empirical research. We can however 9 present a 
preliminary analysis based on local· authority records. 
In 1978 the Cleveland County Council Research and Intelligence 
Unit assessed the effects of changes in the economy on employment 
opportunities for inner area residents in Middlesbrough. Given the 
accelerated decline in the economy since this period, some of the 
statistical detailed analyses will understate the true picture. 
Although the study defined the inner area by the geographical 
concentration of the most deprived sections of the population (ie. 
socio-economic status) living near the centre of Middlesbrough, the 
defined labour market area was made on the basis of job search, and 
journey to work - which included most of the South Tees area extending 
to the Redcar Steel Works. 
As regards competition for jobs inner area residents tended to 
reflect Cleveland averages for proportions employed in metal 
manufacture but not in chemicals. As might be expected, male residents 
in the inner area competed poorly for skilled work - a relatively large 
proportion were in occupations relating to labouring, transport, 
storekeepers, packers etc. (Table 26) In terms of female employments, 
as could be expected, a large proportion of women worked in the Inner 
Area itself, with a high propensity of women working in the 'search 
area' to have par-t-time jobs (p 18). The study indicates that, given 
the socio-economic profile of inner area residents and their 
vulnerability as regards competing for jobs, there is a large section of 
the working population in Teesside prone to unemployment or 
under-employment. 
143 
The other dimension to recent changes in the Cleveland economy is 
that the opening up of 1 new industry 1 utilising mainly female employment 
(ie. branch plant 1 light industrial 1 development) has not occurred at 
the same rate as in the rest of the Northern Region (Robinson and 
Storey 7 1979). Between 1965 and 1976 7 15 7 300 new jobs were created in 
Cleveland and approximately 75% of these were attracted from outside. 
Despite these new sources of employment and the creation of new service 
jobs in the urban centres of Teesside 7 female employment opportunities 
have not significantly increased. The main findings of a study by 
Cleveland County Council ( 1979) on female activity rates stressed the 
consistently low activity rates compared with Britain. It was also 
found that there was a substantial 'hidden unemployment 1 ; aproximately 
12% were seeking work but not registered compared with the official 
hidden unemployment rate of 1% (in 1979). This confirms a previous 
analysis of employment/unemployment made by the Northern Region Strategy 
Team whose projections showed that 80 per cent of potential female 
employees in the Northern Region are in Cleveland while the County 
accounts for less than 20 per cent of total females in employment 
(Cleveland County Council 7 1978: p 20). 
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Unemployment trends-1979·~-8~ 
Unemployment rates, as Table 25 shows, have increased dramatically 
since 1979. Furthermore, since 1976 these rates have risen well above 
the Northern Regional average, and have always been consistently above 
the national average. The Teesside Travel to Work Area contained 31,000 
people out of work in October 1981, and the highest unemployment rate of 
any Travel to Work Area in the Northern Region. There are two aspects 
of this increase that are particularly significant: the large proportion 
of school leavers (ie. new entrants to the labour market) who find it 
increasingly difficult to find work, and long term male unemployed who 
have been made redundant in traditional contracting sectors. 
New-entrants 
The number of young people waiting for an offer of a place on the 
Youth Opportunity Programme Schemes indicates the extent of youth 
unemployment. In 1979 there was a waiting list of 930. In 1980 this 
had increased by 74% to 1, 621. In October 1980, the total number of 
young people available for permanent employment was 8,832 - an increase 
of 44% on the total for the same month in 1979 (6,126). In 1982 this 
figure had increased to 9,000. Another aspect of the declining 
employment opportunities for young people is those numbers recruited for 
training apprenticeships. In the first nine months of 1980 only 876 
apprentices had been recruited by employers compared with 1 , 402 during 
the same period in 1979 - a reduction of 38%. (Cleveland County 
Council, 1980) 
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tong term unemployed 
Data broken down by Travel To Work Area on duration of unemployment 
is not readily available 9 but there are indications that male 
unemployment in the older age group (40=60 years) is increasingo It ca~ 
also be argued that jobs lost in steel, shipbuilding 1 chemicals and 
engineering have led to the creation of a pool of unemployable men o 
Many of these industries require job specific skills and the nature of 
technological change militates against adjustments in the labour market 
whereby transfers between occupations can easily be made 1• Evidence to 
suggest that this trend has been taking place in Teesside is produced 
by results of Department of Employment surveys of redundant workers and 
data presented in the County Council's Annual Economic and Demographic 
Review. One year after the closure of the Steel Works in Hartle pool, 
more than 600 of the 1,160 men made redundant were still without work 
and only 380 jobs were found whilst the remainder had either retired, 
moved or failed to register (Guardian 28/12/78). A similar survey found 
that out of the 943 men made redundant by the Haverton Shipyard closure 
in 1979, only 64 managed to find new work. The survey recorded that 
boilermakers were particularly affected. Furthermore in January 1982 
almost 20,000 people had been unemployed more than a year, almost double 
the number in 1981. Over 40% of all unemployed males have been 
unemployed for more than 12 months. (Cleveland County Council, 1982: p 
2) 
1 The study of the North Shields labour market by the North Tyneside (CDP 1978) 
supports this view. 
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8.7 eonclusion 
This chapter, descr).bing recent trends has focussed upon the impact of the 
combination of long term restructuring and state policies upon the Cleveland 
economy. Statistics produced in this study (largely derived from the County 
Council Research and Intelligence Unit) including the detailed assessment of 
ICI's and BSC's operational plans reveal that economic problems will intensify 9 
leaving Cleveland with the prospect of unemployment rates remaining consistent! 
high and above the regional and national averages for a long period. The polic 
implications of this will be discussed in the next and concluding Chapter 
(Chapter 9). 
CHAPTER 9 
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURIWG 9 UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE-FORMULATION OF LOCAL 
ECONOMIC STRATEGIES:-THE LIMITS TO LOCAL-INITIATIVES 
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The drastic deterioration in the local economy has brought about a 
shift in local authority policies (especially those of the County 
Council) towards developing more radical measures of intervention. These 
include the fuller use of existing powers and sources of funding and the 
development of more direct aid to industry through industrial finance 
schemes (eg. making industrial mortgages available). Two particular 
initiatives are new; first is the positive support for the establishment 
of co-operatives (through a Co~operative Development Agency) and the 
second involves the setting up of a Local Enterprise Agency, made up of 
relevant interest groups involved with the local economy. Additional 
innovatory initiatives have been put forward such as the promotion of 
new technology and intervention in the local labour market through 
training schemes and welfare rights schemes for the unemployed. 
(Cleveland County Council, 1982 and Cleveland County Council, 1982a: pl.J) 
This economic development policy adopted by the local Labour Party 
which holds control over the County Council, represents a conscious 
policy of counteracting the effects of industrial rationalisation. 
Although Clevelandvs strategy is not on the same lines as the more 
'radical' approaches adopted by the Greater London Council, West 
Midlands County Council and Sheffield City Council, (see Sheffield City 
Council 1982, for example), nevertheless important questions are raised 
about the responsibilities of local government, accountability of 
industry to local communities (eg. in terms of effects upon the 
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environment and employment policies 9 working conditions etc.) and the 
generally limited scope of action open to local authorities, given the 
scale of the problems. Recent reports indicate a greater awareness of 
the latter point, reflecting a politicisation amongst planners and 
policy makers within local government, and resulting from this an 
increasing awareness and scepticism about the credibility of traditional 
policies. 
It is important to assess this questioning and change in policy 
direction in relation to current State practices and the nature of the 
economic crisis. 
It is also important to note that Teesside' s development is not a 
unique phenomenon. Research on other port complex developments in 
Western Europe (Castells, 1976; Castells and Godard, 1974; Bleitrach and 
Chenu, 1980; Damette, 1980; Arcangeli and Vitiello, 1982 and Arcangeli 
et al, 1982) reveals remarkably similar patterns of development and 
change in port economies. These studies describe how port areas were 
promoted by national States as a central feature of regional planning 
policy in counteracting uneven development and regional inequality. 
This policy has comprised two complementary components: planning of 
infrastructure to facilitate loca tional requirements of 9 capital 
intensive' port related industry and allocation of selective grants to 
these branches (primarily in the form of regional development subsidies) 
having the effect of encouraging their location in port areas as well as 
writing off fixed capital investments. The impact of this policy in 
France is described by Bleitrach and Chenu (1981): 
"The concrete form taken by the setting up of powerful 
industrial poles such as Dunkirk, Le Havre and Fos ... reveals a 
very close complementarity between state interventions and 
those of the major firms involved. Initially the state carried 
out those large scale works which would not bring immediate 
returns (habour installations, railways, motorways, telephone 
systems, electricity and water supply etc.). In the second 
phase, the state made massive loans to the big firms which 
agreed to locate in the infrastructures already established and 
were therefore assured of short term profits. In such a 
process, the principle of freedom of enterprise the 
possibility that firms, because of changes of techniques or 
fluctuations in their markets or their finance, need neither 
use the infrastructures provided by the state nor respond to 
public financial incentives - is respected absolutely. vv 
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The relative advantage of different port locations can become 
crucial - in other words an intensification of competition between firms 
induces port areas to compete against each other to attract major 
multinationals by offering the most favourable terms: 
91 It was reported that what tipped the balance in favour of 
Wilhelmshaven and against Dunkirk as the location of a major KI 
investment in PVC and chlorine capacity was that the German 
politicians at both city and regional level were the most 
helpful ICI had met." (Hudson, 1981a: p 24) 
The fact that large multinationals offering investment and 
employment can play-off one area against another is an important 
constraint upon realising employment and economic growth objectives in 
port locations. 
There is a clear indication that State regional policies have, in 
fact, reproduced uneven development but in different, although arguably, 
more severe forms. This is illustrated by the emergence of v branch 
plant' economies in peripheral regions and the utilizing of 
infrastructures and regional aid by multi-nationals where control and 
ownership lies outside the region (Damette, 1981). Thus economically 
depressed regions (and in particular port zones) have become highly 
sensitive to the strategies of those branches operating on an 
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international scale (Perrons 1 1981). State intervention in the 
development of such complexes has encouraged the mobility of capital and 
associated with this development 1 rationalisations in production and 
plant closures (or re-location) as competitive pressures intensify. 
Thus the State promotion of port complexes is subject to conflicting 
interests and pressures - from working class communi ties 1 trade union 
organisations, property developers and multi-nationals. Policies 
formulated reflect the tensions between these interests in the pursuance 
of social and economic planning strategies. Bleitrach and Chenu (1981) 
argue that the distinction between the two types of strategy arise from 
the ideological aspect of state intervention (in the case of Teesside 
via the poiitics of modernisation). The division disguises the social 
relationship of exploitation in its actual form and the fact that the 
State will act in favour of the interests of in tern a tional capital in 
general in order to counteract inherent tendencies towards a fall in 
rate· of profit, overaccumulation and uneven development. It is this 
central feature of State intervention which raises the question of the 
State's ability to achieve balanced social and economic growth 
objectives. 
relevance: 
In respect of Teesside the following issues are cf 
First, local industrial decline and high unemployment have created 
tensions at the local level expressed in social unrest and increase in 
crime. This matter has been raised by the Chief Constable of Cleveland 
in a recent report ( BBC, Look North, 21/5/82) • Riots in major inner 
city areas indicate that this is a national trend. Tensions have been 
also prevalent within and between state institutions reflected in the 
struggle over establishing local economic strategies and influencing 
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national economic ini tia ti ves. Centrally controlled institutions have 
considered imposing further limitations upon local authority involvement 
with economic development through proposed restrictions in the use of 
the 2p rate in the 1972 Local Government Act 9 and restricting 
intervention to local authorities accorded Inner Urban Area and 
Enterprise Zone status. This threat was ;-Ji thdrawn after considerable 
opposition but nevertheless the fact that it was mooted in the first 
place is of significance 9 as is the establishment of Urban Development 
Corporations and the current financial arrangements regarding the Rate 
Support Grant settlement, which represent a considerable restriction 
upon locally determined and controlled service provision. Secondly, the 
politics of modernisation in establishing Teesside as a port zone and 
subsidising the operations of dominant industries has generated 
contradictory and conflicting outcomes. Policies legitimised in terms 
of retaining jobs have contributed towards their disappearance. Part of 
the process. of state intervention in the restructuring of capital has 
been the internationalisation of production and ability of industry to 
switch location to another area. The development of ICI v s new 
petro=chemical complex at Wilhelmshaven, the recent cut backs at Wilton 
and the closure of Rohm and Haas on Seal Sands illustrate the global 
nature of industrial restructuring and that national, not to mention 
local, state institutions have little or marginal control over choice of 
location. The impact of past policies has reinforced tendencies towards 
increasing mobility (because regional expenditures have written off a 
large proportion of fixed capital outlay) and the use of capital and 
plant transferences as a part of reorganisation plans. The parallel 
development of port zones in Western Europe and third world countries is 
an important integral feature of mobility for those branches which rely 
on large scale production complexes. 
152 
An outcome of t~'le strategies of selective support for dominant 
capitals has been the abandonment or possible abandonment of areas and 
thus accelerating the obsolesence of fixed capital investments and the 
associated 'waste' and unproductive element of public expenditure which 
has to be written off, either directly through subsidies to the local 
authorities or indirectly through income maintenance (and special 
programmes such as inner city initiatives) of the rent and rate paying 
population. Therefore the mass of 'sunk' infrastructure is particularly 
vulnerable to the 'hyper-mobility' of capital, itself a trend brought 
about as international competition has intensified. (See also Ive, 1979) 
The close interlocking relationship between spatial policies and 
dominant industries, as well as the overt spatial dimension of the 
growth zone policies, bas reproduced uneven development - not just 
between officially recognised regions but within regions. Policies have 
supported processes of concentration and centralisation of capital at 
the expense of weaker less competitive sectors, or parts of industries. 
The corollary of this is spatial uneven development and continued 
regional economic and social crisis. Rationalisation in mining, steel 
and engineering instigated through state intervention has led to the 
abandonment of villages and towns in Durham and Northumberland - Consett 
being the most well known recent example. 
Whilst the above represents deep social-economic changes in other 
areas as a direct result of the development of Teesside industries, the 
impact of these developments within the Teesside conurbation has been to 
create increasing conflicts as opposition to pollutant and hazardous 
industries on Seal Sands and near to residential areas has grown in 
recent years. For a period the environmental lobby bas polarised 
~· 
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opinion around those seeking to develop alternative strategies relying 
less upon the 'base industries' and those who followed the jobs at all 
costs lobby. The political as well as economic implications of mobility 
had reached its profundity - the possibilty of re~locating elsewhere and 
massively losing jobs in the local economy always ~as apparent to local 
authorities as well as the local labour movement - yet at the same time 
it became clear that consensus policies had not realised their 
objectives. It is in this context we can understand the formation of new 
economic development initiatives. 
The County Council are therefore currently seeking alternatives to 
policies pursued in the past. However, the new initiatives are bound up 
with the contradictions of state intervention as described above and 
more fully in Chapter 8. It is these contradictions of policy formation 
which are seen as the major problematic in achieving a balanced local 
economic development. It is with this point in mind that we can return 
to some of the major arguments and themes of this study about the nature 
of the state (see Chapter 2). It is appropriate here to highlight the 
inter-related aspects of state intervention which emerge from the study 
of policies in Teesside; the first relates to state action reflecting 
and reproducing conflicts and contradictions endemic in the accumulation 
process, the second to the impossibility of the state undertaking long 
or medium term planning in order adequately to secure the conditions for 
the long term profitable accumulation of capital. The third aspect is 
the ability of the state to mobilise an alliance of interests around 
consensus policies which eventually comes up against conflicts and 
problems generated by the actions of the State. 
( 1) One of the central problems for local authorities in Cleveland in 
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achieving long term planning objectives for creating employment 
opportunities has been its relationship with multi~national companies. 
This is a problem for a national state 1 s economic strategy. Local 
authorities, in their provision of infrastructure for the continued 
profitable development of steel and chemicals 9 have clearly performed 
these functions as part of the central government 1 s national industrial 
strategy. However 9 these policies have been subject to constraints 
imposed by the internationlisation of production and mobility. In this 
respect the arguments provided by Jessop are relevant: 
91 Since multinationals also tend to be the most advanced 
capitals, however, there is also pressure to encourage their 
activities. This is apparent in various forms of subsidies, 
concessions, infrastructural support, etc. to assist 
multinationals in making capital investments and reorganising 
production. This is a complex process with contradictory 
effects. For the short term gains from the domestic investment 
and foreign sales of alien multinationals may be reversed 
through the long term expatriation of profits. Conversely 
foreign investment by a domestic multinational can lead to 
short tero losses from the export of capital (together with 
jobs) and to long term benefits from the repatriation of 
foreign income (in so far as this is not reinvested abroad). 
Similarly problems arise in relation to technological 
dependency and potential positive spill over effects." 
(Jessop, 1980: p 26) 
Therefore the central contradiction between 'capital in general' and 
'particular capitals' finds a major focus here. Analysing the 
development of policies since the 1960s illustrates that the state is 
not simply the tool of capital nor will it, in the short term, act in 
the interests of capital in general. Regional modernisation policies 
which were geared to supporting the growth of multinationals have turned 
towards stimulating the growth of the small firm. This policy, in 
relation to Teesside, has produced interesting results. For example a 
major factor in the restructuring and capacity cuts in the polyester 
plant at Wilton by ICI as discussed above can be explained by the 
abandonment of the Gas Gathering Pipeline project financed by the 
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government. Its cut back means that ICI lacks a direct and secure 
supply of methane (Elrichman, 1982). Regional and urban expenditures, 
although arising as a response to accumulation imperatives (i.e. 
increasing competitiveness of raw material producing industries in the 
region) have not in the long term been able to comply with these 
imperatives (the case of British Steel is appropriate here), and in fact 
generated further problems due to reinforcing dependency upon the 
'narrow range of industries 9 • Although there is evidence , as we have 
shown, that such expenditures stimulated economic activity in the form 
of concentration and centralisation and restructuring, it has not 
compensated for increasing indebtedness and fiscal crisis. 
(2) The above problems of state intervention have contributed to the 
inability of the state to undertake long or medium term rational 
planning. This is worth a special mention given the particularly 
optimistic forecasts and goals and objectives contained in urban 
planning documents. During the 1970s major institutional changes took 
place, including the reorganisation of local government. This 
restructuring within the state in Teesside during the 1960s (and post 
1974) represented a shift towards more sophisticated spatial policies 
and corporate planning. Although such changes can be seen as being in 
the interests of 'dominant capitals' nevertheless there were competing 
interests vying for state support. Pressures from differing vested 
interests were reflected in conflicts within the state between different 
institutions. This illustrates that the state is internally 
heterogeneous rather than being a monolithic bloc. It also illustrates, 
especially in the case of land allocation policies, that tensions within 
the state deepened as problems in the local economy came to the fore 
during the late 1970s. For example the local autho!"ity pursued the 
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interests of smaller capitals and light manufacturing industry whilst 
the Port Authority maximised land available for capital intensive 
industry (i.e. multinationals). This represents a typical case when the 
amount of power required for comprehensive planning of the production 
process is denied to the state by the accumulating units themselves. In 
addition the establishment of participatory models for incorporating 
different interests has only served to heighten tensions because of the 
emerging struggles from sections of the community who had no real or 
effective control over decision making and whose interests were clearly 
not being served. This occurred in its clearest form in the case of 
urban renewal policies, and in the siting of the nuclear reactor at West 
Hartlepool. 
(3) The study of State policies in Teesside supports the view that class 
strategies are not purely demarcated along the lines of capital versus 
labour but relate also to the possibility of an alliance of interests 
representing various sections of the community. On the surface this 
would seem to represent a pluralistic mode of operation by the State. 
In practice, as discussed in the Chapter 4 in some detail, (and briefly 
in Chapter 1) it represents the means by which the State operates in the 
interests of powerful interest groups representing both multinationals 
and property developers. The class alliance, as established in the 
early 1960s, took its origins from political practices in the 1930s. 
Those in ownership of key industries took the opportunity to take 
account of dominated interests by articulating a strategy which appealed 
to social democratic objectives pursued by large sections of the labour 
movement. In this period the alliance was uneasy due to the bitterness 
of many struggles over lock outs and wage cuts. In the 1960s, with the 
development of the 'Post War settlement' between capital and labour via 
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a politically strong Labour Party~ consensus policies were widely 
accepted in most sections of the community in the North East. Thus the 
ability of the power bloc formed in the Region (via various 
institutional bodies of the state such as local authorities~ quangos~ 
etc) to maintain its hegemony was due to its success in articulating 
v popular democratic v struggles and aspirations into an ideology which 
sustained the power of the dominant classes. It is argued here that the 
relative success of the politics of modernisation was reflected in the 
ease with which the development programme as formulated in the White 
Paper on the North East was implemented. 
The above three comments on the way the State has opera ted in the 
context of the development of the Teesside economy form~ in essence, the 
three central arguments of this study. It can be asserted that there is 
sufficient evidence to argue that past policies in promoting economic 
development have failed ~ thus the gap between intentions and outcomes 
of policies. In fact the outcomes of policies have had the opposite 
effect~ and in this respect the conclusions made by the North East Area 
Study are pertinent: 
v'The relative dominance of the politics of modernisation in 
the policies and proposals of the structure plan reflects the 
strength of the interests supporting these policies •• the 
problem is simply that all the structure plans and other 
public agency plans that have been made up until now ( ie. 
1975) have, in their content and ideology, been dominated by 
the politics and ideology of modernisation. There is no local 
authority structure or corporate plan dominated by principles 
of social reform and positive discrimination where the 
politics of modernisation are made to take a minor role." 
(North East Area Study, 1975, p 334) 
This leads on to the question whether the apparent failure of past 
policies has been perceived in such a way as to promote a generalised 
questioning of consensus policies and ideology. The evidence provided 
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in this study is inconclusive although certain critical groups have been 
identified: notably the environmental lobby and sections of the local 
·authority and Labour Party seeking changes in the direction of economic 
policies. Further research is needed to consider the degree to which 
interest groups within the Teesside area perceive the relevance of, and 
need, to change political priorities. There is no doubt that the recent 
(June, 1982) programme of restructuring at ICI 9 s Wilton complex will 
promote a further process of questioning. 
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Table 1: International Comparisons with Performance.of British Manufacturing Industry 
Chang~ in Gross output 1951-69/70 
% change % change Gross % change % change Gross 
Output Productivity investment output productivity investment 
p.a. p.a. ratio p.a. p.a. ratio 
USA 3. E. s UK 3. E. s 
- -
1951-:-56 3.00 1. 88 19.0 1951-55 2.67 1. 95 14.0 
1956-66 3.88 2.57 18.8 1955-60 2.45 2.09 13.2 
1960-65 2.97 2.18 18.9 
1966-69 3.36 1. 08 18.4 1965-69 2.35 2.81 21.2 
FRANCE 3. E. s ITALY 3. E. s 
- -
1951-57 4.37 - 18.7 1951-55 5.07 3.58 18.3 
1957-60 4.06 4.40 21.8 1955-59 5.11 4.56 22.0 
1960-64 5.91 5.27 25.0 1959-63 6.05 4.47 24.3 
1964-69 5.35 4.88 29. 1 1963-70 5.08 5.41 22.8 
WEST GERMANY 3. E. s JAPAN 3. R s 
- -
1951-56 8.24 5.60 23.4 1953-57 7.61 5.38 21.7 
1956-61 6.20 4.80 26.6 1957-61 10.47 9.20 26.7 
1961-65 4.84 4.32 30. 1 1961-64 9.64 8.50 34.5 
1965-70 4.50 4.46 29. 1 1964-69 10.23 8.64 36.5 
Scurce: T F Cripps & J R Tarling, Growth in Advanced Capitalist Economics 1950~1970 
CUP 1973 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-~~--
Table 2: Aspects of the Development of the Manufacturing Sector and of Chemicals and Rubber 
Output 
All manufacturing 5.7 
Chemicals and rubber 9.3 
Production in Industrial Western Europe, 1958-60 to 1976-9 
Employment 
0.7 
1.8 
Annual % cumulative change in: 
Labour 
productivity 
4.9 
7.4 
Unit Labour 
costs 
3.3 
0.8 
P . 1 r1.ces 
2.0 
-0.4 
1rlage bill as a 
% of value added 
1958/60 1967/9 
63.4 70.6 
50.6 56.3 
Note 1: -implied prices, defined as the growth of output at current prices divided by growth at 1963 prices. 
Source: Hudson, 1981 
Table 3 National Labour Market Trends 1961-76 
Changes in Employment for Men and Women: 1961-76 
(thousands) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---~--~--~--~-------~~-~-~-~~~~ 
Total 
employed 
Changes 1961-66 Changes 1966-71 Changes 1971-76 
Industrial 
groupings 1961 Males Females Total Males Females Total r'lales Females Tota 
Manufacturing 
Of which: 
Textiles 
Shipbuilding 
Metal manufacture 
Clothing and Footware 
Food, drink and tobacco 
Mechanical engineeringn 
Services 
Of which: 
Transport and communication 
Distribution 
Public administrationn 
Mining and quarrying 
Construction 
Gas, electricity and water 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
TOTAL+ 
8,340 
789 
236 
624 
605 
744 
N.A. 
1,662 
3,159 
N.A. 
720 
1 '592 
374 
827 
23,245 
+88 
-9 
-55 
-31 
-10 
+19 
+37 
+58 
-73 
-59 
-63 
-151 
+279 
+30 
-79 
+217 
+106 
-50 
0 
+3 
-13 
+27 
+17 
+989 
+40 
+187 
+76 
-1 
+34 
+12 
+24 
+ 1 '164 
+194 
-59 
-55 
-28 
-23 
+46 
+54 
+1,047 
-33 
+128 
+13 
-152 
+313 
+42 
-55 
+1,381 
-180 
-41 
-14 
-53 
-16 
-35 
+8 
-44 
-64 
-123 
+47 
-175 
-214 
-66 
-133 
-782 
-271 
-108 
-o-2 
-8 
-45 
-23 
-13 
+186 
0 
-120 
+ 115 
-4 
-3 
+9 
-3 
-2 
-451 
-149 
-12 
-61 
-61 
-58 
-5 
+142 
-65 
-244 
+162 
-179 
-217 
-57 
-136 
-784 
-512 
-47 
-10 
-76 
-20 
-33 
-98 
-:-268 
-89 
+31 
+17 
-48 
+27 
-33 
-34 
-327 
-275 
-54 
+1 
-11 
-46 
-21 
-22 
-:-977 
-2 
+83 
+89 
0 
+20 
+7 
-5 
+727 
-78 
-10 
~8 
-6 
-5 
=12 
-:-1? 2i.i 
-9 
-:-11 
-:-10 
-4 
+4 
~2 
=3 
-:-40 
Source: The figures in the last 7 columns are derived from the Census of Population by the Unit of Manpower Studies. They have bee 
adjusted for changes in the Standard Industrial Classification. The figures for 1971 were derived by applying the industria 
distributions applied by a 1% sample Census of Population returns to the 100% in employment figure of the Census of Population. Th 
figures for 1971-75 were derived from the Census of Employment and are not strictly comparable. 
Notes 0The figures for mechanical engineering and public administration were not available due to changes in the SIC. 
+The totals at the foot of the columns include inadequately described and not elsewhere specified. That is why they 
do not equate to the sum of sub-totals above which do not include these figures. 
Table 5: Classification of Openings of Establish8ents by Ty~e and Origin_ in Cleveland 
TYPE/ORIGIN 
1. Exogenous 
a) Re-location of an entire company to 
Cleveland 
b) New branch plant of a company which was 
not already operating a plant in Cleveland 
c) New subsidiary company setting up its first 
plant in Cleveland; parent company not 
operating in Cleveland ---
d) Independent company setting up first plant in 
Cleveland, established by an entrepeneur who 
has moved into the County from elsewhere 
(Sub Total) 
2. Indigenous 
a) Independent company setting up its first plant 
No. of 
Establishments 
12 
70 
6 
5 
(93) 
in Cleveland 125 
b) New subsidiary company setting up its first 
plant in Cleveland; parent company operating 
in Cleveland 21 
c) New branch plant of a company already operating 
in Cleveland 42 
(Sub Total) (188) 
3. Not classified 22 
TOTAL 303 
Source: Cleveland Establishment Data File (Robinson & Storey). 
Employment 
1976 
420 
8129 
2767 
76 
(11,392) 
1825 
691 
1209 
(3,725) 
205 
15,322 
Note: 'Openings' component here excludes transfers into manufacturing. 
Table 6: Changes in Employment, 1966 to 1975 ( 1000s) 
Cleveland 
Employment 
1966 1975 % 
Agriculture/Extract 3.7 2.4 1 -
Food and Drink 4.2 7.7 3 + 
Chemicals and Allied 35. 1 28.0 11 -
Metal Manufacturing 33.9 28.2 11 -
Heavy Engineering/Shipbuilding 18.9 18.2 7 -
Electrical and Light Engineering 10.6 10.6 4 
Clothing and Textiles 7.0 6.8 3 -
Other Manufacturing 7.3 7.0 3 -
Change 
1966 to 
1975 
1.3 
3.5 
7. 1 
5.7 
0.7 
-
0.2 
0.3 
Northern Region 
Employment 
1966 1975 % 
130 67 5 
31 33 3 
60 53 4 
62 49 4 
118 114 9 
76 82 6 
54 57 5 
60 66 5 
Change 
1966 to 
1975 
-
+ 
-
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
63 
2 
7 
13 
4 
6 
3 
6 
Great Britain 
Emplcyment 
1966 1975 % 
1131 738 3 
771 701 3 
493 467 2 
627 501 2 
1281 1123 5 
2441 2212 10 
1190 877 4 
1605 1453 7 
Change 
1966 to 
1975 
-
~ 
-------------------------------------------~-~---~-----~------------------------------------------·--
Sub...;.t'otal Manufacturing Industry 117.0 106.5 - 10.5 461 454 - 7 8408 7334 - 1C 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------~----------------------~--
Construction 25.2 23.3 9 - 1.9 105 96 8 - 9 1604 1274 6 
Transport, Communication etc. 15.7 7.0 7 + 1.3 108 88 7 - 20 2022 1838 8 
Distributive 24. 1 26.3 10 + 2.2 152 144 11 - 8 2857 2710 12 
Professional Services 24.9 41.3 17 + 16.4 153 210 17 + 57 3343 4553 21 -~ ,~ 
Public Admin. and Miscellaneous 
Services 22.6 34.8 14 + 12.2 168 207 16 + 39 3422 3766 17 + 
---------------------·-------------------------------------------~------~-~-~-~-~----------------~-~ 
Total 233.2 251.6 100 + 18.4 1277 1266 100 - 11 22787 22213 100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--~-~--~--~~~~~-~--~-~~·~ 
Notes: (1) Selection of the two years, 1966 and 1975 which occur at different stages of the business cycle exaggerates job lossas t 
some extent. 1976 figures would exaggerate the. losses even further. 
Sourc.e: 
(2) Cleveland figures include all employees in employment in the Stokesley and Loftus employment excharoge areas, soma of Hho 
work outside the Cleveland County Council boundary. 
(3) Due to differences in the methods of data collection, 1966 public administration figures for Cleveland exclude civil 
. servants. 
Cleveland County R&I Unit, CR 178B, op.cit 
Table 7: Large Payments of Regional Development Grant: Great 
Britain, Northern Region and Cleveland, 1975176 to 
197 /79. 
YEAR AREA RDG PAYMENTS % of % of 
(EM) G.B. North 
1975/76 G.B. 197.38 
NORTH 70.03 35.05 
CLEVELAND 49.01 24.08 69.98 
1976/77 G.B. 276.55 
NORTH 117.29 42.40 
CLEVELAND 81. 18 29.35 69.21 
1977178 G.B. 255.16 
NORTH 100.80 39.50 
CLEVELAND 63.78 24.99 63.79 
1978179 G.B. 417.06 
NORTH 135.24 32.40 
CLEVELAND 67.58 16.20 49.97 
Source: Trade and Industry (Dept of Industry). 
Table 8: The GratoJth of_ ~Employ~at Fil ton, 1946-57 
(as at 31 December) 
Chemicals production Construction 2 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Male 
36 
353 
940 
1 '641 
1 '821 
2' 159 
2,218 
3' 161 
4,631 
5,457 
Female 
34 
59 
82 
98 
108 
114 
159 
195 
224 
274 
1 Total 
121 
467 
1 '074 
1 '826 
2,023 
2,394 
2,544 
3,582 
5' 166 
Total 
831 
996 
1 t 267 
1 '777 
2,700 
1 '853 
1 '818 
2,794 
2,283 
3,069 
4,667 
2,795 
Notes: 1 - the difference between the total and (male plus female) is 
juveniles, aged 18 and under 
2 - includes both ICI and private contractors 
Source: Hudson, 1981 
Table 9: Major Investment Projects in the Chemicals Industry in Teesside, 1975 
Company and Location 
Current 
ICI-BP, Wilton 
ICI Agricultural Division, 
Billingham 
ICI Fibres Division 
Wilton 
ICI Organics, Petrochemicals 
and Plastics, Wilton 
Monsanto, Seal Sands 
Monsanto/Montefibre (UK) 
Seal Sands 
Phillips Petroleum, 
Seal Sands 
Long term 
ICI Agricultural Division, 
Billingham 
Phillips - Imperial Petroleum, 
Seal Sands 
Project 
Ethylene cracker & 
downstream plant 
Acids, alcohols and 
glucose plants 
Terylene 
Various smaller 
extensions 
Expansion of capacity 
Plant for production 
of nylon intermediates 
Oil processing & storage 
(but not refining) 
Protein plant 
Refinery expansions 
Sources: Chemical Age and European Chemical News 
Cited in Hudson 1981 
Cost Completion date 
£in."" 
135 1977 
30 1975-6 
12 1977 
1967-7 
1977 
120 1976 
40 
1980-5 
Table 10: Chemical Employment on Teesside 1971-77 
Employment 1971 1972 1973 
Exchange Area M F T M F T M F T 
Billingham 15,395 1 '914 17' 309 13,456 1,652 15' 108 11,693 1 '~l46 13' 139 
Eston (South 13,023 8C2 13,825 11,822 731 12,553 11,464 719 12,183 
Bank) 
Guisborough 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hartle pool 630 76 706 613 71 634 629 63 697 
(inc. Headland) 
Loftus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Middlesbrough 180 32 212 179 17 196 209 16 225 
(inc. Stokesley) 
Red car 10 .2 12 9 1 10 11 2 13 
Saltburn 27 2 29 110 5 115 153 7 160 
(Stockton and Thornaby included in Billingham) 1 '272 146 1 '418 
TOTAL 29,265 2,828 32,093 26' 189 2,482 28,671 25,431 2,404 27.835 
Employment 1974 1975 1976 19 7 7 
Exchange Area M F T M F T M F T M F T 
Billingham 11 7 799 1 '830 13,179 11,026 1' 196 127222 107835 17147 11,982 107 S79 1 7 158 12' 
Eston (South) 8,831 725 9,556 97883 1 '030 10,913 107011 17011 117012 99896 17005 10' 
3uisborough 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 10 25 15 10 
jartlepool 655 71 726 709 66 775 692 106 798 660 82 
(inc. Headland) 
l..oftus 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 6 2 
"liddlesbrough 246 22 268 190 22 212 239 30 269 222 26 
(inc. Stokesley) 
Redcar 10 2 19 19 3 22 20 6 24 13 3 
Saltburn and 769 122 891 787 150 937 807 165 972 831 194 'I . ? 
fhornaby included 
in Billingham 
rotal 22,558 27333 24,891 22,759 2,478 25,237 22,625 2,519 25,273 22,625 27749 257 
~ate: 1 Chemicals 1 is here defined as SIC Order Group V: unfortunately disaggregation to MLH's fails to distir.guish between heavy 
ingorganic and organics, an important distinction on Teesside. Both are included under MLH 271. 
Source: Department of Employment (unpublished) Cited in Hudson 1981 
Table 11: Regional Development Grants (£,000 9 s) Received by Selected Chemical Compan 
in Teessioe, 1974-8 
Company Location 
British Chrome and Chemicals Stockton 
Co. Ltd. 
B. P. Trading Ltd. Middlebrough 
British Titan Products Ltd. Hartlepool 
Great ham 
Cleveland Potash Co. Ltd. Salt burn 
W. R. Grace Ltd. Seal Sands 
ICI (Fibres) Ltd Middlebrough 
1974 1 
130 
460 
ICI Ltd. Billington 1,106 
Middlebrough 802 
Port Clarence 64 
t'lli lton 
ICI Ltd. (Petrochemicals) Wilton 
Monsanto Ltd. Seal Sands 
Norpipe Petroleum (UK) Ltd. Seal Sands 
Norsea Pipeline Ltd. Seal Sands 
Polyamide Intermediates Ltd. Middlebrough 
Rohm and Haas Ltd. Seal Sands 
Shell (UK) Ltd. Middlebrough 139 
Notes: 1 - fourth quarter data only 
1975 
70 
2,749 
73 
68 
106 
1976 
206 
2,510 
71 
94 
5,315, 4,747 
6,172 9,991 
38 
819 
1 '218 6,973 
3,4?.7 2,005 
3,316 8,387 
309 2,960 
326 34 
1 '551 1' 104 
Source: Department of Industry Cited in Hudson (1981) 
1977 
310 
2,58 
539 
388 
392 
2,245 
7,017 
403 
7' 128 
4~072 
8,334 
2,081 
99 
554 
1976 
247 
3,346 
1 '462 
3,286 
1 '062 
209 
95 
9,219 
15,064 
174 
571 
1,307 
9,812 
1 j 888 
7,269 
3,388 
154 
.:.T.::.a.::.b=.l.::.e~12~: _....:R~e:.c:g~icmal Development G!'ant Payments hy Tndi vid.ua~- Stc:::l 
Plant 
1975176 RDG Investm~mt Total Investment 
Lac ken by 2,105,000 10,125,000 
Middlesbrough 
· Redcar 11,926,000 59,630,000 
Hartle pool 668, 000 
1976/77 
Middlesbrough 9,742,000 48,710,000 
Lac ken by 
Cleveland 
Redcar 18,949,000 94,745,000 
1977178 
Middlesbrough 6' 114' 000 30,570,000 
Lackenby 
Cleveland 
Redcar 12,320,000 61,600,000 
Stockton 27,000 
1978179 
Middlesbrough 5,844,000 29,220 000 
Redcar 9,305,000 46,525,000 
Source: Cleveland County Council, 1982 
Table 13: BSC Closures in the UK 1977-1979 
Work Closures Lost job Redundancies 
Opportunities 
1977 
April 
May 
May 
June 
June 
June 
September 
September 
October 
October 
October 
December 
1978 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
August 
October 
November 
December 
1979 
January 
May 
July 
August 
Grimesthorpe foundry 
Mossend construction works 
Cleveland burden handling works 
Britannia constuction works 
Teesside engineering works 
Hartlcpool sinter and ore plants 
Cleveland coke ovens 
Ebbw Vale hot strip mill 
Clyde iron works 
Clydebridge open hearth furnaces 
Stockbridge rod and bar mill 
Hartlepool iron andf steelmaking 
and primary rolling 
Llanwern spiral weld pipe mill 
Clyde iron coke works 
Llandore ingot mould plant 
Dalzell open hearth plant 
East Moors works 
Shelton works 
Ebbw Vale open hearth 
steelmaking and rolling 
Treorchy construction works 
Glenarnock works 
Clydesdale forge 
Irlam rod mill 
Bilston works 
River Don works (manning cuts) 
Orb works (cuts) 
Plus 84 other closures each with less than 200 
job losses 
TOTAL 
Source: Financial Times 23.8.79 
300 
230 
570 
270 
320 
240 
490 
650 
450 
350 
230 
1 '670 
220 
320 
210 
250 
3,250 
1,330 
2,250 
300 
720 
210 
410 
11900 
400 
200 
60 
200 
40 
150 
210 
140 
50 
450 
430 
320 
40 
1 '31 0 
130 
310 
200 
210 
2,820 
1,330 
1 '520 
290 
680 
70 
410 
1,300 
350 
200 
Table 14: Employment Changes by Plant in ESC (in Cleveland) 
Plant Employment 
1965 1971 1976 1977 
ESC South Teesside 9296 2937 9944 9831 
(South Bank) 
South Bank 5110 3919 5191 4815 
Cargo Fleet 4417 1875 1063 960 
Ayrton Street 569 302 
Skinningrove 2487 2366 1140 1070 
Total Employment: 21879 17699 17311 16676 
Source: Cleveland Establishment Data Bank 
Table 15: Reclamation of Derelict Land in Cleveland 1974-78 
Derelict Land reclaimed 
District Land 1974/5 1974/5 1975/6 1976/7 1977/8 TOTAL 
---
Hartle pool 73 1(0) 1(0) 5(2) 3(0) 
Stockton 336 2(0) 17 (0) 38(32) 0(0) 
Langbaurch 515 6(0) 58(0) 31( 30) 123(79) 
Middlebrough 86 0(0) 0 ('O) 53(0) 0(0) 
Cleveland 1010 9(0) 76(0) 127(64) 126(79) 
Source: Derelict land returns to D.O.E., Cleveland, 1974-78 
Note: ()refers to land reclaimed by agencies other than the local 
authorities 
10(2) 
57(32) 
218(109) 
53(0) 
338(14.3) 
Table 16: Grant Aid to Local Authorities in Cleveland From the EEC 
Regional Development Fund (1980) 
A. Project receiving Regional Development Fu~d Aid 
Project 
Northern Route Phases 1A and 1B - construction 
Graythorp Bridge - construction 
Seal Sands Emergency Access Road - construction 
Mandale Triangle and Bon Lea Industrial Site 
Thornaby - infrastructure for future industrial 
development 
Bolckow Road Industrial Estate, Grangetown, 
Phrase 1 and 2 - infrastructure for future 
Responsible Authority 
Cleveland C.C. 
Cleveland C.C. 
Cleveland C.C. 
Stockton-on-Tees B.C. 
industrial development Langbaurgh B.C. 
Nelson Street Industrial Estate, South Bank, 
Phrase 1 and 2 - infrastructure for future 
industrial development Langbaurgh B.C. 
Cannon Park Industrial Estate, Middlebrough -
infrastructure for future industrial development Middlebrough B.C. 
James Street Industrial Estate, Middlebrough -
infrastructure 
Letitia Street Industrial Estate, Middlebrough -
jnfr<J~tructure 
Riverside Park Industrial Estate, Middlebrough, 
Stage 1 - infrastructure 
Preston Farm Industrial Estate, Eaglescliffe -
infrastructure 
Wolviston Back Lane - construction 
TOTAL COST OF CATEGORY A PROJECT 
Middlebrough B.C. 
Middlesbrough B.C. 
Middlebrough B.C. 
Stockton-on-Tees B.C. 
Cleveland C.C. 
B. Projects awaiting decision in Brussels 
Provision of basic infrastructure for future 
industrial development: 
Belle Vue Way, Hartlepool 
Powlett Road, Hartlepool 
Bolckow Road Industrial Estate, 
Grangeton Phase 3 
Newport South Industrial Estate, 
Middlebrough 
Provision of roads and sewers at local 
services site, Coulby Newham 
Riverside Park Industrial Estate, Stages 2 
and 3 - infrastructure 
TOTAL COST OF CATEGORY B PROJECTS 
Responsible Authority 
Hartlepool B.C. 
Hartlepool B.C. 
Langbaurgh B.C. 
Middlebrough B.C. 
Middlebrough B.C. 
Middlebrough B.C. 
C. Project recently submitted 
Creatham Creek Bridge 
Hart By-Pass - construction 
A178 Improvement, Hartlepool - construction 
Northern Route phase 1B stage 3 - completion 
of interchange 
Portrack Lane Phases 1 and 2 - improvement 
Haverton Hill/Seal Sands Link - construction 
A179 Hart Lane - improvement 
A1049 East of Hart- improvement 
Carlin How By-Pass - construction 
Guisborough By-Pass - construction 
Provision of basic infrastructure for future 
industrial development in Hartlepool: 
Graythorp 
Longhill 
Greenland Road 'IPJest 
TOTAL COST OF CATEGORY C PROJECTS 
TOTAL COST OF PROJECTS 
Source: Cleveland County Council (1980) 
Responsible tuthority 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c. c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c. c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Cleveland c.c. 
Hartlepool B.C. 
Hartlepool B.C. 
Hartlepool B.C. 
Table 17: Employment Growth on Industrial Estates 1972-77 
Industrial estates in the Borough of Hartlepool are excluded from the 
analysis m-Jing to the fact that they t-rere not included in the 1972 
survey. 
Skipper 9 s Lane Industrial Estate 
Portrack Lane Industrial Estate 
Cowpen Lane Industrial Estate 
Eaglescliffe Industrial Estate 
Bowesfield Industrial Estate 
East Middlesborough Industrial Estate 
Old Airfield, Thornaby 
Longbeck Trading Estate, Marsken 
Skelton Industrial Estate 
Trunk Road Trading Estate, Dormanstown 
Bon Lea Trading Estate, Thornby 
Teeside Industrial Estate, Thornby 
Ross Road, Portrack 
North Tees and Gunsi te 
Portrack Grange 
Leeholme Road, Billingham 
1972 
1 '364 
723 
1 '694 
503 
204 
4,460 
1 '377 
485 
536 
599 
86 
979 
775 
579 
530 
999 
15,893 
1977 
-· ~-
2,260 
4,202 
1,482 
896 
4,863 
1,853 
716 
642 
624 
422 
1 '017 
965 
856 
425 
694 
23,353 
net grm..rth 
896 
713 
2,508 
979 
692 
403 
476 
231 
106 
25 
336 
38 
190 
277 
-105 
-305 
7,460 
The 1977 survey includes firms which existed in 1972 but were not 
surveyed. 
Source: CCC 'Industrial Survey' 1977 
Table 18: Employment Change in Industrial Estates in Cleveland 
EElploymen t 1965 Employment 1971 Employrrer: t 1971 
Industrial 
Estate, Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total 
Teesside 72 143 215 653 313 966 863 166 1176 
Trading Estate 905 2563 3468 1238 2816 4054 1198 1436 2634 
Hartle pool 
North Tees 132 450 582 126 286 412 86 220 306 
Eaglescliffe 115 56 171 195 364 559 
Long beck 
(Marske) 87 147 234 88 27 115 116 46 162 
Skelton 54 245 299 157 336 493 269 543 808 
Portrack Lane 29 33 62 31 35 66 48 66 114 
(Stockton) 
Hartle pool 
I.E. 127 338 465 159 266 425 183 387 570 
Skippers Lane 190 33 223 261 44 305 
Bowersdale 74 7 81 61 6 67 44 4 48 
(Stockton) 
East 
Middlesbrough 104 618 722 34 660 694 12 416 428 
Skerne Road 48 79 46 
1584 4492 6176 2852 4913 7765 3275 3881 7156 
Source: Cleveland Establishment Data Bank 
Table 19 
Employment Forecasts for Cleveland~ 1980 
SECTOR/YEAR 1981 1983 1986 1991 1996 
PRIMARY 1 '700 1 '700 1 '700 1 '700 1 '700 
---~-~-~----------------------------------~--~-~-----~------------~------~---
Chemicals & Oil 23,600 22' 100 21,450 20,550 19,500 
Metal Manufacturing 16,950 15,700 15,200 15,200 15,200 
Mechanical Engineering 
and Shipbuilding 10,450 9,450 8,100 7,000 6,900 
Other Manufacturing 25,450 24,450 25,200 26,500 27,800 
ALL MANUFACTURING 76,450 71 '700 69,950 69,400 
CONSTRUCTION 16,350 14,750 15,750 16,250 16,250 
--------~------------------------------------------------------------~~------
Public Utilities, Transport 
and Communications 14,300 13' 600 14' 150 14' 150 14,150 
Distributive Trades 25,700 26,550 26,850 27,350 27,800 
Financial and Professional 
(Business) Services 9,850 8,850 9,600 10,900 11,450 
Other Professional Services 
(Education and Health) 27,900 26,400 26,200 26,400 28,100 
Miscellaneous Services 21 '750 20,500 22,400 23,550 24~700 
Public Administration 12,700 12,300 12,300 12~300 12,300 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL SERVICES 112' 200 108,200 111,500 114' 650 118,500 
ALL EMPLOYERS 206,700 196,350 198,900 201,850 205,850 
------~----------------------------------------------------------------------Source Cleveland County Council, Annual Monitoring Report, 1980 
Table 20: 1965 Forecast of Employment in Teesside, 1991 (OOO's) 
Teessplan Ind. Group Nos Empolyed Change % of Total 
1965 1991 1965 1991 
1 Chemicals 33.1 36.6 + 3.5 16.6 11.4 
2 Metals 30.6 22.0 
- 8.6 15.3 6.8 
3 Engineering & Shipbuilding 15.7 14.9 - 0.8 7.9 4.7 
4 Other Manufact. 17.3 74.2 +56.9 8.7 23.2 
5 Retailing 21.6 41.0 +19.4 10.8 12.8 
6 Central Service 20.9 40.4 +19.5 10.5 12.6 
7 Non Personnel Service 37.4 53.8 +16.4 18.7 16.8 
8 Health & Education 16.8 31.6 +14.8 8.4 9.8 
9 Agrilculture & Expenditure 4.2 2.0 - 2.2 2. 1 0.6 
Total (Rounded) 2000.0 321. 1 +121.1 
Source: Teesside Survey and Plan, Vol. 2, p 71, (1969) 
Table 20a: Changes in employment in Teesside, 1965-91: Service Employment 
(OOO's) 
Teesplan Industrial Group 
5 Retailing 
61 Finance 
62 Public Admin 
63 Low Accountary 
64 Recreation Catering 
65 Miscellaneous Service 
72 Utilities 
73 Railways 
74 Road Transport 
76 Sea Transport 
77 Wholesale Distribution 
78 Laundries 
81 Education 
82 Medical Service 
82 Domestic Service 
Insured Employees 
1965 
16.2 
2.3 
6.4 
1.3 
6.8 
1.8 
3.3 
2.5 
4.4 
2.4 
3.8 
3.3 
9.2 
6.9 
0.8 
99. 1 
Forecast 
41.0 
4.5 
11.8 
5.3 
13.4 
3.5 
4.4 
2.2 
7.5 
1.9 
5.8 
6.4 
17.9 
12.0 
0.8 
163.8 
Range 
1991 
35.7- 41.8 
4.0- 5.1 
11.6- 11.9 
4.2 - 6.3 
11.7- 13.6 
3.1- 3.8 
4.1- 4.7 
2.0 - 2.5 
7.4 - 7.6 
1.7 - 2.0 
5.0 - 6.4 
5.6 - 6.2 
17.9- 17.9 
11.7- 12.3 
0.8 - 0.8 
Source: Teesside Survey and Plan Vol 2: Analysis Part 1 Chapter 6, p 69 (1969) 
Table 21: Employment Forecasts for Cleveland, 1980 
SECTOR/YEAR 1981 1983 1986 1991 1996 
PRIMARY 1 '700 19 700 1,700 1 '700 1,700 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemicals & Oil 23,600 22' 100 21,450 20,550 19,500 
Metal Manufacturing 16,950 15,700 15,200 15,200 15,200 
Mechanical Engineering 
and Shipbuilding 10,450 9,450 8' 100 7,000 6,900 
Other Manufacturing 25,450 24,450 25,200 26,500 27,800 
ALL MANUFACTURING 76,450 71 '700 69,950 69,250 69,400 
CONSTRUCTION 16,350 14,750 15,750 16,250 16,250 
Public Utilities, Transport 
and Communications 14,300 13,600 14,150 14,150 14' 150 
Distributive Trades 25,700 26,550 26,850 27,350 27,800 
Financial and Professional 
(Business) Services 9,850 8,850 9,600 10,900 11,450 
Other Professional Services 
(Education and Health) 27,900 26,400 26,200 26,400 28' 100 
Miscellaneous Services 21 '750 20,500 22,400 23,550 24,700 
Public Administration 12,700 12,300 12,300 12,300 12,300 
------------~---------------------------------------------------~------------
ALL SERVICES 112,200 108,200 111 '500 114' 650 118,.500 
ALL EMPLOYERS 206,700 196' 350 198,900 201 '850 205,850 
Source Cleveland County Council, Annual Monitoring Report, 1980 
Table 22: Employment Change 1961-1977 
Middlesbrough Employment Exchange Area 
SIC 
ORDER 1961 1966 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
--
XX Construction 5,332 5,996 6,324 8,407 9,358 7,837 7,996 8,663 8,301 
XXI Gas, Electricity 
and Water 959 1' 141 1,163 930 860 455 376 L~55 374 
XXII Transport and 
Communications 5,920 5,243 6,551 6,396 6,577 5,446 6,313 5,449 5,435 
XXIII Distributive 
Trades 11 '359 10,354 9,796 9,302 9,647 9,631 9,563 9' !131 9 ,24!1 
XXIV Insurance, 
Banking, 
Finance and 
Business 
Services 955 1 '260 1 '917 2,019 2,236 2,389 2,355 2,347 2,600 
XXV Professional 
and Scientific 7,099 9,158 17' 497 18,649 20,055 N/A 22,720 15,816 13,017 
XXVI Miscellaneous 5,476 6,089 6,874 7,568 7,995 5,815 7,550 8,369 9,002 
XXVII Public Admin 
and Defence. 2,515 2,821 3,895 5,077 5,503 N/A 6,404 5,503 5,409 
Source: Cleveland County Council, Annual Monitoring Report, 1980. 
Table 23: RDG Received and Net Jobs Lost in ICI and BSC, 
Cleveland, 31.3.76 to 31.3.79 
2 ~ 4 
Employ- Employ- 1-2 RDG 
ment ment received 
31.3.76 31.3.79 31.3.76-
(a) (a) 31.3. 79 
in Cleveland in Cleveland (b) 
ICI 16530 15341 2070 55,943,000 
BSC 29487 18500 3883 65,043,000 
Sources: (a) Figures from the companies concerned. 
(b) Trade and Industry, Dept of Industry. 
5 
Jobs Lost 
per £100,000 
of RDG paid 
37.00 
59.69 
Table ·: 2 3 a : 
£17m 
BRITISH CAROME 
. ~ 
PHILLIPS N. TEES (REFINERY 
~~~~~~~&<~~~~~~~~~~~~~P=TTIOCHEMS) £3f0m 
I~Y¥~~~~~~~~?~nr~~3~ BENZENE 
~~~~&&&:(1~~~~~~&d~~;!JxEFINERY £20m 
ICI PROPOSED NITRATE LIQUOR PLANT £2m 
~ ~ 
0 
~500m (PHASf 1 and 2) 
MILLS HARTLEPOOL £18m 
~ ~ 
LACKENBY £100m 
~ 
NITRATE ACID PLANT £8m 
~ ~ 
ICI COMENE PLANT £10m 
NITRAM PLANT £10m 
~ 
PROTEIN PLANT £10m 
ETHYLENE 
~~~h&~~~b&~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CRACKER £150m 
0 0 
ICI/BP BUTADIENNE 
~~~&d~~~db~~~~~~~~~~~~ ELANT £11m 
TABLE 24 EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE AND UNE~PLO~M~NT TRENDS IN CLEVELAND 
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Table 25: Employment Change in Cleveland 
sz::::ToR 1977 (2) 1979 (3) 1980 (4) 
PRIMARY 2,295 2,400 2,350 
Chemicals & Oil 26,832 26,000 24,950 
Metal Manufacturing 27,022 22,500 19 7 4.00 
Mechanical Engineering 
and Shipbuilding 15,724 12,600 11,600 
Other Manufacturing (1) 29,418 27,500 26,800 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL MANUFACTURING 98,996 88,600 82,750 
CONSTRUCTION 25,317 17,200 
Public Utilities,Transport 
and Communications 15,710 15,250 14,950 
Distributive Trades 25,358 25,800 25,700 
Financial & Professional 
(Business) Services 9,224 10,300 10,350 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
(Health and Education) 28; 166 30,700 28,700 
Miscellaneous Services 23,399 23,800 23,400 
Public Administration 13,346 13,500 13' 100 
- ALL SERVICES 155,183 119,350 116,200 
ALL EMPLOYEES 241,791 230,350 218,500 
Notes: 1. Excludes HLH 4l i (Man made fibres) which is included in 
'Chemicals & Oil' 
2. Annual Census of Employment: 1977,- Department of 
Employment 
3. Cleveland County Counci 1 Estimates : November 1979 
(revised) 
4. Cleveland County Council Estimates : November 1980 
Source: Cleveland County Council, Annual Monitoring 
Report, 1980 
Table 26: Occupations of Different Groups of Cleveland Male Workers 
Gas, coke, chemicals, glass 
and ceramics 
Furnace, forge, foundry, 
rolling mill,electrical & 
allied 
Textiles, clothing, food, drink, 
paper, plastics, rubber, 
etc. 
Woodworkers, printers, 
decorators, construction 
workers 
Labourers, transport, 
comm'n, warehousemen, 
storekeepers, packers 
Clerical workers 
Sales workers 
Service, sport and 
recreation 
Administrators, managers, 
professional, technical, etc. 
Other 
All Cleveland 
Male Residents 
5.3 
30. 1 
2.4 
11.5 
17.7 
5.6 
4.4 
4.4 
17.5 
1.1 
100 
Source: Cleveland Household Survey, 1978 
. ···~:.. '-. '":-
~ In;.'ler Area 1 
Male Residents 
who Hork in the 
'Search Area' 
4.6 
30. 1 
2.3 
13.3 
31.2 
4.6 
2.9 
3.5 
7.5 
100 
All Clevelanc 
Male Resideni 
t·Jorking in tl 
'Search Area 1 
8.6 
33.2 
1 • 1 
10.5 
17.3 
5.7 
2.5 
3.9 
16.9 
0.3 
100 
